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The system of transliteration adopted here is that re­
commended hy the Royal Asiatic Society (JRAS, 1928, part I.)
The hamzah is marked "by an * , and the Layn is marked by an  ̂ .
Some words now common in the English language, though 
incorrectly transliterated/have beeh left in their usual form; 
e.g. Mecca and Medina.
The nominative form of the word "Abu*1 is adhered 
to throughout; e.g. LAli b. Abu Talib, and MuLawiyah b.
Abu Sufyan.
The plural of many Arabic words is formed by adding the 
letter ws” to the original singular; e.g. Muhajlrs, hadiths, 
and imams.
The Qur'anic references are quoted, from the versions 
current in Muslim States. Thes'e occasionally differ from 
the European texts of the same book (Plugel’d edition in 
particular,).
In the gadith the number of the kitab is given first, 
followed by the number of the bab. If KrehlTs edition is used, 
the figure between brackets should be of help as it identifies 
the volume and page in which the particular badith may be found. 
Thus Bukh. 63:9 (iii:8), means kitab 63, bab 9 of any edition
of Bukhari; in Krehl’s edition this tradition is found in 
volume iii, page 8.
The notes appropriate to each chapter are given at its 
conclusion. The bibliography contains full reference to the 
books consulted.
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I H T R O D  U 0 T I O I  ,
2
In this thesis an attempt is made to examine poli - 
tical theory and its practice in xslam. The survey begins 
with the hijrah or emigration of the prophet Muhammad 
from Mecca to Medina in 622 A.D., and ends with the close 
of the first century of the »<Abbasid caliphate in 232/847.
It thus covers the four most important stages in the deve - 
3opment of the Muslim Empire, namely: the politico-religious
rule of the Prophet, the reign of the Orthodox Caliphs, the 
Umayyad dynasty, and the golden age of the lAbbasids. We 
shall, therefore, observe the growth of a otate from infancy 
to full manhood.
by theory is meant the principles of goverijment enun­
ciated in the Qur’an, the ffadith or traditions attributed to 
the Prophet, and the views of the learned among the Muslims.
By practice we mean the way in which the rulers actually con­
ducted the affairs of State. There is reason to believe that 
the difference between thought and action in the political 
history of Islam is Immense. While in theory religion is 
the primary motive of the behaviour of all believers In Allah, 
the practical application of the noble and lofty ideals em­
bodied in Islam has on the whole been sadly disappointing.
As Arbuthnot says,”the Muhammadan religion may be regarded 
as creating in theory the purest democracy in existence... 
but in practice the ways of the world are different." (1)
It is this particular relationship that we shall endeavour
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to test and expound In the following pages.
with few exceptions, political considerations derived 
from the worst kinds of blind lust for power outweighed the 
religious. The fundamentals of belief and worship changed 
but little all through the different periods of Islam, but 
the management of government varied greatly in the course of 
time and was subject to the Influence of men. ihe successes 
and failures of the Muslim Empire were not adventitious, 
rather they were the result of causes amenable to invest­
igation and account. The Muslims founded an empire because 
they followed the path of imperial races. «hen they weak­
ened in energy and resolution their empire was lost and they 
gave way to more determined and ambitious people.
The method of argument followed here is partly Muslim 
and partly objective. The first is by no means the anti­
thesis of the second; but since each has a particular field 
and apjjroach, the division seems necessary. religion is 
primarily a matter of conviction and is established on belief; 
philosophy on zne other hand, is essentially the outcome of 
critical, systematic, and rational thinking. doth aspects 
have their contribution to bhe life of Islam.
@y.f task, then, is to discover whether, and if so, 
under what conditions, the political side of Muslim history 
could be attributed to premeditated thought. we shall try 
to find out whether the i-rophet had established his plans for
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the government of his people on rational grounds, or just 
followed his intuitive faculties in all matters temporal 
and spiritual. ' We also want to decide whether his suc­
cessors - who could not strictly speaking lay claims to 
divine inspiration - had a political aim well thought out 
and carefully constructed, or just followed in the steps 
of their prophet. Since the Muslim State was a reality 
in the history of the world, and continued vigorously for 
at least four centuries, it would he necessary to assess 
how' it functioned, and judge whether it kept its structure 
intact as a result of conscious efforts to keep it alive, 
or whether it continued its course through the original 
momentum of the first wave of conquests in the name of Allah 
and Islam.
To all Muslims the Qur’an and the Hadlth are the main
springs of guidance in all matters. These two sources fere
sconsidered as direct and indirect revelation- of God. This 
attitude, though exaggerated, is not wholly unreasonable; for 
had it not been for Tslam as a religion none of the other 
aspects of civilisation built on that foundation could have 
originated. As Prof. Browne says,1 it was undoubtedly to 
Islam, that simple yet majestic creed of which no unprejudiced 
student can ignore the grandeur, that they owed the splendid 
part which th^y were destined to play in the history of
civilisation.” (2)
The Muslims believe that the p,ur’an is the revealed
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word of God to His Prophet Muhammad.. Be that as it may, for 
the purposes of the present work which is not directly con­
cerned with religious issues, wc submit that the Qur’an is 
the oldest extant record of the revelations of the Prophet. 
There is reason to suppose that the chances of forged insert­
ions by interested parties in its text are .remote. Prom 
another angle the Qur’an gives an accurate account of the 
knowledge and views of Muhammad. It stands to reason that, 
since he argued with his opponents in an attempt to convert 
them to his side, he must have understood well and mastered 
the teachings embodied in the book he was arguing from.
The opinions expressed in the Qur’an can, therefore, be con­
sidered as the bases of all knowledge possessed by the Prophet. 
If at any time there is divergence of views between the Qur’an 
and the Tradition, the first must invariably be accepted as 
the most accurate representation of Muhammadan beliefs.
The value of the Hadith as a source of information 
concerning the life ana ideas of the Prophet is now open to 
serious doubt. Scholarly research has shown that the Trad­
ition has definitely been subjected to fraudulent fabrications 
to serve r)&rticular factional ends. Besides, it should be
borne in mind that, while the p.ur’an was recorded during the
lifetime of the Prophet, the collections of Tradition were of 
a much later date. That lapse of time must have contributed 
to unaermining the authenticity of this record. The men who
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transmitted the sayings of the .prophet were quite aware ' 
of the great authority attached to the dicta of Muhammad.
It is probable that, through piety and good intentions, 
they justified to themselves the fabrication of some 
badiths_. All parties seemingly availed themselves of the 
opportunity. The result was that contradictory pronounce­
ments were attributed to Muhammad; and hence the difficulty 
of accepting one version and rejecting another. But we 
cannot, however, agree with Dr. Khadduri that, ‘‘forgery 
has reduced its (the Hadith’s) importance to zero value, 
as it is impossible, in spite of the efforts of Muslim and 
al-Bukhari to know the genuine from the forged hadith.1 (3) 
The criterion is surely the Qur'an itself. The fradiths 
which contradict the established principles of the Book may 
safely be dismissed as fabrications. Similarly traditions 
containing prophecy or forecast may also be ignored.
On certain questions, the Qur'an has been clear and 
definite. xhis is particularly the case in matters of be­
lief and worship. The other issues have been decided by 
inference and deduction. The Muslims think that Islam is 
not only a religion but a way of life; and hence there are no 
strict divisions between sacred and secular affairs. This 
viewpoint should not be condemned as confounding the spirit­
ual with the temporal; rather it should be looked upon as an 
asset, for the truth is that man acts as a whole and not in
parts. ihe real difficulty arose from subjecting every 
problem to the test of religion as interpreted by the 
theologians; in other words, the theologians invested 
themselves -with the authority to settle all questions 
whether or not these fell within their domain of know­
ledge and concern. The result of this outlook was that 
Islam became static instead of being dynamic and progress­
ive. while other people and institutions advanced and 
adapted themselves to their time and circumstances, Muslim 
organisations were handicapped and shackled. Although that 
was not the real essence of Islam, it was at least its trad­
itional practice.
Three ways of approach have been tried in discussing 
the subject, namely: (a) the Qurfan and the Tradition,
(b) the expressed opinions of the lawyers and jurisconsults, 
and (c) the analysis of the important pronouncements of the 
caliphs, and the different ideas held by the various parties. 
The following chapters are Intended to cover that ground.
•rhere are, however, two difficulties, namely: (a) the 
adequate translation into English of certain Arabic technical 
terms, a.nd (b) the discussion of Muslim political thought 
independently of religion.
(a) It seems to us that the translation of some Arabic 
words into English demands more than finding equivalents in the 
latter language. jp'or example, the translation of shari iah and 
fiqh into law and jurisprudence in the sense in which these 
words are understood, in hnglish is insufficient. Even
8
the definition of Goldziher quoted in chapter iii of this 
thesis, is not comprehensive.- enough to cover the whole 
field so as to convey the real essence of the Muslim 
notion of jurisprudence. Por fiqh is not directly con­
cerned with nall aspects of religious, political, and so­
cial life," as Goldziher maintains. it does not deal with 
these as such, hut only in so far as they have a bearing on 
religion. Fiqh, therefore, is principally understanding 
and erudition of religion. In the course of this work we 
shall try to explain the meaning of the important terms which , 
are relevant to our subject. But we think, nevertheless, 
that a fuller examination and expounding of the numerous tech­
nical phrases and terms pertaining to Muslim law, jurispru­
dence and politics can be the subject of an independent work.
(b) The theoretical study of politics in che western 
sense of the word falls within the scope of philosophy. but 
in Islam neither politics as a theoretical undertaking, nor 
philosophy as a branch of knowledge has an important place.
The subje-ct matter of politics has been treated by the faqihs 
or jurisconsults, while the study of philosophy has on the 
whole been discouraged. It should be remembered that think­
ers of renown like Ibn Khaldun and al-Mawardi, were not 
sociologists or political philosophers but jurists who treat­
ed society and the State within the framework of religion. (4) 
Por example, in his prolegomena, ibn Khaldun definitely
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condemns philosophy and maintains that it contradicts the 
shari1 ah., (5) And although he devotes some of his energy 
to political discussions of a philosophical nature he does 
not include politics among the mental sciences, and advises 
■k*16 ^lama’ or Muslim savants to keep away from its in­
vestigation. (6) The acceptance of religion as the sole 
criterion has "been prevalent in Islam from its earliest 
stages and has been maintained throughout its history. There 
may he justification for accepting the view that the Arahs 
were not philosophically inclined, owing to the fact that 
most philosophers of distinction in Islam were not Arahs in 
origin. As Hajji Khalifah hluntly asserts: ’’the Arahs have
not heen prepared hy nature for philosophy except in very 
rare cases.” (7)
It is also worthy of note that within the whole period 
surveyed here we do not know of any authors devoted to the 
pursuit of political philosophy. The exception that tends 
to confirm this impression is that of Ihn Ahu ’l-Rahi1. He 
wrote a hook on politics in the early part of the third cen­
tury of the Hijrah,> and called it suluk al-malik fi tadhir 
al-mamalik or ,fThe Way of the Ruler in the Government of King­
doms.” (8) But even this point is not generally conceded; 
for Brockelmann argues that the hook is of a later date. (9) 
Besides the usual sources of fiqh and sharl^ah, abun­
dant material on the nature of political thought in Islam may
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be found In historical and literary works. 1-hose writers 
have reflected ably the current thoughts in their own times.
.but their main service has been the preservation to poster­
ity of the important pronouncements and opinions of the in­
fluential leaders. The value of these records is enhanced 
because the writers themselves were seemingly insufficiently 
alive to the inherent political character of those state­
ments. ihe analysis of some important speeches by rulers 
has been attempted here.
The conclusions reached from the present investigation 
are mainly theses-
(1) Neither from the Qur’an nor the Tradition can 
one establish a definite method for the conduct of the State. 
The Qur’anic injunctions are general in character, and the 
relevant foadiths are so detailed and exact that they reveal 
at once the groups in whose favour those fradiths had been 
fabricated.
(2) The opinions of the theologians and juriscon­
sults reflect their own points of view. They should not, 
therefore, be looked upon as'patterns for the ideal Muslim 
State.
(3) A new conception of the relation between religion 
and the state is possible and necessary. -rhe subjection of 
the latter to the former is fallaciously based and unwarranted. 
The Qur’anic contention is that the thoughts and actions of
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rulers and ruled should fall within the ethical code of 
Islam. As long as men observe the principles of justice 
and charity they can safely adopt any system of politics 
suitable for the requirements of their time and circum­
stances.
(4) The Muslim State is not static but dynamic.
It is definitely amenable to modification and change; be­
sides, it has an organic nature derived from, and expressed 
in the life of the people.
5̂) Aristocracy and not democracy seems to be the 
nearest possible realisation of the Q,urfanic State.
In practice autocracy or despotism of the supreme 
ruler prevailed throughout the whole period under examin­
ation. But this desijotism varied in character and it thus 
became possible for students of politics to distinguish the 
features of government under different rulers and dynasties.
(a) The Prophet Muhammad governed as an autocrat or 
an absolute ruler. From the nature of his Apostolic office 
he was an interpreter of the divine law, and a law-maker in 
his own right.
(b) The Orthodox Caliphs were supreme political 
rulers deriving their sanction from the will of the people 
who elected them. Those immediate successors of Muhammad 
very nearly fulfilled the demands of a just state.
(c) With the Umayyad dynasty a hereditary conception 
of government began. ihe supremacy of the Arabs over the
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rest of the Muslims was asserted and exercised by the Umay- 
yaas who conducted the otate on political and not on religious 
lines.
(d) The tAbbasids went to the other extreme and ruled 
as absolute theocrats. They declared that their sanction of 
government was derived from Allah and not from the people. 
Though generally lax in morals, the ^Abbasids claimed for 
themselves a kind of personal divinity totally alien to the 
original precepts of Islam.
We have reason to assume that the conduct of State 
can have a place of independence in the life of Islam. Suc­
cessful political life is principally the duty and respon­
sibility of the community as a whole. This view may be con­
firmed fxom the impartial and non-committal attitude of the 
Prophet on the subject of succession and leadership. Por 
Muhammad must have deliberately left this matter to the de­
cision of the people concerned. nad he intervened, he might 
have invested his successors with semi-prophetic authority, 
and the government of Islam would have been a theocracy for 
all time.
xhe contrast between political theory and practice in 
Islam has been striking, and it thus tends to confirm the 
negative conclusion stated abovei Prom the general rules 
and injunctions of the Q.urfan the opposing parties tried to 
deduce definite conclusions. Confusion and contradictions
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were the outcome. 3o curious and inconsistent were somo of 
these deductions that the murder of children, women, and the 
aged, were allegedly justified on ^urTanic premisses. (10)
So hostile were some of those parties to one another that 
persecutions and merciless murders often took place. The 
caliphs themselves were not immune against that weakness of 
character; In fact they were the instigators of some of the 
most heinous wickedness. The despotism of the rulers was 
aided by the readiness of the subjects to surrender with 
little or no resistance, their inherent rights and privileges. 
It is futile, therefore, to assert even indirectly that re­
ligion has been the mainspring of such crimes. The truth 
seems to be that the motive for workly power has on the whole 
been stronger than piety and genuine religious beliefs. If, 
however, the time comes for men to control their passions and 
conauct their life according to the conceptions of the 
Muhammadan religion, the Muslim State may yet be realised.
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N O T E S
Since the views expressed in this introduction are 
expounded in the following pages, only reference to 
quotations will he included in these notes.
(1) P.P.Arbuthnot: Arabic Authors, London, 1890, p.149.
(2) LHP i: 186.
(3) Majid Khadduri: The Law of War and peace in Islam,
London, 1940, p.13.
(4) Cf. fi.A.R.Gibb: The Islamic Background of Ibn
■Khaldun*s Political Theory, art. BLSOS, VII,i:23ff.
(5) Khald. P. xxviii:219.
(b) Ibid. 210-219.
(7) Hajjt Khalifah: Kashf al-zunun, Ed. Fltigel, Leipzig,
1833-1858, i:77.
(8) Ibn Abu ‘l-Rabi1 tSuluk al-malik fi tadbir al-
mamalik, Cairo, 128o/1869. Section iv, p.98 ff. is 
particularly worthy of note; it is devoted to the 
divisions and principles of politics.
(9) Cf. Carl Brockelmann: Geschichte der Arabischen
Litteratur, 1:209, and Supplement, i;372. Prof. 
Sherwani supports the view that the book had been 
written by command of al-Mu^tasim. Cf. Studies in 
Muslim Political Thought and Administration,
Lahore, 1943, p. 43 ff.
(10) LIqd, i: 346.
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PART ONE
THE INFLUENCE AND CONTRIBUTION OF MUHAMMAD.
16
CHAPTER, I.
THE EARLY ACHIEVEMENTS OP THE PROPHET.
In the first half of the seventh century A.D. the 
Prophet Muhammad was struggling hard in an attempt at the 
conversion of his compatriots to his way of thought. In 
his preaching of Islam the Prophet maintained that he was 
fulfilling the command revealed to him by God. "We 
revealed to you an inspired book by Our command. You did 
not know what the Book was, nor what the faith was...." (1) 
"Surely We have revealed to you as we revealed to Noah and 
the Prophets after him...." (2)
The object of Muhammad1s mission was the same as other 
Prophets before him. They were all sent "as givers of good 
news ana as warners, so that the people should not have a plea 
against Allah after the coming of the apostles...." (3)
Before the revelation of the Qur’an the Prophet was 
supposed to have been in a state of religious ignorance and 
uncertainty. "We explain to you with the best explanation 
by Qur revealing to you this Qur’an, though before this you 
were certainly of the unaware ones." (4) In another verse of 
the Qur’an Allah reminded Muhammad that by an act of divine 
favour he was shown the right way. "Did He not find you an 
orphan and gave you shelter? And recognised your inability to 
see and led you aright?" (5)
The principal dogma of Muslim teaching is the unity of 
God. "Allah is one, eternal, omnipotent, and there is none 
like Him." (6) Some Traditions suggest that the Prophet said
18
"He who admits that there is no God but Allah, and dies thus 
believing will enter paradise." (7) In their confession of 
faith all Muslims declare that "there is no God but Allah; 
Muhammad is nis servant and apostle.” (8)
Against this back-ground the whole of the Prophet's life 
history must be reviewed. All his thoughts and actions emanated 
from this religious conception. During his long career he was 
called upon to play the parts of legist, moralist, diplomatist, 
and head of State. Important as these roles were, they were 
only secondary to his main work as preacher of a message of God.
At the beginning of his mission Muhammad concentrated on 
the area of Mecca for the propagation of his beliefs. For 
three years he worked in secret within a very narrow circle 
of relatives and friends. At one time his party consisted of 
five slaves, two women, and Abu Bakr. (9) Then followed a 
period of ten years in which he publicly taught and practised 
his religion in his native town. (10) That city of Mecca is 
considered holy by Muslims, and in prayers their faces are 
turned towards it. ^n fact it is to the Kabbah, thought to be 
the sacred house of God, that they address themselves. (11) 
Little notice was taken of the Prophet when he started.
The Meccans treated him with kind forebearance as a fine 
orator whose utterances did them no apparent harm. The 
rich aristocrats who governed the city "regarded him with 
good humoured toleration as a harmless oracle monger," says 
Nicholson. (12)
19
Another reason for the non-interference with him at the 
beginning was that he belonged to the noble tribe of 
Quraish, which was the most powerful in the locality.
By his orations, however, the Prophet was neither 
seeking admiration as such; nor was he aiming at the simple 
amusement of his kinsmen. An unshakable belief was motivating 
him to convey his message with zealous passion. But the 
majority of his fellow citizens turned against him when his 
designs came to light. In their opinion, his religious teach­
ing was revolutionary in character, and did not suit their 
customary pattern of life.
They argued with him, but he frustrated their arguments . 
with his superior mastery of logical disputation and rhetoric. 
(Id) They told him if it were money or social prominence that 
he was seeking, they would gladly satisfy all his wishes and 
ambitious desires; but he answered them firmly; ”1 do not 
come to you looking for money or worfely honour, and I have 
no personal desire to reign over you; but Allah has sent me 
as His apostle,and revealed a Book to me, and ordered me to 
be a giver of good news and warning. I have delivered the 
message of my God. If you accept what I have told you, It 
will be to your own good in this world and the next. If you 
reject my mission I shall be patient, and shall wait for the 
judgement of Allah between you and me.1 (14) When he persisted 
in his prophetic claims the Meccans appealed threateningly to 
his uncle and patron Abu Talib to exercise control over him.
They said to the embarrassed uncles "by Allah, we shall not 
overlook the insolence of him who insulted our ancestors, 
ridiculed our conceptions, and belittled our gods. Either 
you will ask him to leave us alone, or we shall fight you and him 
till death." (15)
The uncle was in a dilemma, because he did not believe 
I in the teaching of his nephew and died as a non-Muslim, (lb)
I Yet he was bound by familial ties to protect Muhammad. Abu 
1 Talib, therefore, approached the Prophet and advised him to 
1 give up his new ideas. But Muhammad was adamant, and gave his 
i uncle a prompt answer, “Oh Uncle I by Allah I will not forsake 
I this cause until God shall make it prevail or until I shall 
I perish therein - not though they should set the sun on my 
1 right hand and the moon on my left 11 (17) And so the struggle 
i went on until he decided finally, to go to Medina.
To appreciate fully the extent of the success achieved
i '
| through his emigration to Medina, it would be necessary to 
| assess the concrete results of the first phase of the propheticI career in Mecca. There is reason to believe that the result of thirteen years of preaching in Mecca - three of which were■ • ■ ?*|[ done secretly - was disappointing to Muhammad. Although tne 
| thought of transferring the centre of his activities to a new
■j ̂territory had occurred to him some time before the actual 
departure from his native city, the open and persistent 
hostility of his fellow citizens, and the persecution inflicted 
upon him and the small number of believers must have hastened 
the process. It was apparent to him th&t there could be no
compromise* The conflict of ideas and interests had assumed 
a very serious nature, and one of the parties was bound to be 
annihilated* Leaving miracles aside, it would have been a 
certainty that Muhammad and his followers were going to be 
wiped out had they remained in Mecca any longer, or had they 
chosen to enter into open armed struggle with the greatly 
superior number of their uncompromising antagonists* In 
dealing with the situation, rash courage resulting in certain 
defeat had to be ruled out of the Prophet’s calculations. It 
was not really death itself that frightened him; for in war he
11 proved that he could face perils courageously and unflinchingly.
jWhat worried him most was the loss of the cause, for the
18establishment of which he devoted life and energy. (18) Had 
jMuhammad been captured and killed by his enemies at that very 
'critical stage, Islam might in all probability have died with him.
Professor Toynbee, however, considers the Eijrah as a 
^definite exhibition of moral and spiritual weakness on the 
part of the Prophet. He says: "the truth seems to be that
.-ilIn the invitation to Medina, Muhammad was confronted with a 
Challenge to which his spirit failed to rise." (19) This
vfVerdict is based on the professor’s "conjecture on the historic
Inalogy of Jesus and the Christian Church", and goes to suggest
4fhat "if Muhammad had lived in those circumstances and had died 
is Jesus did without offering resistance, then Islam might have 
'©come something different from, and spiritually higher than, 
hat it has become in fact....Instead of sealing his prophetic
22
message with his blood by becoming Caesar1s victim 
it was Muhammad’s ironic destiny to compromise 
and debase his prophetic message by becoming an Arabian 
Caesar himself. (20)
Both on logical and historical grounds we find that 
we are diametrically opposed to the views of Professor 
Toynbee. In the first place the difference in the careers 
of Jesus and Muhammad is so striking that it renders the 
application of a common conclusion an expectation out of 
place. We agree that the ideal expression of resistance 
to evil and sin demanded that jesus should seal his message 
with his blood. Such an action fitted in beautifully with 
the doctrines he preached, had he chosen any other course, 
it would have been to the decided detriment of his lofty 
principles. On the other hand, had Muhammad been killed 
by his enemies, it would have been in their opinion, and 
perhaps even in that of his own followers, a final proof of 
falsehood. In fact when the Meccans realised their inability 
to defeat him by peaceful means, that is to say, prove him 
wrong by reasonable argument, they seriously considered 
murdering him. (21) Had they succeeded in their ignominious 
scheme, they might have retained their paganism. In 
any case the application of analogies of this kind is not 
the best way of deciding the truth. For although the 
apostles and messengers of God had one noble aim in common, 
their circumstances were not usually identical.
In the second place the assumption that an invitation 
was issued to Muhammad to go to Medina, is basically wrong.
The truth seems to be that the Prophet had been trying very 
hard to persuade the Medinese to accept him in their midst 
and give him refuge. After a reasonably long time, the 
plans he was perfecting to settle with his followers in that 
new locality reached maturity. This should be considered 
as a diplomatic victory for the Prophet; in other words, 
the agreement of the people of Medina to give him shelter 
and protection was the successful realisation of one of 
his most ambitious plans. He went there with renewed hopes 
and brighter prospects. He was convinced that the change 
was really imperative for the service of Allah, and the 
maintenance and expansion of Islam.
The hostility of the Meccans was not due to religious 
motives only, though the religious factor should not be
minimised. Subtle and deep rooted political issues were
also involved in that conflict of ideas. It is apparent
that the stress during the Meccan period was laid mainly on
religion, but the political consequences inherent in the
acceptance of Islam could not be hidden from the penetrating
eyes of his antagonists. Obviously, there is no strong
evidence to show that Muhammad ’’entertained ulterior political
designs during the Meccan period of his Prophetic mission.1 (22)
But that did not matter much; because the acceptance of
Isl^m ipso facto implied the surrender to the absolute
24
rule and authority of the Prophet in all matters divine 
and secular* As was proved later, that happened to be 
the case. Not only were the people asked to confess 
the omnipotence of Allah - a thing probably not unknown 
to them even before the birth of Muhammad - but they 
were expected to agree also that Muhammad was the sole 
interpreter of the message of God. The Prophet,therefore, 
had to be given unquestioned obedience; in other words, 
the Muhammadan movement was nothing less than a religio- 
political revolution. The Prophet’s authority among his 
people was unique in the sense that he was the only person 
who could explain the commands of God; and by that fact 
his position had to be second to none. No distinction was 
made between divine and secular affairs. To the believers 
he was the final reference in all matters. It is true of 
course that during the Meccan period his sermons were 
mainly devotional; he was initiating his adherents into 
the new faith. Once that was over, he introduced a strong 
measure of discipline in their life. The Medina verses with 
their stress on obedience to Allah and the Prophet are a 
proof of that development in the religion of Islam.
Both the rulers and ruled in Mecca had reason to oppose 
the initial efforts of Muhammad. The ruling class considered 
that his success would constitute a potent threat to tneir 
established position. Every success he achieved meant a 
defeat to them coupled with an equal measure of#material loss.
The ruled on the other hand, were apathetic and 
unimaginative. The ideas preached by Muhammad demanded 
higher imagination, and strength of character, than they 
were hitherto prepared to expend. If by nature people 
have a disinclination to change consolidated beliefs, 
they would certainly offer at least equal resistance to 
drastic alterations in the institutions based on those 
beliefs, for the latter are symbols and expressions of 
the former. That explains the veryslow progress achieved
by the Prophet in his native town.
Mecca was governed by a plutocratic minority. We 
avoid on purpose the use of the word “aristocracy" in
this connection because there is no proof to show that the 
rulers were the best or most excellent element In the 
community. The chiefs of the various clans usually 
assumed government, and used to decide in assembly the 
important affairs and common problems of the whole 
community. (23) Each clan, seemingly, held an office in 
connection with the Kabbah. The most influential office 
was probably that of the holder of the keys or that 
sacred temple or house. This is borne out by the tradition 
that when Muhammad had finally conquered Mecca, and was thus 
the undisputed lord of the vanquished city, he took possess­
ion of the keys. After performing devout prostrations he 
called ^Uthman b. Talhah who was the guardian of the temple 
up to the fall of the city and confirmed him in office. (24)
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Then he (Muhammad) appointed his uncle al-lAbbas in 
charge of the well Zamzam and said to him: "it is no mean 
office this, that I give now unto thee." That tacitly 
implied that the post of guardian of the Kabbah was the 
most coveted one. (2b)
It is difficult to decide how just and stable the 
government of Mecca was. Prom the available sources of 
Information, however, it seems that at times, its board 
of elders or governors enacted some fine principles of 
justice. These became binding when the contracting 
parties had taken solemn oath or pledge to respect and 
fulfil them. (2o) Ibn-hisham gives an interesting 
illustration of the working of that system. (27) Some 
heads of clans entered into a compact whereby the contract­
ing parties took it upon themselves to see to it that 
justice was done, and violated rights restored to any 
bona-fide citizen or temporary resident in Mecca. This 
they called Hllf al-Pudul. (28)
Nevertheless, in spite of these creditable instances, 
Mecca seems to have been a poorly governed city. There are 
ample data in the Q,ur»an and Tradition to confirm this view. 
But we think it an unfair method - dialectically - to quote 
arguments from these sources to discredit a system, the 
destruction of which was their ultimate aim. This is a 
common fallacy of thought, yet by no means an infrequent one. 
It has been agreed at the outset that Muslim law was binding
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only on Muslims, or on others who resorted, voluntarily to 
its Jurisdiction# We cannot, therefore, condemn a people 
of a different standpoint just because our teachings are at 
variance with theirs\ unless of course, we possess a proof 
that our moral ideas represent the snmmum bonum in ethics.
If one wishes to try a case with strict impartiality, the 
instrument of trail should be the particular legal or moral 
code binding on the person or institution concerned.
However, we can reasonably infer that, at the dawn of 
Islam, Mecca, as well as many other parts of the Arabian 
Peninsula, was in a degenerate political condition. From 
Pre-Islamic poetry, with its appraisal of raids, plundering, 
internecine tribal feuds, and tne description of the very 
narrow clan Royalties, we are given an uncomplimentary 
picture. But even this evidence is not conclusive. Some 
scholars hold that pre-Islamic poetry is ̂ not really pre- 
Islamic; and that it has been composed after, and not before, 
the advent of Islam. (29) The truth Is, therefore, that 
unless we possess seme genuinely authoritative pre-Islamic 
documents, most of our description of life and conditions 
must remain on the whole speculative.
It is obvious, in fact it is certain that Muhammad 
wanted to win to his religion the maximum possible number of 
adherents. Therefore, knowing the psychology of his people, 
he would present to them terms that were most likely to win 
their favour. From the terms he presented, and the practices 
he allowed to survive temporarily in Islam, and which he
later attacked and prohibited, we can safely deduce that 
the social, economic, moral, and spiritual conditions of 
the Jahilite Arabs were not good or high, ‘fake for 
instance the picture of a paradise where wine is served 
in silver goblets, carried by smart pages, to patrons 
dressed in expensive silk garments. (30) Would such 
ideas appeal to any people other than those inclined to 
crave for these things? And has there been in history a 
society given to excessive carnal pleasures without being 
a decadent and unjust society? And since these expensive 
luxuries could be had only at the toil of some other 
section of the community, that section must of necessity 
have been greatly oppressed and exploited. Frequent 
Q,ur*anic references give support to this view. And was 
it not due to the polygamous practice of the Arabs that 
the Qurfan allowed each man a maximum of four wives;
And to the virtuous and chaste in this world a happy life 
was promised in the next? (31) Obviously all these 
inducements were intended as a compensation for giving up 
the excessive indulgence the people were accustomed to. 
But with the consolidation of faith, the evil things 
which were deeply rooted in the structure of society, and 
which the Prophet tolerated for a time malgre lui, had to 
be abrogated. To begin with "he sought to bring his 
teaching into harmony with their prejudices, and lead
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them gradually to a better knowledge." (32)
Prom the masterly rhetoric the Prophet used in order 
to persuade the rich believers to pay 2 %̂ of their annual 
wealth to ameliorate the condition of their poor bretn^ren, 
we conclude that the rich Arabs were neither generous nor 
unduly charitable. (33) The Qur’an, therefore, fixed the 
compulsory alms at the lowest possible acceptable rate.(34) 
Benevolence, nevertheless, ranked very high among the desired 
virtues of a Muslim. The praise of charity as the foundation 
of moral justice has been a feature both of the Qur’an and 
tne Tradition, iet knowing his people , the Prophet did not 
leave it to individual judgement to fix the amount of Zakah.
It is to his credit that "Muhammad perhaps, is tne only 
lawgiver who has defined the precise measure of charity."(35)
As a measure of equality the Prophet discouraged the use of 
silk garments for dress. That, incidentally, gives the 
impression that silk clothing was customary to a certain class
of that society.
The prohibition of usury also conveys the impression
that the poor were being exploited badly. This suggests that
the masses were in a constant state of financial embarrass­
ment. At that time, the volume of money lending was a sign 
of a slump and not as nowadays of a boom. Men resorted to
loans to tide them over severe hardships. Money was
essentially used for personal purposes, and not for the 
finance of industrial or trade enterprises, as is the case now.
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Apart from the Qurfan the Tradition mentions that 
Mecca was a big, busy, and flourishing city-state. That 
information is not expressed directly, but is inferred 
easily from fragmentary items. Putting these together one 
can visualise a concrete whole. The book of trade (Kitab 
al-Buyu*-) (3b) points out that many kinds of consumers1 
goods, not necessarily home produced, could be had at Mecca. 
Besides the lively condition of commerce, there were many 
ordinary and skilled trades in existence. For example: 
blacksmiths 17:38, perfumers 17:38, tailors 14:30, weavers 
14:31, butchers 12:21, fruiterers 12:20, provision stores 
11:18, traders who crossed the seas in the course of 
business 8:10, auctioneers 25:59, middlemen 28:68, wine 
merchari s 42:105, potters and sculptors 41:104, 43:113. (37) 
In the markets of Mecca one could buy the following 
among other things: silk garments which were a luxury 17:40, 
carpets of fine design and quality 17:40. Gold was legal 
tender but was not the only currency available 5:1; paper 
money was known and used 31:78, and gold and silver were 
exchangeable but the rate was not stated 31:77. (38)
It is not difficult to understand, therefore, that the 
work of the Prophet in converting Mecca must have been very 
arduous indeed. The task of persuading a city of that size 
to give up its accustomed way of life and accept a ne-w set 
of ideas, could not have been easy under any circumstances.
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It is quite probable that, at one stage of the initial 
struggle the Prophet had concluded that his progress was 
aiscouragingly slow, and a change of ground was thus 
indicated. This process was hastened by the vehement and 
persistent molestation to which he and his followers were 
subjected. The ordeal was made worse by the fact that at 
that juncture he was ordered (by Allah) not to retaliate.
Taking the small number of converts into account, 
one would certainly justify the Prophet in his decision to 
try his fortunes in a new locality. It seems that at the 
time of the Hi jrah the number of the Muslims was not over 
three hundred men and women; and possibly even less.
Actual figures are not given in early Arabic sources. 
Ibn-Hisham, (39) however, mentioned by name the people who 
emigrated to Medina following the Prophetfs instructions. 
These numbered seventy four. It must be borne In mind that 
this was a source of very great honour and pride onee 
Islam had the upper hand. To the Arabs who were very 
fond of their glorious deeds a man’s name could not have 
been missed out by a chronicler if that man had really 
been an emigrant or muha jir. The number of three hundred 
should,therefore, include all Muslims in areas other than 
Mecca -including early emigrants to Abyssinia- as well as 
all the believers detained in the city Itself.
It would be interesting to establish what percentage
of the whole Meccan population that figure represented,
because it would reveal in a concrete form the extent 
of the Prophet’s achievement in thirteen years. To do 
so, some estimate of the population at that time must 
be attempted. It should be mentioned here that Muhammad 
did not restrict the Invitation to the Meccans alone.
During the annual season of heathen pilgrimage he had 
opportunities to propagate his faith among members of 
other tribes. Besides, he is reputed to have sought 
refuge in al-Ta’If, and to have urged its inhabitants 
to confess Islam, but was not successful, he did like­
wise with the tribes of Kindah, Kalb, Banu Hanifah, and 
Banu tAmir with the same disappointing result. (40)
Jurji Zaidan suggested that the number of Quraish 
during the reign of the Caliph MJthman was two hundred 
thousand.(41) He quoted ibn-Khaldun for that information. 
(42) Carlyle said in his essay on "Mahomet” that Mecca 
"had at one time a population of 100,000" (43) He did not 
- say where he found, or how he computed that figure. One 
feels disinclined to entertain it as authentic.
Since no reliable census, or any other trustworthy 
record is to hand, perhaps the safest method would be 
the examination of army figures during the Prophet’s 
campaigns. According to Tradition there were nineteen 
battles in which he took part; but we think that the 
most important, and historically significant ones, did 
not exceed eight in number. The strength of the opposing
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forces was as follows:-
BATTLE MUSLIM TROOPS MECCAN TROOPS
Badr 3U5 900 - 1000
Uhud 700 - 1000 3000
Al-Khandaq 3000 4000 (44)
Khaibar 1600




Without unwarrantable stretch of imagination the following 
conclusions may be reached from the above figures:-
1- The maximum estimate of Meccan Muslims prior to 
the hijrah could not have exceeded tne 300 mark, possibly 
not even 200. Most authorities agree that the Muhajir 
warriors at Badr numbered 80-85 men. That constituted the 
majority of them. So important was this battle in the 
history of Islam, and so great was the honour of those who 
fought in it, that some historians mentioned by name those 
who failed to take part in it. (4b) That battle gave tne 
Muhajirs an opportunity to show their devotion to their 
religion and their support to the new policy of expansion 
by force of arms. It should be remembered in this connection 
that tne Ansar were not bound by the terms of their compact 
with the Prophet to wage aggressive war with him. The 
striking feature of this famous battle is tnat it was fought
within less than two years from the arrival of Muhammad 
in Medina. Since only Muslims were allowed to join the 
ranks of the Prophet»s army, we can see at once the 
wisdom of his decision to transfer his activities to a 
new locality. (47) There seems reason to suppose that 
in one year or so, the city of helpers produced more 
followers of the new religion than Mecca did in thirteen 
years; a clear justification of the Prophet1s action. (48)
2- In the battle of Badr, the Meccans had a thousand 
troops in the field. 149) By that number they thought 
they could deal a crushing blow to the Muslims. Since in 
all their combats against the rising power of the Muslims, 
they relied mainly on sheer weight of superior numbers, we 
may gather that the Meccan chiefs could not have estimated 
the number of their adversaries at more than half their 
own; and even allowing that Muhammad's army was then 
composed of equal fighting units of Muhajirs and Ansar, 
this establishes yet another indication that the emigrants 
could not have counted more than two hundred and fifty 
persons.
3- At Uhud, the Meccans were estimated at three 
thousand men; and at al-Khandaq the figure was about 
four thousand. According to Arab historians, these 
warriors represented Mecca, and not its adjoining or 
allied tribes. Chroniclers tell us that the total number
of fighters against Muhammad at al-Khandaq was ten 
thousand. Be that as it may; our main concern at the 
moment is with Mecca.
If a city in the seventh century A.D. could put 
into the field of battle four thousand able bodied men, 
what would its total population be? We may venture to 
state that it would be at least eight or nine times 
that amount. This estimate is not based on the modern 
conception that, to put a warrior in the field, a states­
man must reserve eight or ten others for his supply, 
equipment, and maintenance. Such ideas are out of 
place in the case of Arab armies of that age. They used 
simple weapons like swords, spears, arrows, shields, and 
stone throwers. They were hardy by nature, and their food 
rations were carried with them to last the whole campaign. 
Our estimate is based on a conception of the social life 
of Mecca as pictured by many historical sources.
Polygamy was rampant. The Qur’anic legislation of 
four wives was at the time considered a harsh rule.
Taking rich and poor together, it would be very reasonable 
to assume that the adult female population would be double 
that of the male. The Arabs were known to be a prolific 
race, but owing to severe climatic conditions and 
rigorous circumstances of life, infant mortality must have 
been high. That situation was also aggravated by infanti­
cide or wa‘d. Therefore, an estimate of four non-combatant
children to each warrior may be justified. Aged men and 
women, slaves and foreign settlers may count at least 
another four thousand. On that estimate, the approximate 
total of the Meccan inhabitants about the year 622 A.D. 







Since it was considered a miracle that the Muslims with 
tneir inferior numbers defeated their superior enemies,
(50) some historians might have been inclined to accentuate 
the phenomenon by putting the figures of Muslim troops at 
the lowest possible level, and that of their enemies at 
the highest possible standard. In calculations, this 
possibility was not overlooked, and hence the very conser­
vative figures we have quoted above. Compared with the 
computations of others, this estimate may be considered 
as an under-statement. (51) For example, Maulvi Muhammad 
‘Ali, in his commentary on the Qur'an says in reference to 
the Prophet’s last visit to Mecca for pilgrimage that the 
sacred city contained over one hundred thousand followers
(52).
At once we conclude that on account of numbers alone,
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the Muslims prior to the hijrah constituted a negligible 
section of the population, and even if the ratio of con­
verts had increased many times, it would still have taken 
Muhammad more than the normal span of human life to form 
a strong minority in his native city. This gives yet 
anothe/ reason for tne wisdom of his emigration to Medina,
Perhaps it may be wise not to lay the stress on the 
religious element as the main cause of the Meccan opposit­
ion to the Muhammadan movement; because, it would indeed, 
be credulous to attribute great and profound religious 
belief to that loose society. The advantages - purely 
worldly and material - were the main reason for the resent­
ment of the Meccans. It had not occurred to them that the 
importance and sanctity of their city would be retained 
in Islam. Any impartial observer may look upon this as an 
act of political compromise of the first order; for the 
retention of some of the ritual connected with the 
pilgrimage to Mecca seems very bewildering to many Muslims 
because it is very reminiscent of heathen customs. Notice, 
for instance, how i-IJmar b. al-Khattab is reputed to have 
said on kissing the black stone of the Katbah; !,0h stone I 
I kiss you, knowing you to be only a stone, had I not 
seen the Prophet doing so, I would not have done it myself .n
(53)
To the Meccans the adoption of one God, and the abandon­
ment of the many idols their city possessed would have meant
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a crushing blow to their livelihood, and prosperity.
These idols had a national as well as a local signific­
ance. The various Arab tribes which had their own idols 
in their particular localities, used to flock to Mecca 
at certain seasons to make sacrifices to the Meccan ones.
We are not told that the reverse took place. Also, 
offices of importance in Mecca were mostly connected witn 
some kind of service to the chief temple, or to tne 
pilgrims themselves. It becomes obvious, therefore, that 
the stern opposition on the part of the rulers was mainly 
due to political and economic reasons, rather than to.pure 
religious convictions or piety. As Margoliouth points out,
11 it is, however, certain that the gods suffer by the 
neglect of their dues, and as they have representatives 
on earth, some men suffer thereby also; and since the 
favour of gods is thought to be necessary for the well­
being of the state, many persons who have no other commer­
cial interest in the matter are anxious to suppress heresy 
for fear of offending their masters.” (54)
This view may be strengthened further by two consider­
ations? the presence in Mecca of Jews and Christians who 
were not idol worshippers, and by the comparative ease with 
which Islam spread in Medina. If the Meccans were really 
firm believers in idols and idolatry, they would have been 
intolerant of other faiths, because religious tolerance 
was as yet unknown. There is no evidence to suggest that
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the Jews and Christians who had settled in Mecca were 
ill treated on account of their faith. Nor is tnere any 
indication that attempts had been made to dissuade them 
from their religions. On the contrary, Muslim chroniclers 
even state that some Qurashites had adopted Christianity. 
(55) Essad Bey explains atSy the main reason for the 
religious tolerance of the Meccans. ’’Every idol”, he 
says, ’’meant more visitors, assured greater incomes to 
the inhabitants... .The Meccans themselves were fairly 
indifferent to all the gods. They were only too happy 
to offer everything that might make the market more 
successful.” (bb) It is needless to say, that the rulers 
of that city, in no small measure owed power, and high 
prestige among other tribal chiefs, to the presence of 
the idols in Mecca. Any threat to those false gods meant 
a threat to their livelihood! and hence, the reason for 
their vehement opposition to Islam.
Once we understand the purely selfish and ulterior 
motives behind the Meccan untiring resistance to the 
Message of Muhammad, we can with perfect ease find the 
adequate grounds for the rapid expansion of Islam from 
the HiJrah onwards. In Medina no vested interested were 
endangered, ^n the contrary, Islam might have strength­
ened the position of tnat town against its rival Mecca.
For if this new faith proclaiming the unity of God would 
prevail, fewer people would have reason to go to a
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particular locality to make sacrifices to its pseudo-gods.
And perhaps, some of the habitual pilgrims of heathen days 
might even change their course and set their caravans in 
the direction of Medina to see and hear the Prophet of 
the new and revolutionary movement. Let it be borne in 
mind that IslAm was revolutionary only in the sense that 
it was an endeavour by an Arab against the established 
religious order of his society. Muhammad was not content 
to hold the unaccustomed belief within his own heart. Like 
all apostles before him, he was proclaiming fearlessly the 
message entrusted to him, and was actively trying to convert 
to his ordered way as many members of his society as he could. 
That inevitably led to strong resentment from the leaders 
whose interests were threatened.
There is reason to believe that Islam as a monotheistic 
religion was not totally new. Christianity and Judaism, the 
two other monotheistic religions, were already known and 
practised in Arabia. We must, therefore, concede tnat besides 
the idols, the Arabs must have had some idea of a supreme 
and all powerful God. Allah was seemingly the word symbolic 
of that idea. Muhammad did not coin tne word himself, because 
it was in circulation before his birth, iiad it been associat­
ed in any way with idol worship, he would in all probability 
have cnosen another word &r the One and Eternal God of Islam. (57.)
Whereas Judaism and Christianity came from outside, tnat 
is to say, did not originate in Arabia, Islam was revealed
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in the pulsing heart of that country, and from tnere, 
spread all over. This is the source of the personal 
element of pride the Arabs had in that religion once it 
was established. Unfortunately, this feeling of exultat­
ion turned later into an unjustifiable monopoly of power. 
The result of the initial stage of the struggle for 
Islam should not be judged in terms of numbers only, 
because that would give a misleading view of the case.
The few men and women who had the strength of character to 
declaim their convictions and support Muhammad publicly 
were only the pioneers of the new movement. There must 
have been others besides them who found it more convenient 
not to commit themselves at that early stage. The truth
T tiseems to be that the rpophet Muhammad had iniiAted a mental
and spiritual activity of such proportions as astounded his
rivals and set the whole people thinking. Once they saw
the light of Islam, a distinctive factor entered into their
lives. Some were dazzled, and shut their eyes against it
preferring the darkness of their spiritual night; others
realised that in the progress towards that light, the way
lay open for the emancipation of their souls. And although
the Trophet had thought it prudent to concede ground for a
short time, he was certain that ne would come back to bring
to a successful conclusion the work he had originally
started, nis emigration to Medina should not, therefore,
he considered a flight from danger or an admission of
defeat. In the circumstances, it was the best tactical
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Khald. H. ii,2:19.
The Prophet ascribed his success "to the miraculous 
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Mecca is said hy IbnKhaldun (H. ii,1:338) to have had 
a population of 70,000 inhabitants at one time.
Maulvi Muhammad LAlI: The Holy Q,ur * an, Woking, 1917,p. 1231.
Bukh. 25.:50 &60 (i:404 &406). Even in his farewell
pilgrimage the Prophet is reputed to have kissed the 
Black-stone. This practice, though reminiscent of 
heathen customs was accepted unquestionably after the 
Prophet's example.
Marg. M. 152.
For example Waraqah t>. Nawfal, Khadijah’s cousin, was 
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before Islam.
Muhammad's father was called lAbd Allah. The word‘Allah7 
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It is interesting to note that in the seven mu^allagat, 
or poems hung on the walls of the Kabbah, and generally 
attributed to pre-Islamic times, the word 1 Allah”, 
occurs twice: Zuhayr, v:27, and Ihn Hillizah, v:75.
Allah is also mentioned in the qasidah of al-Atsha, 
v:52, and Ibn al-Abras, vv.18,19,20. The word 
”al-Ilah” occurs in v.85 of Labid’s mulallaqah. Cf. 
Tibrizi : Commentary on the mutallaqat, ed. C.J.Lyall,
Calcutta, 1894. Cf. ERE, i:326, and Arther Jeffery,
The Foreign voca .bulary of the Qur1an, Baroda,1938,p.66.
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CHAPTER II.
THE CONSOLIDATION OP THE STATE.
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The success of the Prophet in Medina did not come 
by accident. It was the natural result of sound bases. 
Some of tnese, are well worthy of analysis.
Buhl suggests that the desire of the Aus and 
Khazra.j to end their tribal feuds and unite under the 
political leadership of a neutral ruler - a foreigner, 
in other words - caused them to issue an invitation to 
the Prophet to come ard settle in their midst. 11 The 
Medinese,11 he says, "did. not so much want to attract an 
inspired preacher to themselves as to get a political 
leader, who would readjust their political relations, 
which had been shattered in the tribal conflicts 
culminating in the battle of hu’ath." (1) This theory 
is open to criticism on the following grounds
(1 ) It is alien to Arab traditions which placed 
clan or tribal loyalty above all other considerations; 
thus the invitation to a total stranger to solve other 
people's affairs would appear very awkward. At that 
time, of course, the clan represented and constituted 
their widest or ultimate social and political unity.
It was, in fact, a great credit to Muhammad that he 
skilfully convinced the Arabs of the necessity of 
substituting a national unity for the narrow tribal 
loyalty. This creditable achievement, however, material 
ised if at all, after, and not before, his Hijrah. It
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should he remembered that the Meccans considered his 
departure from their city as a betrayal, and a violat­
ion of the established ethics. The poet al-Harith b.
Hisham said that the i&uhajirs had sold themselves to 
another society (tA shirah) far away, and of a different 
originI And he stated that such behaviour was an 
expression of "ingratitude, definite sin, and severing 
(of relations), condemned by people of wisdom and 
right opinions". (2) The point we seek to establish is 
this: the Medinese would have been condemned in the 
same way had they chosen freely to entrust their 
affairs to someone from a society far away and different 
in origin; because, of course, the Meccans were just as 
alien to the Medinese as the latter were to the Meccans.
(2) There was no parallel or precedent proving that 
at any time in their history the Arabs had willingly 
invited a member of a different tribe to assume the 
reins of government; because that would be a tacit 
admission that the inviting party had no talented men 
of its own. Even if that were the case, it would be a 
shameful weakness the truth of which most people would 
be reluctant to exhibit.
(5) The pacts of al-VAqabah, clearly stated that 
Muhammad and his party were to be given refuge and 
protection. In the negotiations leading to the second 
or great compact of al-^Aqabah the Prophet1 a uncle, »
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al-^Abbas, mad© quite certain of this condition when 
he explained to the Medinese that Muhammad had chosen 
to adhere to them. When they agreed, the Prophet asked 
them to accord him the protection they gave to their 
women and children. (3) This confirms the belief that 
Muhammad was more interested in the. Medinese than they 
were in him. Those negotiators were not plenipotentiar­
ies, they were only the representatives of that section 
in Medina which had declared itself in favour of Muhammad 
and Islam. On the strength of the above consideration 
we feel disinclined to accept the validity of Buhl!s 
conclusion that, by inviting Muhammad to settle in their 
midst the Medinese were 11 seeking in him a saviour from 
their social and political difficulties.1' (4)
Margoliouth denies that there is sufficient evidence 
to support the view that the Prophet was glad ,fto 
accept an invitation from the inhabitants of Yethrib 
to come thither as dictator, to heal their feud and 
restore order." (5)
Yet, the emphasis on the politico-religious motives 
still seems to us the right interpretation for the 
initiation of the njjrah. Only there is reason to 
believe that it was the community of interests that 
united both parties. As Buhl argues with good reason, 
Muhammad was aware that he lived in a higher intellect­
ual world which was closed to the Meccans. The
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conviction of his righteousness became a fixed idea, 
and the "consciousness of being a chosen instrument 
of Allah had gradually become so powerful within him 
that he was no longer able to sink back into an 
inglorious existence with his object unachieved." (b) 
Therefore, he sought new ground for a fresh start, and 
temporarily gave up the struggle with the Meccans, 
consoling himself that “whomsoever Allah guides, 
will be rightly guided, and whomsoever He causes to 
err, you shall not find for him any friend to lead 
him aright.” (7) The Arab inhabitants of Medina, on 
the other hand, found that they were systematically 
subjected to the subtle intrigue of the Jews. (8 ) 
Following the principle divide et impera the Yathrib- 
ite Jews were playing the rival clans of Aus and 
Khazraj against each other to the enhancement and 
maintenance of Jewish ascendency. We do not know how 
much truth there is in the report that the combined 
forces of the Jews and the Aus had defeated the 
Khazraj at Bu^ath; nor can we be certain that the 
first Muslim converts from Medina were Khazrajites, 
Mfresh from a severe defeat which they had sustained 
from the Aus and Jewss and the native tradition 
represents them as having taken up with Muhammad in 
order to outwit the latter." (9) From the collection 
of poems supposed to have been delivered at the battle 
of Badr, we find that both the Meccans and the Medinese
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mention the Aus first as the stauncnest supporters of 
Muhammad and Islam. (10) Margoliouth himself argues 
that "the persons whose conversion decided tne fortunes 
of Islam at xethrib were two chieftains of tne Aus,
Usaid, son of huraith, and Said, son of Muiadh.H (11)
We are, tnerefore, led to conclude tnat the iniliiive 
must have come from both the Aus and Khazraj. It is 
not unlikely that tnese clans had realised that the 
Jews were the main instigators of the fratricidal conflict, 
and thus agreed to invite Muhammad and his followers to 
join tnem and so increase their power and tip the 
balance of power in favour of the Arabs against tne 
Jews in that locality. This view may be corroborated by 
the report that during the negotiations leading to the 
al- lAqabah convention tne Medinese secured the assurance 
of help from the Prophet in case of local conflict with 
the Jew®. Abu * 1-Haitham b. Al-Tayyihan said to tne 
Prophets "Oh Prophet of Allah! There are covenants 
fese tween us and the jews that we intend to revoke. If 
we do so, and if Allah causes you to prevail, would you 
leave us alone and go back to your people?” (12)
Whereupon the Prophet smilingly answered: 111 will live 
and die with you. xour blood is my blood; your ruin 
shall be mine. I am from this moment your friend and
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the enemy of your foes." (15) Thus, "the men of Yethreb 
offered him tneir support and an asylum in their city, 
but they added a condition that disclosed their motives" 
(14) It is probable, therefore, that "the adhesion of 
Yethreb to the new faith was inspired by policy rather 
than religion." (15) If at that moment one of the Medina 
parties were really interested in the safety, or welfare 
of the dews, then they would have objected to the 
Prophet's acceptance of that condition. Instead, when 
they secured his promise of support, they all got up 
and shook hands with him thus signifying the verbal 
ratification of the contract.
The presence in Medina of the Banu fl-Najjar who 
were near relatives of Muhammad was an additional factor 
in aiding his cause; but this reason should not be 
unduly exaggerated; because the Meccans were nearer to 
him that the iNajjars or any other people; and yet, 
when their interests collided blood relationship proved 
to be of very little account.
we can see, therefore, that the people of Medina by 
their acceptance of the Prophet were adding to their 
power. This decision was, nevertheless, fraught with 
danger; for it was obvious tnat, giving snelter and 
protection to a dissident faction of a neighbouring 
city was definitely an unfriendly act towards that city. 
They thus left themselves open to future unfriendliness
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and possible hostilities from Mecca.
However, Muhammad settled comfortably in Medina, 
and was accorded honour and hospitality by the Ansar; 
and it did not take him long to assume supreme power 
in the new locality, ne set to work, and all his 
potentialities as a Prophet-statesman were fully 
exhibited, let it is not safe to assert that the two 
periods formed distinct stages in his career. It is 
true tnat circumstances were different; but the person 
himself did not change accordingly, because tne dominant 
motive of his life remained the same to the end.
Many writers, however, have laid undue stre.ss on 
his political and administrative work in Medina to the 
neglect of the religious. Referring to his life in 
i'ethrib Essad Bey says, "Here ends the life history 
of the Prophet Mohammed, and his career as a statesman 
begins." (lb) Another writer says, "the Hijra marks in 
Muhammad's career a no less interesting change; it 
started the political evolution of Islam, the Prophet 
became the ruler of the State." (17) Bosworth Smith 
says: "with the flight to Medina the scene changes.
The Prophet and his creed now take their place for good 
or for evil on the theatre of the world.*1 (18) "The 
Prophet in spite of himself became by force of circum­
stances, more than a prophet...he became a temporal ruler." (19) 
Zwemer maintains that "The flight to Medina changed not
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only tne scene, but tne actor and drama, He who at 
Mecca was tne preacher and warner, now becomes the 
legislator and warrior.'1 (20) Another writer goes to 
the extent of considering that, "It is with this flight 
to Medina that Islam commences. If the men of Medina 
had refused to receive him it wouihd have been all up 
with the new religion; it would have remained tne 
project of an idle dream." (21) We may also recall here 
Toynbee fs description of the second stage of Muhammad’s 
career as the turn of a prophet into a Caesar. (22)
Buhl’s account of the Hijrah is equally interesting.
"The inspired religious enthusiast whose ideas mainly 
centred around the coming last judgment....with the 
migration to Medina enters upon a secular stage and at 
one stroke shows himself a brilliant political genius."
(23) HWe can confidently record here," says Taha Husain, 
"that this Hijrah has set the conflict between the 
Prophet and ^uraish in a new light, and turned it into 
a political struggle dependent for its solution upon the 
power of the sword; while before it was religious based 
on argument only." (24)
The Hijrah was, undoubtedly, an event of the 
greatest importance in the history of the Arabs and Islam. 
This can be grasped from tne fact that it started the 
Muslim era. (25) Besides, there is reason for supposing 
that in Medina, Islam began to have an independent identity
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or personality which it did not possess in Mecca. But, 
to look upon the nijrah as signifying mainly a political 
change is not wholly true. It is clear from the history 
of the Meccan period that the rulers of tnat city were 
persisting in their antagonism because of their fears of 
the political supremacy of the Prophet, he had by his 
careful manoeuvring of the situation established himself 
as a political power in Mecca, and its rulers resorted to 
force only when his “successful diplomacy threatened to 
wreck the independence of their city.11 (26)
We find no reason, therefore, for tne assumption that 
the life history of Muhammad can be divided Into two 
water-tight compartments; the one religious, and the 
other political. We are more inclined to believe that 
such division leads only to confusion. The Prophet was 
guided all his life by one single purpose, and he does 
not seem to have deviated from it to any marked extent.
Nevertheless, the striking change of circumstances 
is worth while considering, whereas we see him in Mecca 
as a peaceful preacher, patiently arguing with tne people in
an attempt to convert them to his religion, he is in Medina
a leader definitely using a great measure of force in
spreading his thoughts. To think otherwise is to deceive
onlelf. he is reputed to have said, 111 have been ordered to 
fight the people till they admit that there is no God but 
Allah.” (2?) The Qur*an is equally demonstrative of the
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altered policy. Within the pages of the same book one 
finds verses like the following
,!There is no compulsion in religion.” ii.25b.
”Surely you cannot guide whom you love, but Allah
guides whom he pleases u xxviii : 5b.
"Whomsoever Allah guides, he is the rigntly guided 
one, and whomsoever kie causes to err, you shall not find 
for him any friend to lead aright.” xxviii : IV.
“Say: 0 unbelievers! I do not worship that which you 
worship. Nor do you worship him whom I worship....xou have 
your own religion and I have mine." cix :1 ff.
At the same time a different attitude is expressed 
in the following versess-
”....kill them wherever you find them and take not 
from among them a friend or a helper.” iv : 8y.
"Fight those who do not believe in Allah, or in tne 
last day, and do not prohibit what Allah and His apostle
have prohibited " ix : 29.
"Verily the religion with Allah is Islam." iii : 18. 
"Fighting is enjoined on you, and it is an object 
of dislike to you,.,.." ii:21b.
"....and fight the polytheists all together as they
fignt you all together, " ix: 55.
It is revealing to observe that the parts of tne 
Qur'an advising tolerance are mostly Meccan, -while force­
ful measures are encouraged in the Medina suras. On tne
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whole tne resort to force constitutes tne main feature 
of policy adopted after the hijrah. however, this can 
be explained on reasonable grounds.
We shall leave aside the theological argument, 
indicating that the Prophet was strictly following the 
orders of God when he adopted a pacifist policy in Mecca, 
and an assertive one in Medina. Such methods of approach 
are dogmatic, and may be accepted only on belief or trust. 
On that assumption, no one should question the messenger1s 
actions because, he was "obeying implicitly the orders 
issued to him by God." (28) Obviously, this is not tne 
line of reasoning adhered to in this work. Our efforts 
are mainly directed to the discovery of the motives 
behind the Prophet’s dealing with the various problems 
of his life's work. We are guided by tne view th&t he 
is a morally responsible agent, quite capable of 
accounting for his actions on rational bases.
What, we may ask, were the pointers of his policy in 
Medina? A study of his background there, together with an 
examination of tne events which took place after the 
Hijrah may provide an answer.
1. The number of adherents of Islam in Medina 
greatly increased. Muhammad felt his position getting 
stronger every day. The rest of the citizens of that 
town who had not yet adopted tne new religion, were not
openly actively hostile to him. xhat made his task 
easier and prompted him to greater efforts, because 
it was easier for him to win to his side a neutral 
rather than an aggressive population.
2. Muhammad had to convince the Medinese that the 
emigrants or Muhajirs were not a party of parasitic 
refugees coming to compete with the native population 
in securing a livelihood. On arriving at Medina some 
Muhajirs proudly declined the genuine offer of hospit­
ality, and asked to be shown the way to tne market­
place. They were certain that their business ability 
would secure tnem a comfortable living without resort 
to the generosity of their hosts. (29)
3. At the same time Muhammad must have found it 
necessary to demonstrate in a concrete form his 
adherence to the new city. His raids on the Meccan 
caravans exhibited his change of clan loyalty in an 
unmistakable manner.
4. It was obvious to the Prophet that, if he really 
wanted his cause to prevail, Mecca must be subdued. It 
was undoubtedly the most important centre in the whole 
of the Arabian Peninsula. Its strategic geographical 
position, and its bearing on the religious and cultural 
life of the country made that decision a foregone 
conclusion. He had only to prepare himself and wait
for the chance, or create it when the opportune moment
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arrived, before everything else, he wanted to show the 
Meccans that the very things that caused their persistent 
hostility to him were now in a greater peril. They 
opposed him mainly out of selfish motives. Therefore, 
it was incumbent upon him to frustrate the aims they 
wanted to achieve through opposition.
These points may justify his change of tactics; 
for his tactics rather than his strategy altered to 
meet the demands of the new situation, his original plan 
of proclaiming Islam was uniform all his apostolic life.
To achieve his purpose Muhammad had to insure peace 
and unity not only among the Muhajirs and An^ar, but 
between all the Muslims and non-Muslims in Medina; in 
otner words, he had to create a new unity among a commun­
ity of people of different religious views. What unity 
was practicable in that case but the political one? 
Therefore, Muhammad had to organise tne already existent 
body-politic into a State. We do not agree with others 
(30) that the Prophet created a State; for no single 
man can create a State. This is not intended to belittle 
Muhammad^ valuable contribution to the establishment of 
Arab unity. The part he played was indeed very 
impressive.
Prom the standpoint of political theory, however, the 
creation of a State implies the transformation of a 
collective body of men from a condition of nature, to
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one of maturity. Such a process of development takes 
longer than tne span of life of any man. Besides, It 
is an organic growth which cannot be hastened materially 
by tne active nelp of one man or a small group of men. 
(51)
To glorify the work of the prophet, some Muslims 
maintain that he found Arabia in a condition of nature, 
and changed it during his life-time into a fully 
consolidated, and united nation. The same misC*ppre - 
hension is also apparent in statements asserting that,
"the histories of Ital^y and Germany begin respectively 
with Cavour or Bismarck or thereabouts.” (32) The 
suggestions that hitler created the third Reich, and 
Mussolini Fascist Italy are equally wrong. To re­
organise or reform a state does not mean its creation. 
Assumptions of this sort, are condemned by Collingwood 
as nonsense, uand nonsense many centuries out of date.*' 
(33)
Referring to “the state of nature in Medina", Ilyas 
Ahmad says: "socially and morally, this part of Arabia 
was as low in the scale of civilisation as any other 
part of that country." (34) let he admits in the 
following page that "at the time of the First Pledge
of ^-Aqaba...... it seemed that there was peace, goodwill,
mutual assistance and preservation because it was a
state of equality and liberty of each individual."
(55) And, it is obvious of course, that tne influence 
of Muhammad on the community of Medina was exercised after 
and not before the rledges of al-^Aqabah. In point of 
fact, however, a people who, in the words of Buhl, were 
seeking in the Prophet "a saviour from their social and 
political difficulties," (3o) could not have been very 
backward or low. iiven the assumption that they were . 
conscious of their social problems and anxious to solve 
them, is in itself an indication of a fairly healthy stage 
of development before the arrival of the Prophet.
Even assuming that Medina was in dire need of a capable 
and resourceful leader to settle its affairs that does 
not mean that it was in a primitive political state.
Be that as it may, the Prophet supplied the demand, and 
very ably discharged the duties of a prophet-statesman.
It is necessary to estimate the extent of Muhammad’s 
original thought ih the field of politics. Whether or not 
he embarked on that course to serve his religious aims, is 
irrelevant to the present argument. There is reason to 
hold that his political and military successes, perhaps 
more than any other factors, have helped in tne establish­
ment and consolidation of Islam, ne seems to have worked 
according to a well conceived, and clearly defined plan, 
ftis policy aimed at steady progress. Towards his goal he 
advanced with measured but sure steps. Jdis success did not
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cause him to hasten, nis experience must have convinced 
him that it was better to have a few sincere and faith­
ful adherents, than to have many reluctant or hypocrit­
ical ones, ne always guarded his back against sudden 
attack, and made certain that in case of a reverse, 
his followers would not forsake him or revolt against 
him. Little by little he widened his circle, and after 
every triumph devoted himself to the consolidation of 
his gains, before unfolding plans for further action, 
in his own mind, he must have had supreme confidence 
and faith in the righteousness of his cause, an asset 
indispensable to any leader. Let us see how he worked 
and fulfilled his plans.
1. uHITX AT HOME.
In spite of his awareness of the mutual distrust 
and suspicion between the Jewish and non-jewish Arabs 
in Medina, the Prophet tried to unite in peace all the 
members of his new community. (3v) As far as was 
practicable he dispensed with the principal loyalty 
based on the tribal or clan unity, and persuaded his 
followers to adopt an abstract political bond Instead. 
Seemingly that was an Idea of his own. It followed 
naturally from the unification of the Muhajirs and 
Angar under the banner of Islam. The compact with tne 
Jews which he had contracted for unat purpose was a 
necessary expedient, that had to be undertaken in tne
interests of the City-State of Medina. (36) It 
ensured peace which was the prerequisite of the 
development of his plans.
Although•that compact confirmed tne principle 
of religious tolerance in Islam, ‘and gave equal 
status in civic rights to all citizens, it was not 
a compromise between Islam and Judaism or any other 
religion. For while the Qur'an holds that, "God 
will explain - in the next world - tne differences 
between religions," it tells the Muslims at the same 
time that, in the eyes of God Islam is the religion 
par excellence. (39) To tolerate a thing does not 
Imply its acceptance. ‘Particularly in matters of 
religious belief, what one considers to be true 
implies that all other propositions are :felse. (40)
The agreement with the Jews should therefore be 
viewed as an inevitable step in the unification of 
lathrib. Muhammad was quite aware tnat he and his 
followers were still but an insignificant minority 
tnat could be crushed under a determined attack. He 
could not risk having disunited and hostile factions 
in his own city. The wisdom of that policy was clearly 
demonstrated after his defeat at 'Uhud. Had tne 
Meccans then pressed their success home to Medina, 
or had the Jews been obviously dissatisfied and 
broken out in revolution at his back, thus blocking
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his line of retreat, the course of world history might indeed 
have been different.(41) On the other hand that political com­
promise with members of a different religion entailed no material 
sacrifice to the Muslims, because at that time Muhammad was the 
head of the state, and could hardly be expected to sanction 
anything that would jeopardise the interests of his religion 
and its followers. On the contrary, all his efforts were de­
voted to furthering and propagating the cause for which he 
lived and worked. It remains to his credit that he was the 
initiator of that great unity among the Arabs, The idea itself, 
was simple, yet unique; simple because it was the most natural 
and immediate plan to take; unique because it introduced an 
abstract thought in place of the hitherto obvious and concrete 
one of blood ties. Further, it had not been successfully 
attempted before in Arabia, ho longer were the people united 
through the accident of descent from a common father. Their 
unity was now resting on ideals of thought and ties of creed.
So strong and so real was the new bond of Islam that men of 
the same tribe fought against their kinsmen in defence of 
their concepts, a thing unheard of before in tnat land.(4^)
The originality' of xviuhammad’s idea was the more remarkable be­
cause of its unnatural character to the Arab environment.
Small and scattered communities separated from each other by 
seas of sand, tend to oe self-centred, independent, and re­
sentful of any external encroachment on their liberty. Yet
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the prophet brought home to then the idea that there was a 
greater link, in many ways more real and more advantageous, 
that could hold tne loyalties of groups and individuals, 
while any man could still retain his freedom in all ways, and. 
develop to the full his character and personality under the 
new pattern of thought, the basic unit in tn state was ex­
pressed in terms of groups as well as of individuals. That 
was an appreciable advance politically and morally; poli­
tically, because it introduced the principle of allegiance 
to tne city and its citizens; and morally because, as Dr. 
Temple ably expresses it, "Moral progress has largely con­
sisted in the expansion of the area within which obligation 
and loyalty are recognised to exist. At first th^^Ls loyal­
ty only to the clan, and obligation is scarecely recognised 
in relation to members of other clans.(43)
Before the introduction of this idea as a general prin­
ciple, the Prophet formed personal brotherhoods valid for 
legal purposes between men unrelated by family ties. (44) The 
various marriages which he contracted after the Hi.1 rah, may 
also be looked upon as positive measures in the realisation 
of that policy. All along he seems to have aimed at binding 
bis followers to himself and then to each other by every 
possible tie.(45) But it was hardly to be expected that this 
abstract idea would meet with instant and unqualified success. 
Hew thoughts need to be digested mentally and appreciated
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fully before, they begin to modify one's behaviour. The clan 
loyalty had previously served the people well, and had for 
generations been the pivot of group attachment; therefore, 
it was not easy at a moment1s notice to uproot it and dis­
pense with it. In fact it was an innate weakness in the 
moral temper of the Arabs that they could not be brought to 
realise the equality of all men. a fact so often stressed in 
the Qurfan and Muhammad1s injunctions. This defect proved 
later to be a major cause in the downfall of the Arab Empire. 
It is apparent, therefore, that in his attempt to establish 
unity at home Muhammad had to contend with the difficulties 




As soon as the Prophet thought he had founded a solid 
and united home front, he turned his attention to subduing 
his persecutors and antagonists. This action was not under­
taken for the mere sake of vengeance or retaliation.(46) It 
was embarked upon simply because he felt he was in a position 
to assert himself, and his cause, with the weapon that had 
often been used against him without any justification, ne 
felt he was on strong ground, and his resolution was sharpened 
because he possessed a body of resolute and dependable men 
who admitted his .spiritual leadership and were ready to obey
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his every word,. Behind him Medina was a hospitable place 
of refuge. That city with its inhabitants was a source of 
great encouragement to him. ho longer was he looked upon as 
the despised head of an illegal band. Even then,his pledged 
supporters were not numerous; but, their devotion and moral 
discipline compensated for the meagreness of their number.
The rest of the non-Muslim inhabitants were bound by conven­
tion to be either sympathetic or benevolently neutral. The 
worst of them were not actively hostile to him. jie was ready 
to fight; in other words, he was now prepared for his armed 
jihad. (47)
We accept as a fact thar armed force was at one time 
in the history of Islam resorted to as a means of spreading 
religion. Many Muslim writers have devoted time and energy 
to the interpretation of that phenomenon. The crux of their 
argument was that tne Jihad was a defensive and not an off­
ensive measure.(48) Be that as it may, there is no escaping 
the Qur'anic text that the sword, in certain circumstances 
is a legal means of upholding the Islamic faith.(49) Re­
member however, that the same sacred book is quite clear and 
definite on the principle of freedom of religion and tole­
rance of other beliefs.
The simplest and perhaps the most logical way out of 
this dilemma would be to seek the interpretation of these 
verses with an eye on the political background at that par­
ticular
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time. Although from the Muslim point of view the Qur’anic 
injunctions are permanent and universal, that is, generally 
valid for all time and in all circumstances, we notice tnat 
the verses allowing armed violence invariably have a cha­
racteristic Arabian setting. For example, Qur.ii;190 f, are 
retaliatory in nature; "fight (Ar. qatilu) in the way of 
Allah those who fight you, and do not start aggression; 
surely Allah does not love the aggressors.” 191: "and kill 
them whex^ever you find them, and drive them out from whence 
they drove you, and sedition is severer than killing; and 
do not fight them at the sacred mosque until they fight you 
in it...tf Qur.ii:217, gives the law concerning battles or 
fighting during the sacred mnnths. It is obvious that the 
sacred fflnths were a purely Arabian institution. The just­
ification of this policy of positive or retaliatory aggression 
is not difficult to defend. The Prophet found that as long 
as the Arabs, and In particular the Meccans, retained their 
religious institutions, their pride and independent character 
remained intact, as long as Mecca continued to have independ­
ence, it constituted a potent threat to Islam, and encircled 
it in a spiritual siege. Therefore, in order that these fet­
ters might be broken, and In order to insure the future of 
his religion, Muhammad had to subdue that proud city, and 
humble to the ground its arrogant chiefs. Once that task 
was accomplished, and once the Meccans confessed their Islam,
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even by lip service, the whle desert would follow suit. To 
some people physical violence is the most convincing argument. 
Whether the defeated foe was sincere in his confession of faith 
or not, did not matter very much; only uod knows the secrets 
of hearts, nut the possibility always remained that new ge­
nerations would be born in Islam, and take its teachings for 
granted.
A
3. THE CONQUEST OF MECCA.
Mecca was conquered peacefully at hudaibiyyah.(50) The 
Muslim victory without a shot (of an arrow) was final and 
decisive. The humiliation of the mother of cities or umm 
al-qura, was so overwhelming and complete, that in the 
opinion of the jrrophet the physical surrender of the city 
and its annexation to the Muslim State were only a matter of 
time to be decided by himself. xhe prestige he acquired 
through his diplomatic success on that occasion was great.
But the material advantage to the Muslim cause was even 
greater. “Cette remarquable victoire diplomatique du Pro- 
phete mit les Quraishites dans un etat d{isolement total.“ (51) 
In conformity with his policy of steady progress, he realised 
that the time was ripe for extending the message of Islam
by the argument of force. The actual entry into Mecca at
the head of his victorious troops took place some two years
later, but that was in the nature of an impressive ceremony r *
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of a pre-arranged military parade rather than the culmination 
of a battle.
The importance attached to jtfudaibiyyah is based on the 
following considerations:-
(a) The mere agreement of the chiefs of Mecca to send 
delegates to negotiate with Muhammad implied his legal re­
cognition as the political head of another city-state. it 
must have been a bitter memory for the Meccans to recall that 
only six years earlier when the Prophet was in their midst 
they looked upon him as a rebel against society. Wot only 
that, but they discovered to their cost in the course of ne­
gotiations, that during his stay in Medina he had developed 
into a statesman of the first order. Their best negotiators 
were no matcn for him. with the exception of the last one, 
suhail b. UAmr, the rest returned to their chiefs to report 
their failure, undoubtedly Muhammad made the most of his 
intellectual brilliance oh that occasion.
(b) For the first time in the history of Mecca, the 
supremacy of its religious position was put at a serious dis­
advantage. Through lack of vision, the Meccan delegates ag­
reed that the tribes were now free to join the party of Mu­
hammad, that is to say the Muslim community, if they wished.
(c) Although Muhammad and his adherents were not 
allowed to perform the ceremony and ritual of the pilgrimage 
in that year, tneir right to do so was legally established
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by the Convention of Hudaibiyyah. xhe institution of the 
pilgrimage to Mecca as a feature of Islam, and the retention 
of dahilite ritual connected witn it were among the main 
factors in reconciling the meccans to is 15m, and inducing 
other tribes to join in the new and youthful community of be­
lievers. (52) wMecca,M says Essad Bey, "was suddenly to be­
come the centre of the Islamic world. Mohammed made Mecca 
and the Caabe, which drew the hearts of the Bedouins like a 
magnet, the spiritual centre of his anti-Meccan faith. xhe 
victory of Islam over Arabia could only be certain when Mecca 
and Islam should have been fused together, when they should 
have become one in the minds of the Bedouins. The method 
which Mohammed chose gave evidence of a statesman-like vision, 
of a diplomatic capability possessed by no one else in the 
desert.” (53)
(d) The extent of that victory was not hidden from 
Muhammad, nor wsus its importance minimised because he entered 
into negotiations with the Meccan unbelievers and reached a 
compromised agreement with them. He knew what he was doing , 
and if actions are to be fudged by their results, the outcome 
of that treaty proved in a short time that his estimate of 
the situation was perfectly sound, some of his uncompromising 
lieutenants open~ly expressed their dissatisfaction with his 
conciliatory attitude on tnat occasion, uthers did not quite 
grasp the significance of that bloodless triumph. iTJmar in
his characteristic impulsiveness exclaimed to the Prophet.(54) 
"Are you not the messenger of Allah?”
"Yes, i am,” answered tne Prophet.
"And are we not the Muslims?”
"Certainly J ”
"And are they not the unbelievers?”
"Yes, they are.”
"Why then should we bargain with them about our religion?”
"I am the servant and messenger of Allah, and will never 
disobey His commands; and I am certain He will not for­
sake me.” concluded, the prophet.
On the way back to medina, the muslim caravan was mov­
ing steadily and peacefully across the desert. The Prophet 
in great contentment was reciting a new chapter from the 
^ur’an. "Verily, vie have given you a resounding victory. ” (5b) 
Even then some people were still unconvinced. “Is it really 
a victory? ” said one man to the prophet.
"By whom in whose hand my soul Is , it is a victory.” said
i
the Prophet. (5b)
Commenting on the Hudaibiyyah truce, al-Euhri says,
“no greater victory than that was ever attained In Islaijj.
In the two years that foll&ed the truce, the number of adhe­
rents equalled the combined total of earlier ones.*' Ibn 
Hî jaam confirms this statement by asserting that, “the Pro­
phet went to Hudaibiyyah at the head of fourteen hundred men,
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and only two years later on entering Mecca he was followed 
by ten thousand Muslims," (57)
Maulvl Muhammad t-AlI say§, "The truce at Hudaibiyyah 
was surely a real victory for the Muslims, because it opened 
the way for the propagation of Islam among the unbelievers 
and by putting a stop to hostilities gave the opponents an 
occasion to ponder over the merits of the religion against 
which they had hitherto struggled in ;vain in the field of 
battle.w (58)
Dr. Haikal says, "There is no doubt that the Convention 
of Hudaibiyyah was a brilliant conquest. The days proved 
that the political wisdom and foresight inherent in it had 
the greatest influence on the future of Islam and the Arabs; 
subsequent events confirmed the immense profit gained at 
Hudaibiyyah; for only two months later, the way was paved 
for the invitation issued by Muhammad to the Kings, and heads 
of foreign States to join Islam.*’ (59)
4. THE INVITATION TO NON-ARABS.
Muslim historians agree that Muhammad sent envoys to 
deliver invitations to the reigning emperors and monarchs 
of his time asking them to follow Islam, and thus to sur­
render their sovereignty to him. The mission of these en­
voys is supposed to have taken place in the year six of the 
Hijrah, after the truce of Hudaibiyyah. The texts differed
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in content and tone, some were very mild and indicative .of
diplomatic skill and tact in approach. Others were terse,
peremptory, and intimidatory in expression, as though they
were ultimata of war rather than peaceful communications.(60)
The authenticity of these documents has been questioned.
Dr. Bell suggests that they ’’are of very doubtful genuineness
and stories regarding their reception by those to whom they
were addressed are manifest fables."' (61) Commenting on the
letter sent to heraclius Muir says: ’’The terms of this and
other despatches are altogether uncertain. The drafts given
by tradition, with the replies, are apocryphal, and tinged
with the idea of universal conquest, as yet existing (if
at all) only in embryo. The ordinary copy of the letter to
Heraclius contains a passage from the Kor’an which, as shown
by Weil, was not revealed till the ninth year of the Hijra.”(o2)
A Muslim writer -Dr. Hamidullah- maintains that ”Le probl^me
/de 1*authenticite est plus delicat...En 1*absence des ori-
ginaux, ^historien est oblige de s!en tenir aux ouvrages
classiques qui en donnent copie.(65) On the whole he takes a
middle course in assessing the genuineness of the documents.
/ /In his opinion, some "solvent generalement etre consideres 
comme authentique ," others are ’’sans aucun doute , d s inven­
tion posterieure.’’(64)
There is reason to hold that these criticisms are not 
without justification. Muslim chroniclers and historians,
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in repeating tne same story or event, often stretch their 
imagination, and givw scope to their literary faculties.
The inevitable result is that accounts of the same incident 
are often differently stated. Yet the variations are on a 
certain theme, ubviously, it would be credulous to suppose 
that, because there are many reports of a certain event, it 
follows that it must have had some origin in reality. In 
this particular case, however, the evidence in support of 
missions to the then world rulers is rather convincing, 
fhe authenticity of the documents delivered on those occa­
sions -assuming there were any- may be open to doubt; but, 
the actual contact of Muhammad, through his envoys, with 
those dignitaries is probable. It is one thing to suggest 
that the letters in the form handed down to us are fictitious, 
and another to conclude that the invitations did not take 
place.
The general agreement on the date -b A.H.- strongly 
supports the argument. It is safe to assume that by the truce 
of Hudaibiyyah, the Prophet became convinced that the fate of 
Mecca was sealed, he therefore decided to push forward his 
plans of political expansion in the name of religion yet an­
other step. Arab writers give the impression that! in reveal­
ing his thoughts of a universal mission, the rrophet was very 
guarded and apologetic to his companions . “One day after 
Hudaibiyyah, 11 says Ibn Hi sham, 11 the Messenger of Allah said
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to M s  companions, Allah has sent me as a universal mercy to 
all people; so do not disagree with me." After explaining 
to them what he meant, he selected envoys from them, and en­
trusted them to deliver the invitation to Islam.”(6 5) The 
names of the envoys were known and hauded down to posterity. 
Further, it is suggested that one of the rulers -the Roman 
Governor of Egypt- though tactfully refusing the surrender 
of his sovereignty to Muhammad, had nevertheless presented 
him with two slave women -in some reports four- one of whom 
became his wife and mother of his only son. (06).
We conclude, therefore, that contact between Muhammad 
and other rulers was highly probable.
5. THE LIQUIDATION OF THE JEWS.
The Prophet is reputed to have said in his last illness
that "two religions cannot exist in the land of the Arabs.”(67)
If that is so, then it provides a proof of the clear distinct-
*
ion between religion and politics, and their possible inde­
pendence of each other in Islam. For it must have been ob­
vious to Muhammad that Judaism was incompatible with Islam, 
let in spite of the difference he entered into compact wltn 
the Jews soon after reaching Medina, and assured them of their 
civic liberties and religious freedom. Can we assume, there­
fore, that that contract witn the Jews was no more tnan a 
temporary expedient?
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Some historians, like Ibn Khaldun and Yatqubi,(b8 ) take
the battle against the Jews for granted, and do not consider
it necessary to detail the reasons for such a deterioration 
rin delations between two groups bound together by a soilemn 
pledge. Others (69) maintain that the persistent hypocrisy 
and insincerity of the Jews were constant sources of anxiety 
to the rrophet and the Muslims. It is not difficult to see 
that their hostility was tolerated until the opportune moment 
had arisen for securing a decision by force of arms. Accounts 
of the battle of Khaibar suggest that the jews were taken 
completely by surprise.
6. THE FORMAL SURRENDER OF MECCA.
The signatories at Hudaibiyyah pledged their parties to 
keep the truce for ten years. In reality not more than two 
years had elapsed before the truce was broken and rendered in­
valid. The Meccans were accused of violating its terms first.(70) 
From general historical observation, it is usually the stronger 
who breaks agreements, if he is ruthless enough, and provided 
the move is to his advantage. The weaker party as a rule is 
also commonly indicted for initiating the breach of contract, 
be that as it may, had the Muslim party not been in a superior 
/ position, they would nut hste attested their march against 
Mecca. The Frophet had made up his mind that the time had 
come to subdue the rebellious city of mecca and end its
independence. rhe pleading of Abu Sufyan for the continuation 
of the tx-uce was ignored. The man himself'was humiliated 
and refused audience of the Prophet. The fate of that city 
was already sealed and mediation was indeed of no avail.
On his victorious entry into the capital, Muhammad un­
doubtedly exhibited remarkable self-restraint and magnanimity; 
for it certainly needs great moral courage to have one's own 
foe laid low and yet forgive him. To the citizens of Mecca, 
who only a few years earlier had been irreconcilable in their 
hostility to Islam and its preacher, a general amnesty was 
given. It was the greatest expression of thanks to God who 
granted final victory to Muhammad and his arms. Only a few 
men and women were put to death. 50 bitter' was the Prophet 
against those revilers, that he ordered their execution, neven 
though they sought sanctuary under the curtains of the KaUoah 
itself". (71)
Viewed from the moral and political angles, however, no 
other course of action could possibly have been of greater 
value to the cause of Islam. Muhammad’s splendid behaviour 
on that occasion was certainly a vivid demonstration of nis 
moral greatness, and a proof of the loftiness of his purpose; 
for at the moment of his tri^umph, painful memories of the 
past subsided and the enemies were forgiven. £b.e Meccans as 
a result were reconciled to accepting the inevitable, imo 
drastic change took place among the administrators of the
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city. He thought it wise to confirm them in their offices 
under the banner of his religion, Their loyal services and 
co-operation were thus secured. xhe whole conduct of that 
bloodless campaign reflected great credit on the human under­
standing and diplomatic acumen of the prophet.
7. THE TRIBAL DELEGATIONS TO THE PROPHET.
The year 10 of the Hijrah witnessed the conversion en 
masse of many Arab tribes. This movement actually smarted 
in the year 9 A.H. or slightly earlier.(72) Delegates em­
powered to represent their people travelled to Medina and 
confessed Islam on behalf of their tribes. The Prophet wel­
comed them and accepted their profession of faith. Tiach de­
putation was sent back with a political agent, sometimes 
accopmpanied by a learned Muslim to teach the principles 
of religion.
That movement was a voluntary one, and consequently no 
bloodshed was entailed. It included representative bodies 
from nearly the whole Peninsula. The political agents of 
Muhammad attached to the newly converted localities were not 
appointed to supersede the original tribal bhiefs. They 
were mainly concerned with the collection of the tithe. 
Apparently, they were also keen observers and kept the prophet 
well informed of all that was taking place in their spheres 
of duty, some of these agents actually judged and adminis-
/tered
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the laws of Islam. (73)
The movement of mass conversion had a political as well 
as a religious significance. That if followed so quickly after 
the conquest of Mecca was itself a proof that religion might 
not have heen the primary factor in the matter, we tend to 
believe that after the surrender of Mecca, the chiefs of the 
other tribes became so convinced of the power of Muhammad, 
that they thought it would be wiser to join him freely ra­
ther than be forced to do so in a short while. Further, it 
seemed to them that it was now a case of the Arabs fighting 
as a unified whole against the non-Arabs. There could be no 
great loss of face if all the tribes joined forces with Mu­
hammad. The battle of fabuk demonstrated to them that the 
Muslim army was sufficiently strong to challenge and possibly 
defeat the Byzantine forces. The fact that Mecca surrendered 
last, yet was sharing equally In the booty, must have hastened 
their decision in favour of Islam. In any case those tribes 
knew well that they could not stand by themselves for any 
length of time, and had they not entered the Muhammadan ranks 
peaceably, they would have done so forcibly.
Nevertheless, Dr. Haikal's view that ”these tribes fa­
voured unity under the banner of Muhammad, the banner of Is­
lam, to the Persian tyranny”, can hardly be sustained; for 
it was not Islam that they were seeking at that stage. It 
was the fear of what would befall them If they delayed sur­
render
to it that decided their action.(74) It is obvious, of 
course, that neither the Muslim unity, nor the idea of Arab 
superiority or hegemony had taken firm root at that stage. 
Therefore, it seems that those tribal chiefs were simply 
making a virtue of necessity, and were thus keeping their 
authority intact by initiating the move themselves. However, 
the conversion implied no drastic change in the normal life 
of the converts; for as nitti says, ,!for a tribe to become 
Moslem in those days simply meant that its chiefs so became.1 (7o) 
It is certain that a great number of those men did not see 
the prophet personally -there are no records of any visits 
made by him to those areas- but they accepted his suzerainty 
nevertheless.
rhe Prophet was quite aware that some of his adherents 
had been swept into the tide of Islam without really under­
standing its meaning or aims. The essence of religion is 
not in the automatic performance of certain rites, nor is it 
in the public confession of any specific principles. Religion 
is a positive act of genuine belief. It is a mode of life 
based on the solid conviction in the existence of a divine 
power ruling over, and controlling the whole universe, vifhat 
it amounts to in reality is a spiritual relationship between 
man*s conscience and the Creator. Outward manifestations 
count for very little If one is lacking in the inner light of 
faith. Muhammad made this point quite clear. The Qur’an
8b.
i
says: MThe dwellers of the desert say: we believe. Say;
you have not attained belief: therefore say we have sub­
mitted; for faith has not yet entered your hearts..." (7b)
8 . ISLAM: THE RELIGION OF ARABIA.
The closing years of the rrophet’s life witnessed the
fulfilment to an appreciable extent of his main ambition; 
that is, the establishment of Islam as a religion. Some of 
his close companions grasped firmly his teaching, and modelled 
their life on his lofty principles. They thus became worthy 
disciples of his. The rest attained varied degrees of faith, 
un the other hand, many people though admittedly Muslims, 
were only so in name and no more. The success of the Medina 
adventure and the setting up of Islam as the main religion
of that city-state, must have encouraged the rrophet to ex­
tend the experiment to cover the widest possible field.
That seems to have been the pointer of his policy. In fact 
he demonstrated to all the Arabs that it was profitable for 
them morally and materially to hold Islam.
His next step was to show them in the same unmistakable 
manner that it was unprofitable for them no hold any other 
faith. There is strong reason to suppose that the Qur*anic 
verses urging the Muslims to purge all non-muslims refer only 
to residents in Arabia.(77) Idol worshippers are to be killed, 
and non-Muslim believers in God are to be fought till nhey pay
87
tiie Jizyah, which is the 4tax taken from tne free non-Muslim 
subjects of the Muslim government whereby they ratify the 
compact that ensures them protection^ 78) To the self-assert­
ing Arab this is both humiliating and unpalatable. Besides, 
in the narratives containing these verses there are other de­
finite indications restricting the application of certain 
sanctions to the Muslim holy-land. For example
(a) The prevention of heathens from performing the pilgrim­
age to rnecca.(79)
(b) The reminder that it was they who first started aggress­
ion and molested the frophet.(80)
(c) The promise of compensation to the Meccans in the case 
of material loss resulting from the decrease in the number 
of tourists during the season of pilgrimage.(SI)
It is needless to say that it was only the heathen 
Arabs who made pilgrimage to Mecca, and it was they or at 
least a party of them who opposed and persecuted muhammad, 
and it was the Meccans who were liable to lose in case of 
deterioration of tourist trade. Thus we see that the whole 
setting was an Arabian one. If this interpretation is found 
plausible, then the suggestions of Islamic intolerance are 
rendered invalid. The truth seems to be that this alleged 
intolerance was only a protective measure, and not an aggress­
ive move against other religions.
Muhammad must have been in earnest about the unification
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and Islamisation of the whole of Arabia. On the authority 
of mmar, the Prophet is supposed to have advised shortly 
before his death the expulsion of the Jews from the Arab­
ian P eninsula.(8 2)
9. THE SERMON ON MOUNT VARAFAT.
The last memorable public function held by Muhammad 
was tne Farewell Pilgrimage. Many times before he had visi­
ted the Kabbah; but on that last occasion (10 A.H.) the 
setting was different. It was the greatest Muslim rally ever 
witnessed by the man who preached submission to Allah, the 
Lord of heaven and earth. The holy sanctuary, for many years 
the centre of heathen pilgrimage, was on that day reserved 
for Muslims only.(8b) The Prophet had strong reason to give 
praise to the Almighty. At that moment of justifiable pride 
and exhilaration, the principal Muslim realised that his 
mission had been fulfilled and his duty finally discharged. He 
preached a sermon to ipany of the listeners from distant tribes, 
his last sermon, nis words as usual, were uttered with the 
great passion derived from absolute conviction. The voice 
of Muhammad was deep and moving. silence reigned all over, 
and the echo of his words was clearly audible in the neigh­
bouring houses.(84) But the strain of the heavy burden that 
he had unflinchingly shouldered for long years was already 
telling on him. Yet he was glad to watch the multitudes
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performing the full rites of tnat ceremony according to the is-, 
lamic rules, prom that day, no other god was worshipped in that 
vicinity, The walls of the Katbah resounded with words of 
praise in thanks to Allah, At lArafat, so great was the num­
ber of people that the voice of the Prophet could not reach 
them all and Habi^ah b. Umayyah had to relay it. v8b)
’‘Oh People! M said the prophet, ‘̂listen carefully to 
what l say, perhaps I may never meet you again in this place."
He then proceeded with his sermon. He advised uhe believers 
to take care of themselves, and their property; to be con­
siderate towards their neighbours, and kind to women. He 
reminded them strongly of the prohibition of usury, and re­
emphasised its untold harm to society, ne stressed the im­
portance of unity, discipline, and obedience to the le&dei' 
whoever he may be. "Oh peoplei listen and obey even though 
an Abyssinian slave were in command over .you, as long as he 
rules according to the Book of Allah.H (8b) H0h People i I 
am leaving with you that which will never cause you to be led 
astray as long as you adhere to its prescriptions." (87) 
n0h People ! listen to, and understand my words. Know that 
the Muslims are brothers, and no one has any right to his 
.brother;! s possessions, except that which has been given 
willingly; therefore, do not bring injustice upon yourselves.” 
In the afternoon of that memorable day, a famous Qur’anic 
verse (v;3) was revealed. "This day have I perfected for you
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your religion and completed My favour on you, and chosen
Islam for you as a religion;...“ On hearing this verse,
the gatnering understood perfectly that the work of that
great man had reached completion, i'hey then silently dismantled
their tents and dispersed each to his own locality.
Muhammad and his party returned to Medina. i\iot long 
afterwards, illness overwhelmed his already exhausted re­
sistance. He died on the 12th Rabi^ al-awwal, 11 A.H. /
June, 632 A.D. And thus ended a most memorable chapter in 
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called Shirin, a eunach called Mabur, a male called 
Daldal, a donkey called LAfir or YaLfur, and some 
honey from the province of Benha.u Al-Muqawqas, 
nevertheless, retained his Christianity.
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PART TWO.
AN ESTIMATE OP THE POLITICAL IDEAS 
IN THE QUR’AN AND TRADITION.
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CH. Ill 
•EVIDENCE PROM THE QUR'AN.
i.
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Islam in Its final form was declared a universal reli­
gion. Qur.vii:157, "Say: 0 People » surely I am the
apostle of Allah to you all...”'
Qur.xxxiv:28, "We have not sent you but to all the men as 
a bearer of good news and a warner,..."
Qur. xxl:107, "We have not sent you but as a mercy to all 
the nations.“ In his comment on this verse, Maulvi M. VAli
says, "whereas every prophet before him { i.e. Muhammad) was 
sent as % mercy to a particular people he is sent as a mercy 
to the whole world." (1 )
For the proper life of Islam the Qur’an does not sug­
gest the creation of a particular state or any State. The 
dominion of religion is one's own conscience. It appears to 
us, tnat there is no ordinance or definite divine command 
for the creation of a Muslim State or empire, The Book, 
nevertheless, lays down some general moral rules for the well­
being of all men in any form of society. These, if applied, 
would ensure the peace and prosperity of any community, poli­
tical or otherwise. This Qur’anic viewpoint.may be summar­
ised as follows
1. THE VARIETY OF NATIONS.
God created different tribes and nations and intended 
them to retain their identity, xie ordered that they should 
establish good relations with one another, and show earnest-
/ness
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In His worship, in the eyes of God the chosen or most honour­
ed people are the most pious . Qur.xlix:1 2, rr0 you men! 
surely We have created you of a male and female, and made 
you nations and trihes that you m^y know each other: surely
the most honourable of you with Allah is the most pious; 
surely Allah is knowing, aware.Commenting on this verse 
M. tAli says, “The principle of the brotnerhood of man 
laid down here is on the broadest basis... divisions into 
nations... should not lead to estrangement from, but to a 
better knowledge of each other, superiority of one over an­
other in this vast brotherhood does not depend on nationality, 
wealth or rank, but on the careful observance of duty -moral 
greatness.’* (2 )
Nations were intended to be different, and should remain 
so. x̂ ach should lead its own life, follow its own laws and 
morae. If God had wanted, He would have integrated all peo­
ples into one. ^ur.v:51, "...for every one of you did We 
appoint a law and a way, and if allah had pleased, He. would
have made you all a single nation...“ Qur.xi:119, '‘if your
8.Lord had pleased ae would certainly hare made people a single 
nation,...n These differences, however, are manifestations 
of Divine Power, and are declared as signs or «ayat of His 
omnipotence. Q,ur.xxx:22, "One of His signs is th© creation 
of the heavens and earth, and the diversity of your tongues and 
colours; verily these are signs (i.e. convincing evidence)
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to the learned.*' (3)
2. THE PRINCIPLE OF JUSTICE.
Justice is the main pillar of the State, injustice is 
the doom of nations. ^ur.iv;58, ’'...and if you judge bet­
ween people you must judge,with justice...n This verse does 
not refer to legal arbitration only, but also to the method of 
State management oy men of high competence and moral integri­
ty. The whole verse simply stateside '-reciprocal duties of 
the governed to the governors and of the governors to the 
governed." (4)
doQur.xlii:15, "I am commanded to-pjustice between you."
Qur.v;9, "0 you who believe i be upright for Allah, bearers 
of witness with justice, and let not hatred of a people in­
cite you not to act equitably; act equitably, that is nearer 
to piety, and be careful of Allah; surely Allah is aware 
of what you do."
Justice in the Qur’an is conceived as a universal law; 
hence the strict and impartial application of its principles 
irrespective of who is dealt witn. Some Muslims interpret 
this verse and similar ones, in the light of moder politics, 
and suggest that the Qur’an laid down the foundation of a 
law of nation. (5) M. WUi says; "Islam alone can serve as 
an international law, requiring equal treatment for all na­
tions." (b) Be that as it may, it is true that the above
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quotations supplemented bj/ otiiers ,give an encouraging pict­
ure ol' the ^ur’anic point of view on national and international 
justice. On the whole, however, charity, and tolerance are 
prominent features of Islamic teachings. In fact, it seems 
highly doubtful whetner any religion does actually incite 
active hostility to others, we think that no system of be­
liefs can aspire to call itself a religion if it does not 
sustain equity, tolerance, and freedom of conscience.
There is reason for supposing that the Muslim views 
on justice between the various peoples of the world repre - 
sent a definite improvement on the classic! notion of Tlato 
and Aristotle asserting that, "where the existence of other 
states is specifically referred to, it is assumed that the only 
relation whiclothey can have to the State is one pf hostility.
Thus the natural or juristic relation of one (ireek state to 
another was one of latent enmity, and ’was recognized as such.” (7) 
But it should be mentioned that the breadth of the Muslim 
notion of justice is due mainly to the principle of univers­
ality in that religion.
Whereas the appeal of religion is directed to the human 
soul or heart, (8 ) and to men as individuals, the concern of 
politics is the State, society, or community. Its basic unit 
is the group and not the individual. Even in the most ad­
vanced democracies power is exercised on behalf of the major­
ity, or the largest single group of citizens, without total
1G5
disregard towards the wishes of the other parties.
Having affirmed that justice was indispensable to the 
happiness of the individual and society, the Qur’an asserted 
with equal emphasis and clarity that its opposite, namely 
injustice, was injurious to the soul of man, and destructive 
to the Htate.
Qur.xxviii:58, M..verily We do not destroy the villages 
except when their people are unjust.n(9) Idem.xxix;31,
1 surely We are going to destroy the people of this town,- for 
its people are unjust." Idem, xi;102, 1 and such is the
punishment of your Lord when He punishes the towns while 
they are unjust; surely His punishment is painful, severe."(10)
3. CONSTRUCTION IS. THE AIM OP LIFE.
God has created the earth and all that is in it. It is, 
therefore, the duty of man not to destroy maliciously the 
work of the Creator. Those who do, will be punished. Con­
struction and not destruction should bo the object of all. 
Uur.xxvi:185 f., u...and do not act corruptly in the earth 
as destroyers. And guard against (the punishment of) Him. 
who created you and earlier nations." Idem. ii;20b, uand 
when he turns back he sets about deliberately to cause mis­
chief in the land and destroy the tilth and the stock and 
Allah does not like mischief-making." Idem. xxi:10b, "My 
righteous servants shall inherit the land." Idem lxxxixjll f.,
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"Those who acted tyrannically in the cities. And increased 
mischief in them. Therefore your Lord let down upon them a 
portion of the chastisement.“(11)
4. RELIGIONS MAY VARY.
Not only does the Qur1an assert that nations were 
intended to be different from one another, but that their 
religions and beliefs may also vary. The toleration of other 
beliefs is a duty incumbent on every true Muslim. Qur.xxii:67 f. 
"To every nation We appointed a manner of devotion which they 
observe,...Allah will judge between you on the day of resur­
rection respecting that in which you differ." "This verse 
gives us another proof of the principle of tolerance and equal 
religious freedom to all inculcated by Islam,*' (12) Com­
menting on this view, Prof. Sherwani says, "It was therefore 
something novel and startling in the history of political 
principles that the Qur’an should take variety of religious 
beliefs in a State almost for granted, and building from 
these premises, lays down for all time the magnificent ideal 
that there is' to be no compulsion in religion.s! (13)
5. THE RULE OF LAW •
Law is the instrument for protecting society, when 
the authority or governing body in the State is Muslim, then 
Muslim laws must operate. The Muslim law is a divine law.
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since it is assumed to have been revealed in the ^ur’an, it 
is looked upon as the intervention of God through direct re­
velation in the government of society. The parts of the Book 
dealing with law have been developed by Muslim savants and 
jurisconsults or the tulama1 and fuqaha*, into a wide and 
independent science called Shari*»ah_, that is technically,
"the canon law of Islam," or the "totality of Allah’s com­
mandments . " (14) In other words, the nhari*»ah which must 
be followed by every believer, is the "system of rules com­
prising every part of a Muslim’s life from the humblest de­
tails up to the principles of his moral and social existence.
A Muslim may also look for guidance to the science of 
Fiqh, which is the name given to jurisprudence' in Islam, 
and which in "its wider sense covers all aspects of reli­
gious, political, and civil life." (15)
It is not our immediate concern here to follow the 
development of these twin subjects. we need only consider 
their bearing on the political life in the state, it should 
be held in mind that they both owe their origin to the Qur’an 
Their growth and development, however, were aided by the 
Tradition, and intelligent interpretation of jurisconsults 
inĵ he course of time. If indeed there is an institution in 
the Muslim State which is truly organic, then law is that 
institution par excellence; for it grew and advanced with 
the very life of the community. we cannot say that it was
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formed by custom or popular feeling, or that it was the re­
flection of a human will acting in the field of legislation; 
but we can assert, nevertheless, that the breadth of concept­
ion and infinite wisdom of the Divine Legislator in laying 
down the general rules as a guide and leaving the working of 
the details to the people themselves, has allowed a wide scope 
for the ingenuity of the lawyers. They were thus able to deal 
with the varied problems of life with confidence and equa­
nimity.
The Muslim law is binding on all those who profess 
Islam. At the same time followers of other religions are 
not required to adhere to it, because they have the right to 
practise their own laws. Surah v. portrays this principle in 
an unmistakable fashion. The three major religions in their 
juridical aspects contain guidance from God. All revealed 
books should be respected, to the Muslims of course, the 
Qur’an is the last word in perfection and wisdom. If non- 
Muslims appeal to it for judgement they must be treated with 
all impartiality and equity.(16) During the reign of tUmar, 
a Jew brought a case against Will b. Abu Talib, and when 
LUmar came to judge between them he said to Will, u0h Abu 
fl-Hasan go and stand beside your opponent.n VAli hid not 
mind that impartial attitude from the judge, but protested 
that the use of the honorific title Abu ’1-Hasan on that oc­
casion did not show the strict neutrality expected from a
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Muslim Arbiter. (1 '7)
Yet the Qur’an has.shown surprise at the non-Muslims 
who went to the Prophet for arbitration. "And how d© they 
make you a judge and they have the Torah wherein is Allah’s 
judgment?*(18) Similarly, the right of the Christians to 
follow the lead of the Lord Jesus Christ is equally affirmed. 
"....We gave him the Gospel, in which there was guidance and 
light... and the followers of the Gospel should judge by what 
Allah has revealed in it; and those who do not dudge by what 
has been revealed by Allah, are indeed transgressors." (19)
The bases of Muslim law are righteousness or truth, i.e. 
haqq, equity or gist, and justice or ladl. Equality of all 
before the law is che indespensable condition. The subjects 
of the State may differ in religion, but justice is a uni­
versal concept that must apply to all without favour or dis­
crimination. "Judge between them with equity; surely Allah 
likes the equitable.“ (20)
Obedience to those in authority is incumbent upon the 
Muslim even though he happens to live under the jurisdiction 
of non-Muslims. This is both interesting and revealing of 
the tenacity of the Sharitab. "Obey Allah and tne Prophet 
and those in authority over you.“(21) It is quite possible 
that those in authority over a Muslim may be adherents of a 
different religion. In that case, however, compliance with 
the law should be restricted to secular matters only.(22)
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6. THE SANCTIONS OP LAW.
These are treated in the Qur»an under two headings;
(a) punitive or retaiatory measures, and (b) divine 
sanctions. The first are concrete and direct, consisting of 
punishment administered by the authority exercising power on 
behalf of society. rhe domain of this branch of law is limit­
ed to external acts only, that.is, to proven cases of violat­
ion manifested in physical deeds. The object of the eartnly 
punishment is obviously the protection of the community 
against individual aggression, and the insurance of discip­
lined promotion and steady welfare. "There is life for you 
in (the law of; retaliation, 0 men of intelligence, that 
you may guard yourselves." (2$) In the normal course, there­
fore, an action directly or indirectly harmful to the community 
is punishable by law. it does not matter whetner the aggrieved 
is an individual, a private person or body, or even if no 
apparent harm has b’een inflicted upon anyone, .for example; 
theft, non-payment oi tithes or poor tax, and tne neglect of 
prayers are all malpractices. The justification of punish­
ment for the neglect of prayers which is a personal duty to 
Grod, is that the accepted rules have been infringed.
The second, by far the more important, is the divine 
sanction. This category itself is composed of two sub­
divisions s positive and negative. On the understanding of 
this part of belief rests the whole moral basis of obedience
Ill
to the law. One obeys the law not only because Its violation 
would -if detected and proven- be punishable by society, 
but because of the conviction that, in breaking the command­
ments of God one is disobeying his Creator. This religious 
notion can be a deterrent to sinners. Even if one succeeded 
in escaping the punishment of society, he could not avoid the 
chastisement of God. On the positive side, the hope of di­
vine blessing in the next world encourages man to do what is 
right and just. Besides the hope in the expectation of re­
ward, fear plays an important role. Allah knows the heart of 
man and all the secrets of the mind. Nothing can be hidden 
from Him. Therefore, praise or condemnation will be accorded 
not only fpr the acts but for the motives as well. This 
realisation of the power of God should help man to be sincere 
in his intentions.
It is evident that, although the sanctions of the Qur’an 
are both secular and divine, there is a greater stress on the 
latter. ”Juridical order and religion, law and morals, are 
the two aspects of that same will, from which the Muslim com­
munity derives its existence and direction; every legal 
question is in itself a case of conscience, and jurisprudence 
points to theology as its ultimate base." (24) Even if a Mus­
lim sometimes fails to understand why certain things have to 
be observed and others avoided, he Is enjoined to follow the 
rules of law. In doing so he is content that in the obedience
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to God he is promoting his own interests in both worlds. For 
man acts in the belief that he has been created in this world 
for a constructive purpose, and his duty is to realise this 
object as best he can by following the right path. Whosoever 
violates the law "not only infringes the legal order , but 
commits a sin, because there is no right in which God has 
not a share.M (25)
Religion in Islam has a point of view on everything 
that affects the life of a Muslim as an individual, or as a 
social being, or in any other capacity he happens to assume, 
these opinions are expressed in the ^hari^a^. Political and 
legal considerations are of lesser importance compared with 
the religious evaluation. This difference shoud be grasped 
firmly because it constitutes the guide to the real understanding 
of a Muslim’s mind. Whether the subject discussed comes un- 
^er kibadat, that is Hthe regulations relating to worship and 
ritual duties" or mu^amalat, meaning "the regulations of a 
juridical and political nature,H(26) the ^hari iah has the 
final word; hence the stumbling block in the way of in­
dependent thought on matters demanding rational and impart­
ial judgment. And although the ffiqh -broadly speaking a 
synonym for b,hari lah- is applied to the independent ex­
ercise of intelligence, the decision of legal points by one’s 
own judgment in the absence or ignorance of tradition bearing 
on the case in question,(27) Muslim tninkers all through the
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ages could not free themselves from their* conscious or un­
conscious mental fetters for which religion has wrongly been 
blamed. The fault was entirely their own and not religion*s; 
for instead of utilising their faith in a positive manner they 
applied it negatively. They looked backwards to find reasons 
for halting the advance of society. They were so absorbed 
in glorifying their history and all who contributed to its 
making, that they overlooked the truth that in tackling new 
situations something more than simple imitation of ancient 
practices was needed, rondering past traditions is not a 
bad thing in itself; actually it can often be to the be­
nefit of one to study the ways of previous generations, not 
with a view to copying their models blindly, but 'to learn 
their lessons and thus become better equipped for facing the 
future. The weakness of some Muslims, fcowever, was the 
habitual escape from handling pressing issues with the ne­
cessary vigour. Whenever a problem confronted them they 
sought its solution at the hands of men who long ceased to 
exist. They thus labelled themselves thinkers and wanted 
others to do the thinking for them. It is here, and not in 
religion that responsibility for Muslim immobility must be 
pinned.
The assumption that religion has a point of view on 
every suhject should be regarded as an incentive to thought 
and initiative rather than the reverse. Islamic influence
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on silence and the arts, is in our view likened to the power 
of the wise guardian who always directs his ward to what is 
good, and who interferes only to safeguard the interests of 
the minor under his care, what this authority amounts to is 
that it acts as a constant reminder to men, so that their 
aim may always be high. That is a blessing: for if people
in their dealings with one another were motivated by the love 
of God, or even by nis fear -though that is a lower form of 
relationship- many of the petty rivalries and jealousies 
that disturb and disrupt the structure of society would in­
deed be averted. Islam is not more secular than any other
religion. It may even be more spiritual in conception because
it exercises a definite supervision over all human interests, 
and does not allow the establishment of strict lines of de­
marcation between the divine and the secular spheres. An 
intelligent Muslim readily understands that his religion sup­
plies all that is needed for a full and successful life, ne 
knows too, that in secular matters his faith provides general 
guidance but not specific rules, thus making certain that an 
element of moral nobility and spiritual grace always tempers 
his deliberations and actions.
At once, it becomes clear that the position of politics
in the Qur'an is not different from that of any other social
subject. Politics, like economics, ethics, or law, is dealt 
with only in general terms. As long as man bears in mind
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the rights of God, he is free to plan his social lift* In any 
way conducive to the well-being of all. This we believe, is ’ 
freedom within wise and temperate limits; freedom guaranteed 
not only by the rule of law, but by the will of God.
7. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OP THE, QUK’AN.
In peace as in war the Qur'an set for the believers 
some general rules 01 conduct for dealing witn non-Muslims 
whether or not they came under the jurisdiction of a Muslim 
government. These rules of conduct have been magnified by 
some modern writers,;especially by Indian scholars, into a 
code of international law. This is open to criticism be­
cause the technical bases upon which international law is 
founded, are absent from the Qur’an. It does not follow, how­
ever, that Muslim history is devoid of splendid examples of 
just and efficient inter-state dealings. Nevertheless,it 
is not Muslim, history in general that we are examining at the 
moment; we are here strictly concerned with studying a spe­
cial aspect of the Qur’an, namely the international, nut in 
its development, however, the Muslim State was subject to 
otuer influences besides the Book.
The important international features of the Qur’ki deal 
witn the waging of war, defensively and offensively, the 
treatment of prisoners of war and other captives, and their
4
ransom, the tax or jizyah upon nationals who surrender to
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Islam, uut who nevertaless prefer to hold another faith, 
and the conditions or peace on the cessation of hostili­
ties. (28) It is a credit to the Qur’an that it exercised 
moral pressure with religious sanctions on all its adherents 
to wage- war and settle peace in as humane a manner as possi-
I
tie. It is interestingxo observe that modern European 
international law was at the beginning an attempt to tackle 
the problem of war between nations, and up till now all 
international organisations devote the maximum of their 
efforts to the maintenance of peace and prevention of war. 
The Italian Jurist Gentilis (1551-1608 A.D.), and the Dutch 
lawyer Grotius (1582-1645 A.D.) attained fame through their 
theses on aspects of war. "The most important work of Gen­
tilis, says Prof. Brierly, "was the ’De Jure Belli’ pub 4. 
lished in 1597." Grotius, "on the whole rightly regarded 
as the founder of international law," wrote ’De Jure belli 
ac pacis1 which was his best work. (29)
In applying the term international law to the Qur’anic 
features mentioned above certain technical difficulties 
arise. These may be summarised as follows:-
(a) International law is so considered, because it 
aims at separating its rules from religion and ethics and 
making them a branch of jurisprudence without however vio­
lating the accepted precepts of religion and morals. This 
obviously cannot take place in Islam because as long as it
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remains an effective factor in the life of its people all 
branches of knowledge must take congnizance of its authori­
ty.
(h) Laws and conventions of an international character 
are usually concluded between sovereign powers on a basis of 
equality. A law is called international when bilateral or 
multilateral agreement has been reached voluntarily between 
equal States; this means in other words that "the rights of 
one state, whatever they may be, are as much entitled to the 
protection of law as the rights of any other.“(30) The wis­
dom of this assumption as a starting point in international 
law becomes fully appreciated when one realises that in fact 
States are unequal in most respects; for example, in ter­
ritory, population, military and economic powers etc. Apply­
ing this test to the laws of the Qur’an it becomes evident 
that the use of the word international is out of place. The 
Divine Law of the Qur’an, and in fact all divine laws, are 
unilateral. These laws emanate from one omnipotent God who 
has no equal. The injunctions of the Book are only a pat­
tern to be followed by Muslims; but they have no binding 
force on others who refute their authority.
(c) International law is binding on al] signatories, 
and sanctions are taken against any transgressor, ^uch a 
situation is inadmissible in Islam. Any move against a 
Muslim State by a foreign power is looked upon as aggression
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°r ittida’ , and has to he met with equal violence; ff. .who­
ever acts aggressively against you, act aggressively against 
him according to the Injury he has inflicted on you.'1 (51) 
"Muslim International Law," says Dr. Hamidullah “depends 
wholly and solely upon the will of the Muslim Law of the land. 
Even the obligations imposed by bilateral or multilateral 
(international) treaties have the same basis 9\ and unless 
they are ratified and executed by the contracting Muslim 
party, they are not binding, and their non-observance does 
not create any liability against the Muslim State.1’ (&‘d) A 
critic may justly interpret this attitude as meaning that, 
a Muslim State may observe international agreements only in 
so far as they serve its purposes.
(d) International law is actually a limitation on the 
sovereignty of the individual States participating in it. 
Since, however, Allah is the Sovereign of the Muslim State, 
it follows that there can be no conceivable authority to 
over-ride or even limit His Law.
These considerations lead us to the'conclusion that the 
verses of the Qur’an dealing with non-Muslims are no more 
than the express enactments of rules of conduct under certain 
conditions. There is no justification, therefore, for sug­
gesting that ”it is when we turn to international affairs, 
the laws of war, diplomacy and alliances that the thorough­
ness of the Qur’an comes home to us."(33) The truth seems
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to be that the Qur»an is not a manual of international 
affairs, but a sacred book of religion. It is quite true 
that the message embodied therein is morally high and very 
Inspiring, and that barriers of nationality, birth, caste, 
and colour etc. have been discarded in favour of unity of 
faith. At the same time, while allowing a place on earth 
for believers in other religions, the .̂ur’an allotted the 
highest position to the Muslims: -in other words, the faith-
ful legally formed the elite of of humanity leaving the rest 
of the world in an inferior position. 1 You are the best of 
the nations raised for (the benefit of) mankind: you enjoin
what is right and forbid the wrong and believe in Allah...H(54) 
In his commentary M. tAli says, tlNot only are the Muslims the 
chosen people of God, who are now called upon to be the stand­
ard bearers of truth in the world, but they are kt the same 
time declared to be the best of the people that had ever been 
chosen for the purpose. u (55)
Prom the religious point of view the superiority of the 
believers in Allah is understandable, otherwise there would 
have been no driving motive for upholding a certain faith.
The practical result, however, is that legally and political­
ly a superior-inferior relationship exists between the Muslims 
and the rest of mankind f and the world is thus into
two groups. whenever a relationship of this nature exists 
between different people, the chances of equal rights toge-
/ ther
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with lasting peace diminish greatly. As Prof. Carr says:
"no political community can be established among individuals 
divided by conspicuous, significant and irremediable inequal­
ities.“(3b) Hence the insistence of international lawyers on 
an a priori equality between all states and communities, so 
that the weakness or inferiority of one nation or other may 
not be an excuse for disregarding its rights; hence also, 
the emphasis that international relationships should be the 
primary concern of jurisprudence.
The Qur’an with its stress on the brotherhood of the 
Faithful has created a universal institution unrestricted in 
scope. And although the only relation that exists between 
the Muslim community and the rest of mankind is one of hos­
tility, active or suspended, the fact that any person can 
by the simple process of confession of faith alter his status 
from enmity to brotherhood, acts as a check against excessive 
hostility. The difference is one of principle only. iNever- 
theless, disagreements on religious questions can assume very 
serious proportions, and it may be safe to suggest that they 
often lead to the worst kinds of persecution. Admittedly, 
the Qur’anic assumption of the common descent of all men 
from Adam and Eve, is another indication that humanity is 
after all but one family. Therefore, antagonisms between its 
various branches should not be driven too far.
On -the other hand the Book does not suggest the formation
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of a Family of Nations agreeing on the principal differences 
and striving to co-operate in other fields. Fven within a 
single family religion should he the main guide. «0 you who 
believe I do not take your fathers and your brothers for 
guardians if they prefer unbelief to belief; and whoever, 
of you be friendly with them, these it is that are the un­
just. 1 (37) If this is the ca se with relatives and kinsmen 
it follows, a fortiori that it is also so with all non-Muslims.(38) 
It is thus seen that external relations based solely on po­
litical considerations are not touched upon, though it can­
not be denied that the ^ur'an occasionally makes a reference 
to people as political units.(39) But as a rule it is add­
ressed to, and binding upon the Muslims each in his own in­
dividual capacity,, and whenever social groups are dealt with, 
the reference is always made in religious and not political 
terms: a thing hardly accepted or practised In the inter­
national field.
The conclusion cannot be escaped that,"the more spe­
cific definitions of modern International Law show the im­
mense differences between the nature of modern International 
Law and Muslim International Law.'1 (40) Strictly speaking,
"there is no Muslim International Law in the sense of the 
distinction between modern municipal (national) law and 
International Law based on sources and maintained by dif­
ferent sanctions.1 (41) It would be more consistent with the
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precepts of the (jur’an If we referred to the body of rules 
popularly described as “Muslim International Law1’ in a pro­
saic though perhaps more accurate manner by calling it Mus­
lim Inter-religious Code.
8. THE QUK’ANIC THEOCRACY.
’’Judge between them by what Allah has revealed,... and 
you must judge by what Allah has revealed. * (42) This is the 
principle of legal arbitration as well as government accord­
ing to the divine law. Those who do not judge or rule accord­
ingly are described as transgressors (Qur.v:47,b0), unbelievers 
(Qur.v:4b), and unjust (idem v:48).
Revealed religions aim at the establishment of the rule 
of @od, through divine laŷ s and agents. "The system of state 
organization and government in which u-od is recognized as the 
ruler in whose name authority is exercised by His chosen 
agents, the Priests or the Prophets" is called tneocracy. (43) 
The word in this technical capacity seems to have been used 
for the first time by the Jewish historian uosephus (37-luO 
A.D.) to describe the newish government as devised under 
divine direction by Mftses.(44) Hirsch maintains with reason 
that "the dominance of the paw Is as clearly recognized In 
Islam as it ever was in post-exilic judaism.” He asserts, 
however, witnout strong evidence thau “in fact Islam is even 
today a theocracy.” (4b)
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Theoretically, the muslim theocracy is not unlike its 
mosaic cHnterpart, because all its social political and 
legal aspects of life derive their binding force from reli­
gious injunctions and commandments. But whereas many Old 
Testament prophets fearlessly declared their views and af­
firmed their arguments by appealing to the authority of God: 
"thus saith the Lord.", in Islam only one person namely Mu­
hammad, cou/ld command unequivocal personal influence through 
the power delegated to him by Allah, He was the only man 
mentioned by name and office who had the right to legislate.
He had been elected for his post by Allah, and was therefore 
responsible only to Him. The Book was revealed to him, and 
helped him to settle his major problems whenever he was in 
doubt or difficulty. The familiar Qur'anic phrase: "they
ask you...say:" (4b) was primarily intended for Muhammad.
With the death of the Prophet the revelations ceased, 
and although the Book remained as a source and guide, no per­
son whatsoever had any right or authority to speak ex cathedra 
The Qur’an was there for all to read and interpret.(47)
No successor of the Apostle, no Caliph or Muslim ruler could, 
resting on his personal authority, effect any drastic change 
in the established rules of religion. Those who attempted 
to do so were not entitled to legal obedience. As Dr. San- 
houry mentions, hle Calife n«a aucun pouvoir legislatif dans 
le domaine politique, ni aucun pouvoir spirituel dans le
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domaine religieux. lout empietement sur ces deux pouvolrs 
serai-t un acte excessif et, par consequent, nul.li (48) It 
may be said therefore, that theocracy as a form of govern­
ment in Islam began with the announcement of the Muhammadan 
Prophethood and ended with his death.
Since there is no divinity in Islam, and since the 
rulers, even those in the highest positions, namely the 
Caliphs, Hold office and power by the will of the citizens 
who elect them, and since their tenure of appointment is 
conditioned by their adherence to the Muslim precepts, and 
since the words of God can be expounded by any Muslim ac­
cording to his understanding,(49) and since the faithful 
are enjoined to decide their own affairs by debate and 
discussion, (Qur.xlii:58) it reasonably follows thar the 
nature of government after Muhammad should be different in 
character and administrative procedure from that during his 
lifetime. ihat fact was properly grasped by the immediate 
followers of the Prophet. Abu Bakr, who was elected in the 
traditional Arabian fashion, al-bai^ak, said immediately 
on his appointment, "obey me as long as I obey Allah and 
His Apostle, and if I disoby Allah and His Prophet, you 
shall not be bound to comply with my commands.”(50) Such 
limitation on the power of the ruler could never have been 
made by the rrophet, because he himself was a legislator, 
both in his own right as the absolute ruler of his State,
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and by virtue of his position as the agent of divine re­
velation.
But this, unfortunately, is the theoretical interpretation 
of the ^urfanic message. In actual practice many caliphs 
claimed power by simple inheritance and divine right, and 
acted as though they had been invested with supernatural 
authority. The bailah was accordingly reduced to a formal 
ceremony of allegiance and submission to the one appointed 
by God to rule over all men. In support of those autocrats, 
some jurists had to propagate views contrary to the spirit 
and letter of the religion, out seemingly, those propagand­
ists were motivated by fear more than by real conviction.
It is strange to detect this servile tendency even among 
ascetics and mystics of renown. Ibn al-iArabi, (116o - 
1240 A.D.) maintained that "the qualities of the imams 
were the qualities of God. Their obedience was a cate­
gorical imperative. Their power was the legal power of 
Allah; therefore, those who obeyed them would be saved and 
those who disobeyed them would be condemned to damnation."(51) 
In course of time together with the degeneration of ortho­
doxy ,in Islam, and the assimilation of foreign ideas, the 
veneration of the rulers nearly culminated in their dei­
fication. iiome Ottoman Sultans were addressed as though 
they were miniature gods. “King of Kings...Shadow of the 
Provider, writer of justice on the pages of time,...opener
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of the gates of benevolence unto mankind, giver of all kinds 
of bounty in the west and the east... Majesty high as heaven, 
having its dwelling in the sky, moon of the heaven of might­
iness,... engineer of the ways of equity,...” (52)
How far the religion was to blame for this unfortunate 
regression we cannot say, but it can be asserted witn con­
viction that the <o6urfan was not the source from which those 
blasphemous ideas were derived. If it were a theocracy they 
were trying to establish, then surely it was not one after 
the Islamic fashion. The real theocracy of Islam is in our 
opinion the realisation in the tawhid, or unity of Allah, 
of a definite Muslim society. Since the principle of tawhid 
constitutes the main dogma of Islam, it would not be unnat­
ural for the community of believers to establish its social 
organisation on that pattern of thought. 1'or if one believes 
implicitly that there is but one God, then the conclusion 
cannot be escaped that all men are inherently equal, and 
their differences only transitory entailing no permanent 
rights or privileges. That, if any, is the main Islamic 
guide to human relationships and social organisations. The 
essence of tawhid is as Iqbal puts it, “equality, solidarity,, 
and freedom,” and it is in this sense alone that the State 
in Islam is a theocracy, not in the sense that it is headed 
by a representative of God on earth wno can always screen his 
despotic will benind his supposed infallibility. (53)
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9. NEGATIVE CONCLUSION.
Erom the above survey we conclude that the Qur'an has 
touched upon politics only in the most general terns. There 
is no valid reason, therefore, to see in the Book much more 
than that, some scholars even assert that the Qur’an ’’con­
tains no theory of government nor any definition of the re­
lation between civil and religious law and administration,u(54) 
This is a hegative conclusion, and should be recognised as 
such. But it does not necessarily follow that the Qur’an is 
against, or even unsympathetic to social and political pro­
gress. Since the declared object of this religion is tne 
promotion of a happy and constructive life in this world, 
leading to bliss in the next, and sinoe the object of poli­
tical thinkers and reformers is in the main similar to that 
of the theologians, at least as far as temporal affairs are 
concerned, and since man is essentially looked upon as an 
agent possessed of a free will and imbued with sufficient 
intelligence to be held responsible for his deeds, it reason­
ably follows that in Islam there should not be room for con­
flict or antipathy between religion and politics or Ghurch 
and State. Quite the contrary, co-operation should exist 
between them, because both State and Church are expressions
of the will of God.
The truth seems to be that the absence of any specific
/
method of political thought in the Qur’an should be regarded
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with relief and satisfaction, as it leaves the field open 
for the ability of the people themselves to plan their so­
cial life and political institutions as they consider most 
suitable to the prevailing circumstances, oince, however, 
conditions are liable to change from one age to another,
-for that is the law of nature, the ^ur’anic standpoint 
may be considered as a spur and not an ibhibitor to initia­
tive. “HumAn intelligence has now had sufficient experience 
of the dynamic character of the world to acknowledge the 
utter impossibility of a wooden constitutional frame, and 
divine intelligence, of course, could not but take account 
of the fact.“(55) The limits of God mentioned in the eook, 
are only an insurance against excessive worldliness in man’s 
deliberations.(56) Had the ^ur’an recommended a particular 
theory of State, it would have sentenced the Muslim community 
to a permanent and perhaps immobile system. But that was 
neither the object nor the intention of the Qur’an, which 
was first and foremost religious in content.
If this is the case, are we at liberty to make precise 
theories as to the nature of its political norms? Can we 
in other words, borrow an alien system, or evolve one of 
our?and declare emphatically that it represents the true 
spirit of the Book? The logical answer should be a ne­
gative one. let, many attempts had been made to see in the 
Qur'an something which was not in it, and read into its purely
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moral precepts most of the political developments of later 
times .
Some Muslims firmly believe that their revealed book 
has dealt fully with every conceivable subject. This con­
viction is derived from the famous verse: ”... We have not
neglected, anything in the Book...”(57) It is needless to 
say that the interpretation in this case is too literal: 
besides, wheh the sentence is referred to its proper con­
text a more restricted sense in unavoidable.(58) Be that as 
it may, it is quite possible that sufficient fragmentary in­
formation may be gathered from the moral approbations and 
prohibitions of the Book to act as a guide to the examinat­
ion of any form of political theory. On this assumption 
it may be affirmed that some doctrines are inadmissible in 
Islam because they are diametrically opposed to its accepted 
standards, and their adoption by the State would be a vio­
lation of the divine commands. Communism for example, is 
an apt illustration of what is meant here, however agreeable 
Communism may appear to be to some societies, the fact that 
it runs counter to the maxims of private enterprise, profit 
making, possible individual ownership of means of production, 
and of wealth and its sources, all of which are allowed in 
the î ur’an, excludes it from consideration as a possible form 
of Islamic government; leaving aside the inferior position 
communism gives to religion as a factor of decisive import-
/ ance
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in the structure of society.(59) It is on this score alone, 
that the communist theory of State may be unequivocally re­
jected by all Muslims. Similarly, any form of arbitrary or 
dictatorial rule, or any government claiming absolute power 
regardless of the established limitations on man1s authority 
must be equally condemned. Having indicted authoritarianism 
in its various guises, it does not follow that the only re­
maining regular alternative, namely democracy, must therefore, 
be the system most suitable to the life'of Islam. There is 
no reason for such an assumption. As we shall attempt to 
show latex, Islam In practice has not been a working democracy 
at any stage in its history. This assertion is based on the 
technical usage of' the word democracy; in other words a 
State in which (a) "the general will is inclusive of the 
community as a whole or of at least the greater portion of 
the community.“(50) (b) A State in which the legislative 
sovereignty is formally determined by the exercise of the 
general will, and (c) a State in which the free will of the 
majority is prevalent and exercised, and in which the minor­
ities give their consent to be so governed, but in theory , 
however, the institutions of Shura, and I jma t, or consultation 
and unanimity, both develped quite early in Islam, may be con­
sidered as definite democratic bases upon which a sound 
government may be safely established. That such a method 
has not prevailed in the past does not exclude the possibi­
l ity
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of Its adoption In the future. As Prof. Gibb says with 
reason, ”... the traditions of government in the Islamic 
world are not of a kind which tends to develop the qua­
lities required for the successful working of democratic 
institutions, but to deny the possibility of their deve­
lopment under new conditions is to make an irrational leap 
from history to prophesy.” (61)
It is evident that the art of government has not been 
recognised as an independent branch of Islamic study. Fur­
ther, it is interesting to note that the word siyasafe which 
is the technical term for politics does not ocbur in the 
Qur’an, despite the tradition that it was supposedly known 
to and used by the Prophet in that particular sense. Mu­
hammad is reputed to have said that the "Jewish Prophets 
conducted the political affairs of their people .,: (b2) Be 
that as it may, had the study of politics in its own right 
been as important a subject as some modern Muslim thinkers 
would wish us to believe, it would In all probability have 
been developed into a position of its own In the course of 
Muslim history, hven if we consider favourably Ibn Khaldun!s 
argument that the Arabs were inherently incapable of excel­
lence in the art of politics, they way would still have been 
open for its fuller growth and objective treatment at the 
hands of the conquered races who contributed greatly to the 
enrichment of Islamic thought and learning.(63) But it seems
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that the Muslims as a whole allotted to this department of 
knowledge only a humble place. On the other hand, it is 
quite possible that they were alive to its impact on society, 
and yet did not consider it necessary to separate it from 
the collective domain of Sharita&» For if, as Sabine says, 
"Political theory .. is a reflection upon morals, economics, 
government, religion, and law -whatever there may be in 
the historical and institutional situation that sets a pro­
blem to be sived,u (64) then Shari^.ah in Islam may be the 
nearest equivalent to the Western notion of politics, pro­
vided allowance is made for the inherent differences in 
scope between both.(65) . "The structure and working of the 
Islamic State rested on an analysis and systematization of 
those fundamentals into a body of rules called the Shari’at."(bo) 
But care must be taken not to fall into the error of regard­
ing g the S>£aritafo as an inflexible body of rules. Because, 
by its nature and function, this subject must be capable of 
expansion and modification.
ihis idea may be unpalatable to those who teach that 
the nconduct of the Muslim Is alone right which is accord­
ing law, and law here means shari* at, and shariat will tell 
him what is right and what is wrong." and conclude from 
these premisses that "the constitution of the Islamic State 
is written and rigid. it cannot be amended or modif led. ■* (t>?)
It is needless to say that the ajfaari*>ah is the result of the
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combined efforts of many minds, and provides a record of the 
considered views and decisions of the learned on cases not 
specifically mentioned in the two original sources. It is 
highly probable that^his form of applied reasoning is co­
loured to some extent by the personal ideas of the legists 
themselves, t o  accept what they say as irrevocable or final 
would be & tacit admission of their infallibility; but the 
truth seems to be that those ideas are no more than the ex­
pressed opinions of highly knowledgeable and revered jurists; 
but opinions, nevertheless. They serve mainly as pointers to 
the development and evolution of thought and organisation in 
certain directions. Those who consider that the doors of 
independent research in jurisprudence were closed after the 
four principal imams' are indeed ‘taking a poor view of the 
progressive possibilities and vitality of their religion. . 
Surely the imams, or leading jurists themselves do not seem 
to have claimed such exclusive rights. Abu Hanifah (c.7b? 
A.D.) is reputed to have said in all modesty, "we have 
learned this, it is our opinion; if any one comes to us with 
a better we will receive him." (68) Admittedly the work of 
those doctors is a contribution of the first order to the 
science of law in Islam, and even possibly to the scudy of 
jurisprudence as a whole, but it should not be treated as 
unalterable or binding for all time.
The significance of this negative conclusion is twofold:
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(a) The Qur'an is revealed to herald a universal religion; 
one which is not bound by territorial or ethnic limitations. 
It is addressed to all men, and recommends a philosophy of 
life based on the idea that man is an indivisible whole.
The main interest of the Book is the salvation of the hu­
man soul, and its guidance into the ways of righteousness.
(b) The Qur’anic political notions are moral In nature, 
therefore, provided account is taken of these, Muslim think­
ers are quite free to plan and construct the life most suit­
able to their needs and circumstances.
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OH. IV.
THE CHARACTER AND ADMINISTRATION 
OP THE MUHAMMADAN STATE .
*  ■
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When the Prophet died, he left a religion to be pro­
pagated and spread as far as it could reach. But he also 
left a State. The question may be asked whether the same 
principle of preservation and expansion applied to it: in
other words was the Muhammadan State an integral and in­
dispensable part of Islam? If so, it had also to be de­
veloped and extended to keep pace with the religion. If on 
the other hand, the State was not a necessary compliment to 
religion, Islam could still be preached to other nations 
peaceably through the medium of zealous men. Events follow­
ing the death of Muhammad have shown that to the Muslims 
Church and State were an indivisible whole. To some obser­
vers it seems that territorial expansion ranked first, be- • 
cause the Arabs in their conquest did not compel the con­
quered to accept and uphold Islam, and if the propagation of 
faith were their primary object stricter measures would have 
been enforced.
The view has been expressed above that for the proper 
life of Islam the State was not a necessary factor. That, 
of course implied that the iviuhammadan State was an expedient 
resorted to after the »Hi jrah, therefoie we referred to it 
as the Muhammadan and not the Muslim State. In his own judg­
ment the rrophet concluded that the unification of temporal 
and divine authorities was imperative for the life ana safety 
of the religion he was entrusted to proclaim. He was thus
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Man apostle of Allah, as well as a political monarch.n (1) 
Nevertheless, the character he wanted, to he remembered most 
in association with his name was undoubtedly that of the 
prophet, ne attended to the affairs of government only in 
so far as the smooth running of its machinery made it ne­
cessary for him to do so. ±he bulk of his energy was de­
voted to the spiritual side of life, compared with his 
voluminous religious heritage, the genuine traditions on 
politics seem to be small despite the large number of ob­
vious fabrications in the latter group, the reason being 
that politics was not the most essential aspect of his 
prophethood.
The faithful, however, believe implicitly that Muham­
mad was religiously inspired. But surely, this view cannot 
be applied generally to all aspects of the Prophet’s conduct; 
for if we are to credit him with a free will, and consider 
his actions rationally, his infallible inspiration must 
either be set aside or restricted to religion, however, 
there is reason for supposing that in dealing with temporal 
affairs, he relied on his innate intelligence at least as 
much as he did on intuition, if not more. He realised the 
responsibility of his position, and reduced his legislation 
on social and political matters to the necessary minimum; 
in other words he gave more attention to spiritual affairs 
on which he was empowered to legislate for all time, cut
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the political Ideas which were more liable to evolutionary 
change, progressively or regressively, were touched upon 
only in a general manner. It looks as though the traditions 
of Muhammad were a repetition and a reaffirmation of the 
Qurfanic phenomenon of neutrality on this subject.
we cannot tell what shape of State the Prophet had in 
mind, nor how far it should extend. Prom the policy he fol­
lowed, we can surmise that he wanted to establish a strong 
Arab centre to act as the hub of Islam, over which he would 
reign supreme. The object of that unity was the consolidation 
of Islam. The fact cannot be escaped that physical coercion 
was one of the means used for the achievement of this plan.
It Is our considered opinion that at one stage during the 
lifetime of Muhammad, the opponents of Islam in Arabia were 
forced to choose between the sword or physical submission.
That seems to us to have been a personal decision of the 
Prophet; furthermore, its main motive was political; for 
it would be credulous to assume that a man with the in­
telligence and dlermination of Muhammad would believe that 
any faith could be propagated by force.
Since we have already dealt with the expansion under 
the Prophet, we shall now discuss some of its relevant as­
pects .
(a) The Muhammadan State was a political otate. Even 
judged by modern standards and definitions this conclusion
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still holds good. It was in the first place na grouping or 
organization of persons acting together for common ends.,;(2) 
Secondly, it was a unity of legal and political authority 
whose competent and obeyed ruler was the Prophet himself.(3)
And thirdly, it was established on a certain and fixed ter­
ritory where one language was understood and probably spoken 
by all citizens. To use Prof. Le Fur»s modern definition, it 
was a state ’’constitue par la reunion sur un territoire de- 
termine d fun groupe d’hommes obeissaj.it a une autorite in- 
dependante charge de realiser le bien commun du groupe.”(4)
(b) The institution to which we refer as the Muhammad­
an State was Arab in nature and composition, and Islamic only 
in belief, and it was formed after Muhammad’s own conception.
He did not restrict the Islamic message to the Arabs only, 
but declared it to all men. but the State which he helped 
to organise was Arab in character and formation. It was the 
Arabs who were advised, and later ordered, to unite under the 
leadership ofr,the Apostle, the Prophet, tne plebeian ^ummi) .n (;p) 
Although the spread of Islam was his final aim, it seems sur­
prising at first sight to find that the exclusive Arab State 
was not exclusively Muslim in faith. 'with the exception of 
idolatry, which was finally prohibited in the Peninsula, the 
other two monotheistic religions could still be held by any 
pereon or tribe provided that the Jizyah was paid. The 
Prophet is reputed to have fixed the religious tax at one
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dinar per adult person, "free or slave, man or woman.u(b) Mu­
hammad was always hopeful that the remaining tribes would de­
clare their confession and complete the unity for which he 
had striven so hard.
The difference between the Arabs and non-Arabs was clearly 
stressed in the invitations to Islam thought to have been 
issued by the Prophet to contemporary rulers, to the 
chieftains considered Arab or within the Arabian sphere of 
influence islstm or the JizyaJq were offered as alternatives.
For example in his letter to the bishops of Najran he said:
”1 invite you to the worship of Allah; if you refuse then 
you must, pay the j'izyafe, or else I will inflict punishment 
upon you through war.1* (7) To the non-Arabs, like Abyssin- 
ians, Persians, Egyptians, or Greeks, Islam or moral con­
demnation :■ (lawn)were the alternatives. No tribute was 
demanded at that stage. (8)
In the last year of his life, the prophet's plans de­
veloped a step further as a result of his attempts to achieve 
the maximum integration of Arabism and Islam. That decision 
seems also to have been conceived and executed on political 
ground. Experience must have convinced him that the more 
loyalties the citizens had in common, the better it was for 
the national interest. Since, in his opinion, religious sen­
timent formed the loyalty par excellence, the existence in 
Arabia of religions other than Islam became an anachronism
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embarrassing to both parties, xo the Muslims, it was a 
direct challenge resembling a pocket of resistance in the 
middle of a conquered land; and to the non-Muslims, the fact 
of holdig different beliefs excluded them from taking part in 
the great activities of the nation. That painful isolation 
must have made their position very awkward. Be that as it 
may, Muhammad acted in the belief that nationals who did not 
share the faith of the majority tended to weaken from the 
unity of the State; hence the probability of the traditions 
advising the eviction of the Jews and Christians from the 
Peninsula. As Mez suggests, the professors of the protected 
religions have from the beginning hindered and thwarted the 
political unity of the Islamic iimpire. (9) Although the 
freedom of conscience remained inviolable, or partly so, 
Muhammad made the exercise of that right in Arabia so dif­
ficult that it was almost negated. It is easy to imagine 
that after the unbroken series of victories he met with, he 
looked on«the whole Arabic Peninsula, and not only a small 
part of it as before, in a new light. The Peninsula was now 
the nucleus or heart, the rest of the known world the po­
tential body. If that heart were to pump faith into the 
veins of other lands, it should of necessity maintain the 
regular rythm of one religion. It stands to reason that the 
Arabs could not start Islamising the world before they them­
selves were fully Islamised. Admittedly, rigorous measures
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were taken to reach that end; but it must not be taken for 
granted that the procedure followed by the Prophet in that 
case was set as a definite precedent for posterity, other­
wise the Muslims would be condemned to a life of perpetual 
hostility towards the rest of the world. However, that ex­
pediency was not without its repercussions on later generations, 
for indeed, it was aggressive in conception and execution, 
and trustworthy Muslims could not but admit that truth in 
their reports, we quote here two examples from the histo­
ries of Ibn Said and Tabari, both of whom are reputed for 
partiality to Islam.
In his account of tAli’s expedition to al-faman, Ibn 
Said says: MIn the year 10 A.H. the Prophet sent tAli (b.
Abu Tâ -ib) to al-Iaman and ordered him saying: ’go direct­
ly to your destination and when you reach it do not fight 
till you are fought first.1 lAli set forth at the head of 
three hundred horsemen... and when he penetrated into the 
heart of the lamanite land he invited the people to Islam, 
but they refused and attacked him and his company with ar­
rows and stones. Whereupon, t*Ali arranged his contingent 
in battle formation and charged at the enemy, killing twenty 
men in the assault. The rest dispersed and took to their 
heels. He then repeated the invitation and it was unani­
mously and immediately accepted. " (10) It should be remem­
bered that the lamanites were not idolaters, but mostly Jew-
/ ish.
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They were not the aggressors hut the defenders, The attack­
ing party was that of >AlI. Therefore it cannot be denied 
that at one stage of his life, the Prophet offered the sword 
as an alternative to faith. ‘'All, who was among Muhammad’s 
closest companions, was seemingly aware of that policy and 
in agreement with it. He (’'All) is reputed to have said: 
wfrom Arab polytheists only Islam, is recognised, or else the 
sword1 The Jizyah may be taken from foreign polytheists 
or Mushriku ■1-tAjam. If the people of the book, Arab or 
foreign, refuse Islam and ask to be treated as Dhimmis, 
then we should treat them as such, and accept their Jizyah.n(11; 
The legist lahya b. Adam 230/818, specifically mentions,
‘’the Arabs from whom the Jizyah is unacceptable, and for 
whom Islam or death are the only alternatives. (11a)
Tabari’s report of the expedition to Najran is equally 
revealing. MIn the year 10 A.H." says Tabari, 1 the Prophet 
sent Khalid b. al-Walid to Bilharith b. Katb with an in­
vitation to Islam. Khalid was ordered to keep the invit­
ation open for three days before commencing hostilities.
’if they answer you favourably, accept their confession of 
faith, stay with them and teach them the sook of Allah, the 
ways of His Prophet, and the manners of Islam. Should they, 
on the other hand, refuse you or resent your mission, then 
they should be engaged in battle.' When Khalid descended 
upon that locality of Najran, he dispatched his men all over
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to warn the inhabitants: Oh people! submit that you may
be saved (aslimu taslamu), and without a murmour they 
submitted, when Khalid communicated the news to the Pro­
phet, he was ordered to return to Medina with a delegat­
ion representing hajran. On meeting them the Prophet said:
1 had Khalid not told me that you confessed Islam without 
giving battle, I would certainly have thrown your heads 
under your heels.1 (12)
If those isolated instances were intended to serve cert­
ain limited purposes, then they could not be termed binding, 
and imitable. That is probably the truth, because freedom 
of conscience, and religious telerance have not been ab­
rogated in the ^ur’an or the Tradition. These principles 
could still be treated as cardinal Islamic rules.
(c) The Muhammadan State was totalitarian in character, 
and the Prophet as its legal head was despotic in his method 
of government. This conclusion refers to the final develop­
ment before his death. At that stage there were one ruler, 
one people, and one religion; in other words, Muhammad, the 
Arabs, and Islam. we cannot say what would have happened 
had he lived longer; but it may be conjectured on the 
strength of the preparations undertaken prior to his death 
for campaigns in Syria, that the Muhammadan State was in 
process of development into a universal Muslim State giving 
equal rights to all members admitting tneir faith.
By totalitarian, we mean that which permits no rival 
loyalties or parties.(13) There were one supreme loyalty 
and one dominant party: Islam and the Muslims. The minor­
ity by that time small in size, had no weight and no share 
in deciding the affairs of the nation. And until their fi- 
naljeviction during the rdign of ‘'Umar, the non-Muslims were 
forced to remain inert, and accept the position assigned to 
them by the Muslims. As a political system, however, total­
itarianism has some aspects which in fairness cannot be att­
ributed to the Muhammadan State. For example, the view that 
“the State is regarded as a whole which is more than the sum 
of its members, and has a being in its own right," could 
not have been entertained by the Prophet because he was main­
ly concerned with living human beings and groups of people 
and not witn mythical ideas.(14) His teachings make it clear 
that he treated state or nation and people as synonyms. It 
is interesting to notice that the word dawlah, which is the 
accepted technical term for State,is not used in the ^ur'an 
in any political sense.(15) Islam does not encourage its 
believers to conceive themselves as individuals or groups 
whose life is decided only in relation to a State. In fact 
it would be the negation of its main doctrines if one held 
tnat "the State is prior to the individual, tnat its good 
is the object or end of society, and that it is in opposit­
ion to the Church because the latter substitutes God for
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the State." (16) Yet, the essential character of totality 
Is so strong and clear in the expressed thoughts and actions 
of the Prophet that it would he intellectually dishonest not 
to mention it, let alone repudiate it. The basic feature of 
totalitarianism in the Muhammadan State, is the absolutist 
of the Prophet deriving its sanction from the will of bod.
It is a totality represented in the person of Muhammad, ra­
ther than an idea attached to the State as a "living1 per­
sonality. In practice however, both are similar in the de­
mands they make on their subjects, such as supreme sacrifice, 
fanaticism, and unquestioning obedience; only one works for 
lithe glory of Allah" and the other for "the glory of the State."
Despotism, as a description of the Muhammadan govern­
ment calls also for some elucidation because that word is 
often used to convey the idea of tyranny and oppression, ino 
such thoughts occur to us when we think of the Propnet as a 
despot, but, in a work of this sort, it is necessary to be 
as exact as possible; and it is unfortunate .that some of the 
technical terms used in this connection have a sombre emotion­
al colour in the public mind. To suggest that as a ruler, 
the Prophet was a despot, simply means that he was an absol­
ute monarch, in other words, an autocrat or master with un­
restricted power invested in his own person and hot in an 
outside body; a person, that is to say, who was not bound 
by law to give account of his actions or decisions to tne
1 b2
people he governed.; an Individual, who could repeal resolu­
tions adopted singly or collectively by any body under his 
jurisdiction, without at the same time being himself subject 
to similar treatment. He was a master who was fully obeyed, 
yet he was constitutionally irresponsible. It is interesting 
^ to observe that prof. Barker translates the Greek word "des- 
potes" as "master”. (17;
Justice, the will of tne ruler, and the law of the otate, 
are one and the same thing in any Totalitarianism. (18) The 
identification of all three with the ruler, is or must be 
taken for granted under that systê . muhammad, according to 
Islamic beliefs, dispensed justice and nothing but justice as 
commanded by Allah. (19) What he willed, was considered right 
and was consequently enforced. The contrary, that is, the 
acceptance of the people’s will, was a danger from which he 
was warned. (20) The law of the land was the law of the Qur­
’an as revealed and interpreted by the Prophet, He was bound 
by no other code or system. In fact his declared object was 
the abrogation of previous laws and practices. Prom these 
premisses the conclusion of despotism must follow naturally.
It has been established historically that absolute power 
often corrupts its possessor; but there is no reason why 
this rule should apply to prophets who were divinely guided.
By virtue of their prophethood they were incorruptible. At 
any,rate, in Muslim opinion, the theory of Infallibility of
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muhammad has popular support. (21) It should be held in 
mind, however, that because of his unique position, the sys­
tem adopted by the Prophet must also remain unique.' For that 
is the real meaning of absolutism or autocracy as a suitable 
description of the Muhammadan government, nis authority was 
derived from God and not from the people; and by virtue of 
his position he was a law giver in his own right. whether 
the people accepted and admitted his prophethood or denied 
it mattered little to him; for he acted in the belief that 
he was the Messenger of Allah and was responsible only to Him. 
That is the reason for calling his office unique, and hence 
the assumption of similar prerogatives by any successor of 
his can never be theoretically conceded. Muhammad was un­
doubtedly aware of his extensive power, and the dangers in­
herent in its imitation by any other man liable to corrupt­
ion -and no man is ky nature immune from corruption. There­
fore the Prophet observed strict silence on the subject of 
succession. Like his apostolic office, his method of govern­
ment should have come to an end at his death.
II. THE PROPHET»S SECRETARIATE.
The machinery of government or administrative staff un­
der muhammad was very simple. He seems to have meant it to 
be so: besides, he was careful not to confer permanence in
office upon any of his companions lest that action might be
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Interpreted as an authoritative delegation of power. Re ap­
pointed some of his trusted lieutenants as judges, tax col­
lectors, and military commanders. He charged others with 
duties in foreign countries. Clerical functions at home were 
also performed by his command, but all these tasks were de­
legated for limited periods; further, there is no indication 
that a regular administrative staff of a stable kind was at 
any time established during the Prophet*s life. There is no 
evidence either to show that appointments followed a set plan, 
or that promotions following successful discharge of duties 
were awarded. Of course Muhammad had a shrewd knowledge of 
men, and inspired his companions to do their best in his ser­
vice. When the occasion demanded, he appointed one of his 
lieutenants to attend to the specific business in hand, and 
when that was over the appointment came to a natural end.
This statement represents the views of the majority of autho­
rities quoted in this work. Al-Jahshiyari (942 A.D.), and 
Ibn Miskawayh (1030 A.D.) are conspicuous exceptions; for 
they give a detailed and comprehensive account of the various 
clerks forming the Muhammadan administration.
whether Jahshiyari* s report was founded on authentic in­
formation available to him at the time, or was only due to 
his imagination and ''skilled craftsmanship” is difficult to 
establish.(22) Nevertheless, his account is of particular 
interest as it shows that the Prophet was conscious of the
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value and Importance of administration as an organ of the 
State; further that Muhammad was more interested in the 
conduct of political affairs than is generally realised. 
Especially worthy of notice is the suggestion that the Fro - 
phet left no business unattended for more than three days. 
Such promptness was very creditable, particularly to a man 
who had so much work to deal with.
Jahshiyarl says that the Prophet had a staff of princi­
pal secretaries, and in their absence under secretaries de­
putised. The clerks were assigned to the different depart­
ments as follows;
(1) The scribes of revelations; t*Al! and MJthman. In 
their absence Ubai b. Katb, and Zaid b. Thabit deputised.
(2) Private secretaries: Khalid b. Satid b. al-t*As,
and Mutawiyah b. Abu Sufyan.
(3) Writers between the people and the Prophet: al- 
Mughirah b. Shulbah, and al-nasan b. i\iimr. (‘Their work was 
similar to that of public relations officers nowadays.)
(4) Writers between the people in tribal and water dis­
putes; and with the Ansar acted as writers between men and 
women, (Registrars General ?) Ibn Arqam, and Ibn mqbah.
(5) Scribe between the Prophet and (foreign) kings in 
addition to duties as ordinary secretary ? and scribe of re­
velations; Zaid b. Thabit .
(b) Registrar of booty: Kufay b. Abu Fatimah.
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(7) Deputy or representative (khallfah) of every scribe 
absent from work, Ranzalah b. al-Rabil, who was thus nick- 
named the scribe (al-katib). The Prophet used to keep his 
seal with hanzalah, and said to him: "follow me always and
remind me of everything to a third (night)." (25)
Ibn iviiskawayh (24) repeats most of the names in jah- 
shiyari»s list with slight variations. To the scribes of 
revelations he adds fourteen more names, ne says that Zaid 
b. Thabit was an accomplished linguist who excelled in Per­
sian, Greek, and Ethiopic. \25)
There is no need to translate Ibn Miskawayh's version 
as it is quite similar to that of jahshlyari. It may be ob­
served, however, that neither writer goes beyond the com­
pilation of names. For instance there is no mention of 
regular meetings, or explanation of procedure In council.
There does not seem to have been a special place apart from 
the mosque where they conducted their regular business. No 
statement is made about the special advantages resulting 
from that division of labour, nor is there any reference to 
rights or privileges conferred upon the holders of these ap­
pointments. It may be assumed, therefore, that none of 
those officials had any authority to act on his own, and we 
are thus unable to conclude that they formed an executive 
body. we are still of the opinion that the whole administra­
tive power was in the hands of the prophet. Those secretaries
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helped to save his time, and possibly also acted as witnesses 
of revelations and administrative procedure, iheir contribu­
tion on the whole was not insignificant, especially frcm 
the point of view of preserving the Q,urfan. On the other 
hand, some of the duties'performed by those secretaries 
strike one as ambiguous. For example, the question of writ­
ing between the people and the Prophet. Does it mean that 
men needed to have access to their leader througn writing 
instead of personal interview at the mosque or some other 
public place? The writer or registrar of booty is another 
intSesting case; for had that office been in existence at 
the time of Muhammad, there would have been no need for the 
introduction of the Persian system by al-Hurmuzan during the 
reign of mmar. The fact that the Muslims were quite puzzled 
and unable to deal effectively with the spoils of war until 
MJmar adopted the Persian method, indicates that they had 
no method of their own.
What has been contended here is not that Muhammad acted
arbitrarily, or that he forced his wishes against those of 
%
his followers and companions for mere assertion of authority, 
but rather that he was extremely careful not to bestow his 
permanent recognition on any person lest after his (Muljammad’s) 
death claims might be put forward in favour of that person or 
party. This reason seems strong enough to account for the 
lack of authentic traditions on the subject of succession.
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There are of course some Hadiths the purport of which is that 
before his death, the Prophet had expressed definite opinions 
in favour of one person or another, or even in support of the 
right to leadership of one tribe or section to the exclusion 
of the rest. A comment will be made presently on these tra­
ditions to find out if they can stand the test of scrutiny. 
Meanwhile it is necessary to proceed directly to the import­
ant topic of Shura or consultation which was recommended in 
the ^ur'an, both as a virtue and a social necessity. The ob­
ject is to set the principle of Muhammadan absolutism in its 
proper perspective, not as a ruthless dictatorship, but as 
a wise and tempered leadership; and also to strengthen the 
opinion expressed in these pages that in theory and practice, 
the government of the prophet was in a special category by 
itself.
III. THE SHURA AS A MUSLIM INSTITUTION.
The word ahura or similar derivatives from the tri- 
literal root shara_ or shawara, occurs four times in the 
Qur’an; (2b) and in two of these instances it is used in 
the sense of consultation or discussion with a view to reach­
ing decisions based on agreement and general support. This 
seems to us an imperative in verse xlii:S8 which refers to 
the practice among all Muslims, and conditional only in 
verse iii:159 addressed personally to Muhammad. The import-
/ance
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attached to consultation may he grasped from the fact that 
the surah or Qur’anic chapter advising and actually instit­
uting taking counsel is called a1-Shura . (Qur. xlii). Be­
sides, the idea Itself, as an attempt at adopting the wisest 
possible course of action, is likened to the pleasant task of 
extracting the honey from its source; for that is the literal 
meaning of the verb shara or shawara. (27) Taking counsel 
with one another is enjoined in all matters personal, social, 
and religious.
Bukhari says that before taking some of his decisions, 
the Prophet used to discuss matters with his companions. As 
an example, Bukhari mentions that the manner of summoning the 
believers to prayers was decided after consultation. Someone 
suggested the adoption of the Christian method of ringing a 
bell, another advised imitating the jews by blowing a horn, 
and a third (UJmar) proposed that a public crier (mu’adhdhin) 
should be appointed. The prophet favoured tUmar’s plan and 
it was thus adopted.(28) "Consultation must precede resol­
utions." (29) "From the pulpit, Muhammad sought public 
opinion on a personal matter,” says Bukhari. (30) "Oh com­
munity of believers, what do you suggest for me to do with 
the slanderers of my family?" (31)
Al-Zarnuji (1223 A.D.) says that "the Apostle used to 
consult his companions in all matters including personal ones 
relating to his family.”(32) And Ibn Qutaibah states that
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"the Prophet used to seek advice even from women, he used 
to consult them and accept their suggestions.", (35)
Chroniclers and classical Qur’anic commentators are una­
nimous in the opinion that consultation is very commendable 
in the case of the Prophet, that is, a meritorious action 
or raustafoabb. On the other hand, its observance by the people 
amounts nearly to an absolute duty or a farft. Ibn Hisham says 
that the §hura tends to promote social unity between leader 
and led. deferring to Qur.iii;159 "...take counsel with 
them in the affair, and when you decide put your trust in 
Allah...” he comments: "take counsel with them in order to
show them that you are prepared to listen to their views even 
though in reality you are in no need to do so. This would 
unite their hearts around their religion, when however you 
reach a decision, proceed with it irrespective of the approval
or disapproval of any one else."(34) It is interesting to
^ aa Id
note that in the verse,consultation is in the plural (shawirhum), 
while decision is in the singular (t-azamta). Since the add­
ress is to Muhammad it can be deduced unmistakably that his 
is the final decision. No such distinction is made in verse 
xlii:38 which refers to the Muslims generally. Both the action 
and the resolution are in the plural, and that establishes con­
clusively that no Muslim other than the Prophet could legally 
claim for himself autocratic powers and force his will upon 
the believers.
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Al-Baydawi (685 / 1286) suggests that the Prophet is 
under no compulsion to follow the advice of his people; but 
he may do so because of the beneficial moral value that may 
result from placing trust in their wise counsel. “This/1 
says Baydawi, “tends to increase the devotion of the fol­
lowers to their leader and helps to consolidate their re­
ligious loyalty.’4 (55)
Al-Nisaburl (791 / 1588)follows the same line in his 
argument and adds that "the neglect of the shura constitutes 
an insult to them (the believers) and shows hard-heartedness. 
Besides, it has some definite advantages as it is quite 
possible that a good idea may occur to someone other than 
the Prophet especially in secular affairs. Apart from the 
sense of dignity and responsibility it adds to the people, 
the shura is a reliable test for judging the mental calibre 
of men, so that he (Muhammad) could place his men according 
to their ability.” (36) llisaburi attributes the saying to 
Muhammad that: "as long as a people take counsel with one
another they shall always be guided to the soundest con­
clusions.” (37)
In his lengthy exegesis Tabari expounds the above views 
and adds that: “Allah would never have ordered the .shura
had He not known of its inherent value...It is a precedent 
of abundant good and should be observed in solving divine 
and'secular problems.” (38) Tabari agrees with the rest
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that Muhammad Is not bound to adhere to counsel, and that 
final decision in all matters should rest in the hands of the 
Prophet whether or not that happens to be in conformity with 
the opinions and general inclination of the companions.” (39) 
In general council, however, Tabari maintains that the ma ­
jority view must be adopted.”
Two conclusions may be established from the above com­
mentaries: (a) that the ahura is enjoined as a very desir­
able practice in Islam, btiLt it does not amount to a fartjL, 
and (b) that the Prophet being in a category by himself, 
is not bound to follow the advice of his councillors.
Modern Muslim scholars lay great stress on the political 
significance of the shur a ; a thing which had not been dwelt 
upon to any extent by earlier commentators. There is nothing 
wrong in discovering news meanings in earlier texts, but the 
tendency to narrow the sense of the text and restrict it to 
the latest interpretation only is to be deprecated. M. LAli 
says: nThe injunction is clearly meant to prepare them (the
Muslims) for transacting the momentous affairs of State and 
all matters connected with national weal and woe...the Mus­
lims shall be governed by counsel...In this Islam has laid 
the basis of government by parliaments, and the idea found a 
clear practical expression in the early days of the Caliphate, 
when the Khalifa had to refer every important affair to a 
Ma.jlis-i-Shura (councilj, and it is strange indeed that
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government by parliament is now looked upon by Europeans as 
an institution which is quite foreign to Islam and unsuited 
for the Muslim people." (40)
wThere is a place, and a very important one, for counsel 
in the Qur’anic State.” says Prof. Sherwani. ”ihe Prophet is 
advised to consult even those who are his enemies at heart.
It Is this democratic spirit, taking cdunt of numbers as 
well as efficiency, which made the religion of the Qur’an 
capable of converting the world, If not in so many words, 
at least so far as its main doctrines were concerned.i! (41)
It is of course undeniable that from one shura verse, 
at least, a good case may be argued for a kind of democratic 
Muslim State, But to claim that that portion of rhe Qur’"an 
is revealed to prepare the Muslims for a certain kind of po­
litical government, is definitely going beyond the inter­
pretation of the text into reading something that is not 
originally intended. Besides, M. WVli’s statement that ”the 
IQialifa had to refer every important affair to a Majlis-i- 
SHura (council), ” may lead to thinking that the Caliph was 
constitutionally bound to do so. Such assumption cannot be 
substantiated historically, Mr. Sherwani’s application of 
the expression "democratic spirit” , followed by reference 
to numbers and efficiency (both words italicised in the text;, 
is also liable to interpretation in a technical sense, and 
so a theory of a democratic form of government under the
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Prophet may he entertained. Such a conclusion cannot be 
drawn either. For if by democracy is meant a State in 
which the general will is inclusive of the whole or the 
greater part of the community, it follows that the Prophetic 
government wherein the general will acts only as the receptor 
and not the originator of law, is the very antithesis of demo­
cracy. The result is the same whether the constitutionally 
irresponsible agent acts for the welfare of the community 
or not. Even without resort to technical details, Mr. Sher- 
wani’s reference to the democratic spirit, that takes cogni­
zance of numbers and efficiency, can be invalidated on his 
own admission by asserting that , "if there be any division 
among them (the Muslims; over anything, they have only to 
turn to this Law as expounded by God through His Messenger, 
and they would find, all they want.” (42)
IV. THE WEAKNESS OF TRADITIONS ON SUCCESSION.
The Muslims unanimously believed that Muhammad fulfilled 
completely the message entrusted to him, and therefore, they 
had no need for a successor to develop further or introduce 
fresh improvements in the religious heritage of the rrophet. 
The demand for a new leader was mostly secular. Since every 
group of men must of necessity have a guide or chief, the 
Medinese naturally proceeded to choose a new head for their 
community. The heated debate at the shed of the Banu Satidah
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Illustrated that social urge very clearly. It also showed 
that no one could prove conclusively by way of recommendation 
from the Prophet an indisputable right to leadership. The 
problem was settled in the Jahilite fashion of the baitah.
The election of Abu Bakr3 however, was not carried through 
as the natural result of the debate, but was effected through 
a ccmp de main by MJmar.
There is strong reason to believe that most traditions 
asserting the sole right of certain persons or groups were 
deliberately fabricated long after the death of Muhammad in 
order to give credence to propaganda in favour of the par­
ticular claimants of power. The opinion has been expressed 
that, "it became the practice of members of various parties 
to invent traditions in order to uphold the views they wished 
to propagate.n (45)
Since Medina was thinking primarily of its own needs, the 
proceedings seem to have been undertaken in all good faith.
It is unlikely that the thought of offending the rest of the 
Muslims by excluding them from consultaion on such an import­
ant issue had really occurred to the Medinese. They were 
thinking of their city not as the metropolis of the Muslim 
State, but as an independent centre fully entitled to the se­
lection of its new head. Their insistence on the appointment 
of one of their own citizens was an indication of their 
thoughts. This right would have been conceded by others had
156
it not been for the unfavourable repercussions resulting 
from the final choice of a Meccan to the post, when the 
Meccans won the day at Medina, it became clear that the he­
gemony of one section over all others was being contemplated; 
and hence the offence to Muslims outside. (44) For it seems 
highly probable that many Arab tribes declaring Islam had 
been under the impression that their loyalty was to the 
person of Muhammad, especially when the formula of tawhid 
or declaration of faith laid it down that admission of the 
unity of Allah, and the apostleship of Muhammad were the 
only postulates.
It is true that the problem of succession with all the 
dissensions it created and the bloodshed it entailed has 
proved to be the most troublesome of Islamic problems. xet 
had the Prophet himself chosen to appoint someone as his suc­
cessor, Islam might have assumed a theocratic character quite 
incompatible with its original precepts, which included among 
other things the right of the believers to trust their leader­
ship to whoever they thought fit to rule justly. And it might 
indeed be a credit to Muhammad that not even the inventors of 
hadiths could pervert his utterances to serve as conclusive 
evidence in support of any particular claimant.
Traditions were circulated in iavour of Abu Bakr. Simi­
lar ones supported the case of iAli. Some maintained that mo­
nopoly of leadership had been Invested in the family of the
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Prophet. Others affirmed identical views in favour of Quraish 
in particular, and the Arabs in general. These claims could 
be easily offset by the definite principle of equality of all 
Muslims enunciated in the Qur’an.
Another kind of fabricated traditions was said to have 
been expressed in private by the Prophet. And even the 
assumption that such opinions were aired in confidence, sup­
ports, rather than detracts, from the force of argument that 
the believers have the sole right to select or elect their 
head of State.
There was also the kind of Hadiths prophesying certain 
eventualities, and aiming at the right guidance of the people 
by directing them to put their confidence in the party for 
whose benefit the traditions were obviously fabricated, ny 
its length and minute detail this category of tradition may 
be dismissed. It is not impossible for one to express contra­
dictory or even diametrically opposed views on the one sub­
ject on different occasions. In the case of a preacher who 
may be under the sway of emotion to impress his argument on 
the listeners the likelihood of contradiction is not at all 
remote. But cardinal principles are observed constantly.
As previously expressed, although Muhammad was a Prophet he 
did not prophesy, and he repeatedly expressed that such power 
lay in the hands of God only. This point of view is stated 
very firmly and clearly in the Qur’an. The expression LAlim
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ai-gnaib or "Knower of the unseen*1 is an attribute of God. (-x...) 
and. is repeated no less than eleven times in the Book, and 
in various other forms over ten times. The possibility of 
human prophecy or knowledge of the unseen is categorically 
denied.(46) Muhammad’s inability to know the unknown or 
foretell it is unambiguously stated. (47) Now when a tra­
dition purports to make a forecast of events its genuineness 
must inevitably be denied.
The followingvare brief examples of pronouncements on 
the subject reputed to have been made by the Prophet,
"Allah and the believers forbid anyone to covet or con­
test the right of Abu Bakr to command...Verily he is my in­
timate friend. (48)
"The Prophet embraced ‘'Ali and said: 'verily this is my 
brother, heir, and successor among you: therefore , listen to
him and obey.*1 (49)
"This command shall remain in Quraish as long as any 
two of them survive." (50)
"People are as equal as the teeth of a comb...all are 
alike in Islam, no preference is granted to an Arab over a 
foreigner (kAjami). (51)
"Twelve princes (amirs) stall reign over you, and all 
belonging to Quraish." (52)
"The Caliphate is for thirty years; afterwards kingly 
rule will commence.n The recorder of this tradition counted
the years of the reigns of the first four Caliphs and found by 
coincidence that they amounted to thirty. He ended his tra­
dition with the comment: "the Umayyads alledged that they
were entitled to the Caliphate. Verily they were liers; for 
they were indeed among the most evil of kings." (53)
"Members of my family will suffer great hardships, 
banishment, and destitution after me until a party from the 
East, carrying black banners, comes forward,...restores or­
der, and instals a member of my family in power...whoever 
of you lives in that time must hasten to their aid..." (54) 
"The Prophet told Hafsah (his wife) that Abu Bakr, then 
then tUmar, should be in charge of the affairs after him. 
Hafsah passed on this information to ' ishah." (55)
Leaving aside all these contradictory statements, the 
events following directly upon the Prophet’s death may help 
to clarify the point at issue. The Muslims at Medina either 
knew or did not know the will and testament of their leader. 
Proceeding with the appointment of a new head of State in 
spite of their knowledge of the Prophet’s expressed wish in 
favour of a certain person would be too ugly a proposition to 
entertain. For acting as they did immediately on his death 
would simply mean that they deliberately ignored his advice. 
Assuming on the other hand, that they did not know of the re­
commendation by Muhammad of any particular successor, and this 
is the more likely interpretation, it follows that their move
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was a spontaneous one in response to the natural urge of find­
ing a new leader to replace the old or deceased, ‘the pro­
ceedings in the shed of the Banu Sati'dah indicate strongly 
that the Muslims were acting freely; pn other words, they 
were not burdened with specific claims from any source.
Seeing, however, that they were the Prophet*s companions and 
close followers, and considering that they were probably aware 
of his inclinations and trends of thought on various matters, 
it would be reasonable to expect from them a fairly accurate 
account of his ideas. Consequently their views cannot be 
easily rejected in favour of others circulating at a much 
later date.
V. A NEGATIVE CONCLUSION.
It follov«/s from the above argument that the traditions 
on succession are not definite or conclusive; and a negative 
result must therefore be admitted. The position of politics 
is, however, less ambiguous. In his conduct of State, the 
Prophet acted openly and his methods were watched carefully 
by his companions. They in turn tried to emulate his example. 
Nevertheless, oral traditions of a political significance are 
indeed scanty.
Holding in mind that there was ample legislation on many 
suhjects less important than politics, and seeing that the 
impact of State affairs was so great that it could not be
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Ignored, we deduce the the Prophet*s avoidance of establish­
ing the law on this subject must of necessity have had a rea­
son. Indications point out that his methods of government 
were his own, and should strictly remain so; but it would 
have been much better had he said so. The object of his life’s 
work was based on the Qur’an, but not so his political actions. 
He left a religion to be followed by all, and a political me­
thod to be adopted by none. Had that position been properly 
understood, much trouble and bloodshed would have been avert­
ed; and the baffling silence which has bewildered many people 
might not have arisen. "Mohamed, who issued laws-and direct­
ions regardig quite unimportant questions and ceremonies, 
maintained as regards the constitution of the state the pro- 
foundest silence... Hot only as an inspired propnet did Mo- 
hamed fail to give direction as to the most important branch 
of the law of the constitution, but even as a temporal ruler 
he made no arrangement as to how and by whom the Arabs whom 
he had reduced to subjection were to be governed." (db)
The question may be asked, whether in spite of this ne­
gative conclusion, a positive verdict could be traced to the 
Qur’an and Tradition. An affirmative answer may certainly 
be given, provided that the inherent character of the Muslim 
system both as a religion and a way of life remain unchanged 
and unchallenged. Strictly speaking, however, politics qua 
politics has no place in orthodox Islam.
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CH. V.
THE BASES OF POWER, AND EXTENT OF 
AUTHORITY OF THE FIRST ^FOUR CALIPHS.
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The Institution of the Caliphate established after the 
death of the Prophet was a good example of the integration of 
the secular and divine influences, both factors combined to 
produce something representative of each, and yet at the same 
time possessing an identity of its own. Religion alone could 
not guide the Muslims in the choice of their first caliph.
There was no compelling reason why Abu Bakr should have prior 
claims to supreme leadership just because he happened to have 
been an imam or leader of prayers during the last illness of 
Muhammad. Irrespective of what later legists attributed to 
the religious side of that office, the essential function of 
the first successor was a secular one. ne was primarily the 
elected head of the State. Later caliphs, however, assumed 
the title of defender of the faith.
There is reason to believe that the manoeuvres of the 
Muhajirs to install one of them at the helm was a conscious 
attempt to re-establish the hegemony of Mecca over Medina and 
the rest of Arabia. It is true that Mecca was for a short 
time second in importance to Medina, and it is true that it 
adhered to Islam by force of conquest. Medina, on the other 
hand opened her gates and heart to Muhammad and gave him re­
fuge, and by that help it became worthy of the new* name; city of 
the Prophet. It was natural, therefore, that it should gain 
the ascendency over Mecca. We cannot say that a city or a 
State has a living personality or memory, but we are certain
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that its inhabitants reflect such attributes in their be­
haviour, and. are thus unable wholly to sever their past from 
their present. This is perhaps how the national ego survives.
Medina subjected Mecca for about three years (8-11 / 
630-o52). But with the establishment of the caliphate 
with a Meccan at the head, Medina’s identity and independence 
were confiscated for good. Had the Muhajirs succeeded in 
carrying out their plan of burying Muhammad in Mecca, the 
City of the Prophet might have been forgotten altogether.
Since that decisive electoral victory of Mecca, no Medinite 
ever reached supreme executive authority in Islam. Not only 
that, but we doubt if any man from Medina had a chance to 
occupy a high office in the State. While under Muhammad no 
distinction was made in appointments between Muhajirs and 
Ansar, it was noticed that with the inauguration of the ca­
liphate, all important posts were given to Meccans including 
the governorship of Medina itself. The governorship of Mecca 
was invariably assigned to one of its own citizens. (1) This 
Meccan success in self-reassertion should not be hailed as 
a wonderful achievement; for it was indeed the first clea­
vage in the edifice of Islam and a definite sign of regression 
into Jahilite morality of self centredness, and limited loyalty.
The reason for this strange departure from Islamic unity 
was political, and had the profoundest repercussions later on. 
The frustration of the Medinese owing to their failure to prove
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themselves masters in their own house, and the aggression of 
the Meccans were proofs that the quest was mainly for politic­
al power, wot only were the Meccans determined to choose a 
MuhSjir who possessed the qualities of a good Muslim and an 
excellent leader, but they were hoping to effect the election 
of a man of noble Qurashite descent. Alien finally Abu Bakr 
secured the position, Abu Sufyan, who was neither a Muhajir 
nor a very sincere Muslim, expressed indignation at the choice 
of a man “who belonged to the most humble branch of tyuraish."(2) 
This evidently shows that the contest was not only between 
Muhajirs and Ansar, but also oetween the superior ideas vi­
gorously preached by Muhammad for twenty three years, and 
the tlahilite practices. And although the affair ended peace­
fully, and the appointment was the best possible, the seeds 
of suspicion and resentment sown there had their bitter fruit 
later on. Indeed, it must have been a painful memory for the 
iviedinese to recall that the people whom they had welcomed as 
refugees, now became lords in the house of their hosts.
The method of settling that problem was not conducive 
to the maintenance of friendly sentiments between the con­
testants. The Ansar witnessed with much resentment the in-
4
dignities laid upon their candidate Said b. lUbadah, who 
was the chief of the Khazraj. He was a man of great dignity 
and sincerity of faith, and did not seek the appointment, 
but was called out of his sick-b-ed by his fellow citizens and
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asked to stand forward as their representative, nis speech 
to his supporters was very logical, moderate and sensible.
"Oh community of Ansar, there is a precedent in your favour 
and an honour that no Arab can surpass. Verily Muhammad .had 
spent some ten years in his own locality preaching, and none 
but a few listened to him. They could not protect him or de­
fend his religion, nor could they prevent his persecution, 
but when Allah intended you for the high rank, he favoured 
you with belief in him and His messenger, you sheltered him 
(MuhammadJ and his companions, vindicated his religion, and 
struggled against his enemies. ¥ou were the hardest people 
on his foes until the Arabs submitted to G-od voluntarily or 
forcibly. It was with your swords that the Arabs succumbed 
to the Messenger, and he died contented and well pleased with 
you. Insist, therefore, on retaining this command among you 
to the exclusion of all others; for that is your rightful 
due." (3) The words of Said aroused the admiration of the 
Ansar, and the vehement 'disapprobation of the Muhajirs. A 
heated argument then followed. Had it not been for the sudden 
and forceful intervention of the chief Muhajirs, the Medinite 
candidate might have succeeded, or at least a compromised ag­
reement on a system of dual executive might have been adopted, 
fUmar in particular was most persistent in the demand that the 
Muhajirs should have first place, ^e could not be reconciled, 
and was very hostile towards Said and even incited his murder,
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which luckily enough was not carried out. In spite of the 
tolerant attitude of Abu Bakr and his very thctful handling 
of the situation, Sa^d was kicked and trampled upon. (4)
The gravity of this first crisis in Muslim political 
history has not been fully realised. (5) It is interesting 
to observe, therefore, how modern Muslim scholars are tackling 
the question afresh. Dr. Haikal says: ’’Those who can assess
the significance of events, would soon attach to tnis historic­
al meeting (in the shed of the Banu Satiaah) with its far-reach­
ing results on the life of the religion of Islam, as much im­
portance as they would to the great compact of al-tAqabah, 
or the Hijrah of the Apostle from Mecca to Medina. They would 
also find in the achievement of Abu Bakr, and his capable 
handling of the situation the work of the politician, nay, the 
performance of the far seeing statesman.’1 (6)
To show that the institution of the caliphate was mainly 
temporal in conception, it should be stated that neither of 
the contesting parties dwelt at any le^th on the question of 
religion during the whole course of the debate, Abu Bakr him­
self was willing to approve the appointment of lUmar or Abu 
UJbaidah. Bven the recommendation of Abu Bakr that "if he 
is good enough for our religious leadership, he should be 
good enough for our secular management,” tacitly implied that 
the main concern of the meeting was social or political but 
not principally religious. (7) *>Ali was mentioned in that
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debate, but the voices raised in his support did not receive 
an encouraging response. iMevertheless, we think it was here 
that the *-Alid.s may be said to have started their movement.
Those responsible for the cleavage in Muslim unity admit­
ted later that the election of Abu Bakr was a slip that must 
not be repeated. (8 ) Yet, in spite of that admission and in­
stead of trying to close the gap and secure the co-operation 
of the Medinese by giving them a reasonable share in the man­
agement of the expanding State, the Meccans persevered in 
their greed for power. That seems to have been their set 
plan, otherwise they would have implemented the promises 
made by Abu Bakr that the Amirs would be Meccans and the 
Wazirs or counsellors medinites, especially when the person 
who suggested that solution was finally appointed to the 
office of caliph.(9) Had the motive been the integration of 
Muslim power by keeping a united front and select^g to each 
post the person most capable of managing it irrespective of 
his tribe or party, the attempt might well have succeeded.
But the records bear no witness to such a policy. Meccan 
superiority was established over Medina and ultimately over 
the rest< of the Muslim world.
In their disappointment the Ansar were patient but out­
spoken in criticism of the preferential treatment of the 
Meccans to one another. When Abu Bakr assigned the command 
of the army to Khalid b. al-Walid, a man from Medina called
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Thabit b. Qais protested: "Oh, community of QuraishI is
there no man among us suitable enough for what you are always 
fit for? Oh verily we are neither blind to what we see, nor 
deaf to what we hear, out the Messenger of Allah has command­
ed us to be patient, and we shall therefore endure,*' (10)
Some observations may be made on the significance of the 
incidents leading to the establishment of the caliphate,
.first: the heated debate resulting in the revival of dormant
antagonisms revealed at once how little the Arabs had advanced
theduring the life of Muhammad, It was clear that]'new morality 
prescribed by Islam had not a sufficient time to influence 
favourably the behaviour of the believers. Their method of 
argument was still very rough and had not in it th^Lellow- 
ness of conciliation prescribed by the Qur’an. The injunction 
to the Muslims was to argue or debate by peaceful means and 
in the best of manners. (11) The first independent (trial 
was a proof to the contrary; for it seemed that up till 
then Islam had affected the surface only. A longer time was 
definitely needed for Muslim ethics to.catch root. The rattl­
ing of swords was very reminiscent of jahilite violence. In 
that case political considerations outweighed the religious; 
hence the assertion that political development did not keep 
abreast with religious development should in fairness be re­
versed. For as Taha Husain says with reason, "the Arabs could 
not free themselves from political considerations for a singre
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moment during the first two centuries of their history; •* that 
is, the history beginning with the Hijrah.(lS) Religion in 
the form introduced by Muhammad was a new experience in their 
life, and actually it was failure to aspire to its teachings 
and raise themselves to its high ethical code that was re­
sponsible for their ill success.
Secondly, the temporary return to pre-Islamic ideas 
shows that the caliphat^was a conscious imitation of an 
earlier practice, when the Arabs were confronted with the 
crisis and did not know how to solve it on lines of the new 
religion, they resorted to the ways they and their ancestors 
had for generations been accustomed to; that is to say, they 
re-adopted clan loyalty, which in any case was not so deeply 
buried. This view is in opposition to bir Thomas Arnold's 
theory that, “unlike the holy noman hmpire, tne Caliphate was 
no deliberate imitation of a pre-existent form of civilization 
or political organization. It was the outgrowth of conditions 
that were entirely unfamiliar to the Arabs, and took upon it­
self a character that was exactly moulded by these conditions,,. 
The Caliphate as a political institution was thus the child 
of its age, and did not look upon itself as the revival of 
any political institution of an earlier date.” (13) The man­
ner in which the issue was decided, and the division after 
tribal traditions leave no doubt in our mind that the caliph­
ate was a definite revival of the earlier clan government.
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Even on Arnold1s own admission, if the assumption by lUmar 
of the functuions of head of the State was ’’quite in accord­
ance with primitive Arab custom,” does it not follow that 
the custom must of necessity have survived during the reign 
of Abu Bakr before it could reach mmar? In other words, 
it could not have been the outgrowth of conditions entire­
ly unfamiliar to the Arabs.
Thirdly, from the above considerations the idea that 
the caliphate was a form of theocratic government cangjiot be 
entertained. Wellhausen’s assertion that it was a theo­
cratic government cangjiot be sustained. Besides, his view 
that the' end of the world did not come with the death of 
Muhammad seems to have been coloured to some extent by his 
(Wellhausen’s) traditional Christian outlook. (14) For In 
Islam there was no suggestion of a Parousia. (15) As is 
well known, the debate on leadership after Muhammad began 
very soon after -the news of his death was known, and the 
people did not wait to see whether or not the end of the 
world would come, had iAli been elected, there might in­
deed have been great weight behind Wellhausen’s suggestion 
of theocracy, how could the survival of a theocracy be 
maintained when the essential organs of such a system were 
absent from the body of Islam? Admittedly, the divine law 
was there; but the order of men who could claim priest­
hood or divinity for themselves and thus command the
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necessary authority was never a feature of orthodox Islam.(lo) 
It is generally agreed, at least in so far as the first four 
caliphs were concerned, that they possessed no spiritual 
powers setting them apart from the rest of the faithful.(17) 
Later caliphs did not possess such powers either, but some 
of them pretended they did.
It is necessary to distinguish between the original pre­
rogatives of the caliphate as an office, and the rights at­
tached to it later on. It may be conceded that theocratic 
authority was.attached to some caliphs, but that does not prove 
that earlier ones were invested with such personal influence. 
Similarly, the fact that later successors turned that elective 
office into“a despotism placing unrestricted power in the 
hands of the rulers and demanded unhesitating obedience1* 
from their subjects, does not mean that earlier caliphs be­
haved politically in like manner. (18) Nevertheless, the 
reason for that change was not far to seek; for in their 
autocratic attitude those successors were trying to emulate 
the Prophet, and wanted to show that they were not only his 
heirs in temporal affairs, but on the spiritual level as well. 
And as previously stated, some caliphs claimed super natural 
powers for themselves' and alleged that they were the suc­
cessors on earth of God Himself. Such deterioration, how­
ever, was the outcome of many factors. It does not invali­
date our assumption that on its adoption the caliphate was an
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Arab institution in conception and prerogatives, and that 
it owed more to Jahilite than to Muslim ideas.
There is reason to believe that nearly all the movements 
taking place in Islam from that time onwards owed their ori­
gin directly or indirectly to that momentous event, well- 
hausen does not credit this event with the importance it 
deserves, and thinks that it was the murder of iTJthman which 
was more epoch-making than almost any other event of Islamic 
history, and suggests that since then the question of who 
would assume leadership was fought out with the sword.(19) 
Wellhausen does not even see any great significance in the 
part played by Abu Bakr, and maintains that " itlmar b. Khattab 
may be regarded as the founder of the second theocracy, the 
theocracy without a prophet." (20) But if careful attention 
were given to the study of the 'first two years after the 
death of Muhammad, the whole of Muslim history might be 
viewed from a different angle, which we believe would pro­
vide the most proper perspective.
£‘rom the election of Abu Bakr the following different 
currents of opinion began: the supremacy of the Meccans;
the rekindling of dormant Jahilite enmities: the tAlid
party of theocratic legitimists; and the i£bari jites or 
moral anarchists of Islam. All those movements were.in fact 
-interdependent, but they only represented different shades 
of opinion. For example, the assertion of Mecca over Medina
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resulted In the alienation of one major section from the 
other. Among each ol the two groups unity was not very strong 
and relations were not particularly happy. ±he latent enmity 
between the Aus and Khazraj was revived even though without 
much active manifestation. Had the Aus supported the claims 
of the chief of the Khazraj, his election might have suc­
ceeded. On the other hand, Mecca the winning city, was sub­
ject to three channels of thought: (a) adherence to the true
and excellent party of Muhajirs among whom were the caliph 
himself, tTJmar, LUthman, Abu MJbAidah, lAli, and al-Zubair 
to name only a few. (b) Ehe supporters of tAli, who on 
seeing that the question was decided on merits alone, 
clamoured for leadership to be installed in the house of the 
Prophet. (c) The ancient nobility of Mecca; who maintained 
that since power was restored to the old city, it should right­
ly go to the noblest and most distinguished branch of Quraish, 
which they alleged was not that of Muhammad. The leader of 
that movement was Abu Sufyan.
Succeeding events confirmed that the aspirants for su­
preme command were not inert, but were vigorously pursuing 
their schemes and aiming at seizing the opportunity to es­
tablish their authority. So deep rooted were those latent 
antagonisms and jealousies, that no drastic political change 
in Islam was carried through peacefully, and no major dynasty 
launched its ship of state but on a tide of blood. As an
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outlet for repressed hatred, persecutions, and indignities 
were always visited upon the remnants of the dislodged ru­
lers. Could that not be a proof that the religion itself 
was innocent of such atrocities and that sheer lust for 
mastery was to blame?
Ouside the two cities -Mecca and Medina- a movement, 
owing its birth to the teachings of Islam, began to take 
shape in the form of serious challenge to the continued 
hegemony of one group of Muslims over the rest. The in­
herent equality of all believers, derived from the notion of 
divine unity, must have permeated the thoughts of men. Per­
haps more than any other Muslim dogma equality of all faith­
ful men appealed to the inner nature of the Arabs. The result
was a positive denial of the alleged superiority of one party
over the. rest on the refutable basis of kinship or association 
with the Prophet. Thus when the tribes outside the two cities
heard that a caliph had been elected as supreme head of the
whole community, resentment over the decision arose immediate­
ly; not only because the outside clans were ignored in con­
sultations, but because the office itself was not an imper­
ative requirement to the life of Islam. They understood that 
the object of the Muhammadan message was not the creation of 
a certain State in Arabia or on earth, but rather the setting 
up of divine government over man’s soul or conscience. They 
believed that Muhammad aimed at elevating the faithful to a
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moral standard whereby spiritual control should prevail, and 
conscience should reign supreme, but that of course was an 
ideal, and like all ideals difficult of attainment; yet it 
had to be sought after. This, then, was the argument of the 
challengers to the central authority. They thought they had 
attained moral anarchy, and were thus in no need of guidance 
from their equals in Medina. By moral anarchy we mean the 
ethical level at which man recognises no power other than 
that of his own rightly guided conscience.
Looking at the caliphate from that angle, resentment and
active opposition to the rulers of Medina could be appreciated. 
*
The dissentients demanded that claims of superiority must be 
%
discounted and annulled. The assertion of the argument of tne 
caliphs and their supporters was far from convincing. It is 
here that we should look for the seeds of the Kharijite move­
ment denying the validity of the first three elections, and 
suggesting that external government was not an imperative rukn 
or cardinal principle in the foundation of Islam. And if at 
al"1 an imam were needed, no considerations of family or tribe 
should affect the issue. (21)
A distinction should be made between the moral anarchy
8.1of this party and the politic anarchy which is always^ associ­
ated with the word.(22) It is suggested the the Kharijite 
movement sprang into being during the conflict between tAli 
and Mulawiyah. we'think, however, that at the time referred
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to the KharijIte party had reached its manhood, but it was 
born during the battles of al-Rlddah or sedition in the time 
of Abu Bakr. The best definition of that movement is perhaps 
offered by Shahrastani, who describes as Kharijite any one 
who goes forth from, or actively opposes the Imam. Without 
specifying the exact period, Shahrastani maintains that the 
Kharijites began their opposition during the Orthodox Cali­
phate . (23)
It should be borne in mind, that once there was a cali­
phate account had to be taken of it. Irrespective of lega­
lity, though that was not greatly contested, the caliphate 
was the de facto authority in the State. This is a point 
that should be firmly grasped in reading Muslim writers.
Their views seem to us as rationalisations of an existing 
organisation rather than a critical examination of the or­
ganisation itself. The truth seems to be that those writers 
knew that their criticism, if any, had to be as mild and as 
unobtrusive as possible, lest the displeasure of the supreme 
ruler might be incurred, fear of the despot was then an im­
portant factor to be reckoned with, and the people therefore 
took particular care of that fact, and endeavoured not to 
arouse his anger by tresspassing unduly upon his sphere of 
authority.
nevertheless, thorough investigation would disclose some 
revealing statements by Muslim thinkers. Ibn Khaldun for
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example, treats the subject from two different angles, theo­
retically and empirically. Discussing the different aspects 
of succession (Khilafah). and spiritual leadership {Imamah), 
he points out that, “since sovereignty or mulk is a social 
necessity based on conquest and force, the government of the 
sovereign is often unjust and oppressive to those under its 
sway; and therefore obedience to it becomes difficult...but 
since government is essential, resort is often made to poli­
tical principles the validity of which is admitted by all.
If the State is lacking in such politics its authority can­
not prevail, and its power cannot be complete...when these 
principles are introduced'by the wise, distinguished, and far­
sighted statesmen, they are called rational politics or siya 
sah laqliyya&...But when these are laid down by Allah they 
become known as siyasab diniyyah or religious politics, and 
serve the interests of both this, and the next world...Poli­
tics of sheer force is condemned as despicable violation and 
aggression...Tempered or wise politics is also doomed to fail­
ure because it is vision without the light of God, and its 
aim is the service of temporal interests only, but the ulti­
mate object of the Legislator (Allah) is the wellbeing of 
m̂ an in the next world." (24)
In another part of the same chapter Ibn Khaldun says:
Mhad the Imamate been a basic principle of Islam, as is al­
ledged, it would have been established as such, nut that
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has not been the case, because the Imamate was a public in­
terest founded by the agreement of men... succession was not 
enacted by the Prophet, because its importance was not as 
great then as it is to-day." (25)
Now the study of Ibn Khaldun's theories does not lie
i —
within the immediate scope of this thesis, but we have se­
lected those short extracts to show that interest in poli­
tical thought has been kept alive through the ages. It is 
needless to suggest that Ibn Khaldun and those before him were 
writing under the watchful eyes of the caliphs. Any detract­
ion from the importance of that institution would nave been 
considered an offence against the caliph and the existing 
order of State, and treated as an incitement to sedition.
Whether or not the caliphate was an indispensable re­
ligious or political establishment, its legality was derived 
from the support given it by the people. And irrespective of 
all opposition or doubt concerning its validity, once it be­
came an accomplished fact it had to be accepted as such. Abu 
Bakr was chosen, and the rest of the Muslims were informed of 
that decision, and allegiance to the new head was expected as 
a matter of course. Those who witheld their support were 
labelled as apostates and fought into submission to the cent­
ral government.
Apostasy was not the correct description of that move­
ment. It is true that some tribes had rejected Islam, and
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others followed prophets of their own. (2b) The main rising 
however, was in protest against the right of Abu Bakr to 
the Zakatk or alms which was paid to Muhammad during his 
lifetime as an expression of allegiance to his person. It 
may be remembered that in introducing the Zakah as a Muslim 
far#, the Prophet ordered that it should be taken from the 
people and given to their poor. (27) The continuation of the 
Zak&h. ■ payment to the government of Abu Bakr appeared to the 
independent tribes as an expression of submission to Medina.
Their refusal was, therefore, an attempt at regaining their 
full independence. As Becker says with reason, "the fight 
against the nidda was not a fight against apostates; the 
objection was not to Islam per se but to the tribute which 
had to be paid to Medina, the fight was for the political 
supremacy over Arabia, and its natural result was the extens­
ion of the dominions of the prophet, not their restoration."(28) 
Whatever objections rhere may have been to the election 
of Abu Sakr, his spectacular success In keeping the unity of 
Islam, and extending its boundaries, had given the stamp of 
permanence to the caliphate. There is reason to believe that 
Abu Bakr had a greater claim to the title of the true founder 
of the iviuslim State than had UJmar. The honour in this case 
should not have been decided on length of service, but on 
the value of the services rendered. His imperturbability 
before crises, his far sightedness, self control, and unbending
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determination, together with a diplomatic skill rarery matched 
among tne companions of Muhammad put him on a higher level 
than lUmar. Had Abu Bakr failed in his onerous task, it is
very likely that an armed revolution might have taken place,
and it is doubtful if at that time the tender structure of 
that youthful community could have survived the shock without 
permanent injury, The antagonists of the first successor 
might have envied his position, but they certainly could not 
fail to respect him and admire his ability. His piety and 
age, besides the other moral qualities he possessed made him 
both a very suitable successor of the rrophet, and a chief 
after the original Arab traditions. In his political practice, 
he did not lose sight of both requirements, ffis first official 
public utterance was a reaffirmation of Islamic principle^,
and an appeal to the inmost soul- of ancient Arab traditions.
To those who think that government after Muhammad was a theo­
cracy, a re-examination of that speech of Abu Bakr may cause 
them to reconsider their views, far from being the declarat­
ion of a tneocrat, it was a well balanced statement of an 
aristocrat.
Can it be, therefore, that at its inauguration tne 
caliphate was an aristocracy? We thinx a positive answer 
would be the right one. The Orthodox Caliphate^presented 
the most excellent elements in the Arab State. Itsrau=. 
thorlty and sanctions were derived directly from the
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people, and ultimately from God, The bases of that government 
were- portrayed unmistakably in the announcement of Abu Bakr.
The speech referred to became a classic in Muslim history, 
and practically any book dealing with that period gives a 
version of it. w(Oh people t n said Abu Bakr, "now I am chief 
over you, albeit not the best amongst you. If I do well, sup­
port me: if ill, then set me right...obey me wherein I obey
the Lord and His Prophet; when I disobey, then obey me not..; 
Truth is a trust and dishonesty; a betrayal. Before me the 
meek among you shall be the strongest until I vindicate his 
right; and the most powerful among you shall I render im­
potent until I secure the right from him," (29)
At once the constitution of the new State is presented 
in clear terms. As a statement of policy, those words of the 
caliph may be likened to a speech from the throne, or a pre­
sidential address in modern times. Prom its contents the 
following guiding principles may be discerned.
1. The caliphate is an elective and contractual office.
2. Its legal head is directly responsible to his electors.
5. He is neither a despot nor a theocrat.
\
4. Obedience to him is not unconditional'.
5. Autonomy and isonomy are the legal foundations of the State.
These conclusions are in direct opposition to the pop­
ular belief that the caliphate is mainly a religious in­
stitution. De Santillana says: !,God has perfected the
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edifice of law by establishing a ruler (imam, or khalifah), 
and prescribing obedience to his behests. Supreme power can 
be conferred by God alone, because no man, as such, is entitled 
to rule over his fellow beings...The establishment of thejchief 
and obedience to his directions are both a religious duty 
and a necessity of existence for the Muslim c o m m u n i t y “(3Q) 
The same opinion is held by Muslims. Dr. Ahmad says: "No
individual, no amir> and not the whole millat can lay claim 
to the sovereignty of the state; their status is that of 
subjects under the sovereignty of God.1’ (51) "The Muslim mil­
lat,”'says Dr, Yusuf, His a politico-religious unity,..hence 
authority in Islam is unassailed. It is not only feared but 
respected and loved by all alike, because it proceeds not 
from the so called ‘national will’ ..but from Allah,” (32)
While we do not disagree that all power and authority 
are ultimately derived from God, we contend that the will of 
the people is an expression of the will of God. According 
to Islamic belief, of course, no man can act but by the will 
of God. In actual practice, however, he who is appointed by 
the people derives his direct authority from the people, aid 
he who claims power from God, holds no responsibility be­
fore man. Abu Bakr, as his speech showed, entertained no . 
notions about divine ordinance in nomination. He was in­
stalled in his office by his electors as the leader of equal 
men, and in all modesty he mentioned that he was not the best
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of" them. Notwithstanding the religious duties he performed 
as the spiritual leader of the community, he was pre-eminently 
a political functionary, (do) We think, therefore, that De 
Santillana1s opinion is based on later developments of the 
office, and does not go back to the origin of.the instit­
ution itself. The will of the people seems to have been 
the deciding factor in the creation of the caliphate. The 
Prophet is reputed to have said: "my nation shall not una­
nimously agree on an error." (34) Whether or not the Prophet 
really made such a statement, Muslims always acted on that 
principle. The difference has arisen not on tne contents of 
the tradition, but on who actually constituted the community 
or .]*a f l i a of the believers. Size and numbers were not 
the most important factors in assessing the strength of a 
party*s claims.
The community of Medina formed the elite or aristocracy 
of Islam. Both the Muhajirs and Ansar had a special place 
among the believers. They deserved their honour for the un­
failing support they had given to Muhammad. The title of com­
panion or associate became in time a very honourable de- 
signatipn, and in time the traditions attributed to Muhammad 
through them commaneded favourable reception. Of all com­
panions, the first four caliphs were the most distinguished.
We believe, therefore, that aristocracy is an apt description 
of that government. The excellence of those men was not due
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to birth or any other accident, but was the result of rigid 
self-discipline and training in the ideas of Islam. Like 
the guardians of Plato’s Republic, they began from a state 
of ignorance, and with wise direction and rigorous education 
they reached the light of knowledge. They were privately 
elected from a limited group of good and highly capable men, 
and responsibility of government was pinned on their shoulders. 
They took counsel with their associates, but on the whole 
the private inclinations and ideas of the calipns directed 
the general current of opinion in the State. It is doubt­
ful whether any plan was carried through without their per­
sonal approval and desire. Another great source of power 
besides the confidence of the people, was the adherence of the 
caliphs to the precepts of Islam. This is perhaps the most 
probable reason for referring to their government as a theo­
cracy. Al-Fakhrl says: "the first dynasty, or the dynasty
of the four... was not after the fashion of worldly States.
It was more akin to the order of the prophets..." (3b) And 
Zaidan says: ’'we do not consider the Orthodox State as a
political government, but as a religious succession." (36)
But the difficulties in calling that system a theocracy are 
sufficiently intricate to make us avoid its application to
the Orthodox Caliphate.
On the other hand, aristocracy conveys the idea of excel­
lence in all respects, and is therefore more fitting In this
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case. Literally, the word aristocracy is a very suitable 
description of the moral qualities of the Muslim leader as 
conceived in the qur'an, For if, as the Book suggests, the 
cities or States are destroyed because of the prevalence of 
evil-doers and their perpetual mischief, does it not follow 
that the contrary assumption would lead to the prosperity of 
the State and those who live in it? And has it not been es­
tablished (from Qurfanic premisses) that good and construct­
ive life is the aim of our existence in this world? And has 
it not been advised (by Allah) that good must be encouraged 
and evil suppressed? And in order to carry out these commands 
of God, must we not possess the means to do good and repel 
evil? And are not piety, moral goodness, justice of the soul, 
or in short,excellence, the best guarantees for such an end? 
And is aristocracy other than the Kratia of the aristos? We 
think there is reason for supposing that the expression of 
these requirements in one political formula, leads to the 
conclusion that the excellent should have the right and op­
portunity to rule the community of believers; and that is 
precisely what we intend to convey by Muslim Aristocracy.
A system conceived and established on these lines, must 
of necessity be permeable, The reason is to leave the way 
open before all to live up to that high standard, and com­
pete in virtue: "and help one another in goodness and piety,
and do not help one another in sin and aggression." (37)
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virtue and courage, rather than noble descent or sheer un­
scrupulous cunning should be the test of the ruler. As 
already explained, politics has been touched upon in tne 
Q,urfan only in general terms. Moral excellence, however, 
has been praised highly, and Muslims have been exhorted to 
pursue it as a desired end. Obviously, it does not need a 
great stretch of imagination to deduce that the rulers of 
the State must have that quality in abundance. The pro­
viso of permeability is a safeguard against monopoly of 
power on reasons other than moral. It is also a refutation 
of doctrinaire aristocracy in Islam; that is to say, a re­
jection of the idea that one single group of Muslims, namely 
the Arabs, is inherently endowed with the right to govern, 
while at the same time the rest of the believers have to be 
governed with no hope of ever becoming rulers. Thus it may 
be suggested that the special characteristic of Muslim 
aristocracy is the denial of the principle of permanent 
separation of the body politic into two distinct classes, 
rulers and ruled, in which the segregation is unsusceptible 
to interchange or permeability. (38)
The Muslims under the first caliphate acted in the be­
lief that rulers and ruled were equal, and their sub-divi­
sions were only functional and elastic enough to admit the 
most humble if he proved his worth. That system could be 
described as a semi-aristocracy, but with the above expla­
nation
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the additional word could be dispensed with, nowever, the 
bases of that government were strong enough, and a pro­
mising start had been made despite the stormy beginnings. 
but unfortunately that order did not continue for long. with 
the expansion of Islam and the inclusion in its dominion of 
other races and nations, the Arabs insisted on being tne sole 
managers of all affairs on the unacceptable argument of kin­
ship with the Prophet. The contents of that page of history 
are too well known to be repeated here. It may just be men­
tioned that the Muslims did not accede voluntarily to the un­
founded claims of the Arabs, but were actually coerced into 
their acceptance. A critic may say with justice that the in­
clusion of non-Arabs in Islam was the subjection of men, and 
the annexation of territory by the right of conquest. That 
failure accounted for the conflict arising from the earliest 
stages of the caliphate. Further, it provided the historians 
with a vivid illustration of how fine theoretical doctrines 
could be rendered obsolete in practical application.
For twenty three years the Prophet preached and laboured 
in order to raise the standard of his people to a higher level 
of civilisation, and yet the recoil following his death 
proved that the Arabs were on the whole unable to advance 
as quickly as their leader had intended. It is here, and not 
in politics or social development, that we must look for the 
downfall of the Arab Empire. The weakness and dissolution
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were essentially moral, and we suggest that failure to ab­
sorb fully and act upon the religious or ethical teachings 
of Muhammad was the main defect in the moral temper of the 
Arabs.
After the initial struggle resulting in the formation 
of a small group of men quite conscious of tne meaning and 
value of the new ideas, it was an easy matter for anyone to 
confess Islam; In other words, later converts had not the 
same opportunity to study and appreciate the Muhammadan mes­
sage, as had their earlier brethren. To many Arabs Islam 
meant no more than a simple declaration of faith, which al­
lowed them to take part in wars and share In the spoils of 
battles. They took it as a way of life, and pursued it 
actively, and their energies were directed in the channels 
made for them by the thinking few. The masses were so 
efficiently led, and their warlike instincts were so directed 
towards their enemies, that they had no opportunity to stop 
and think for themselves. Action rather than thought was the 
rule of their life.
As a limited policy that plan proved very successful, 
but in the long run it was harmful to the interests of the 
State. The soldier class of the Arabs, that is to say, 
every able-bodied man, was busy conquering new territory, 
and increasing its material wealth and sphere of influence. 
The conquered, on the other hand, were silently trying to
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find out the underlying causes for the sudden change that 
transferred the Arabs from a conditions of bedouin primi- 
tiveness, and confinement within a closed desert, into one 
of semi-civilisation and active expansion. It was this tho­
rough investigation carried out by the subject people that 
resulted in the understanding and consolidation of Islamic 
philosophy of religion &nd life; hence the fact that the 
greatest Muslim thinkers were not Arab in origin. Me hold 
that the Arabs had embarked upon a policy of conquest to 
spread their religion before they themselves had a full op­
portunity to study and digest itJ^real meaning. It is quite 
possible for a man to carry a message from one place to an­
other without knowing its contents. The fighters among the 
Arabs were many, but those well-versed in Islam were only 
a few. In the appreciation of this fact, perhaps, lies the 
key to the understanding and proper interpretation of the 
expansion. At the outset, the Muslims were all Arabs. They 
behaved and thought on Arab lines, and their government was 
conceived after an Arab pattern. "This impression of the 
Government of Abu Bakr,n says Dr. Haikal, "established that 
it was near to the primitiveness of the Bedouins, and that it 
was purely Arab." (39) Instead of advancing towards the 
brotherhood, of all men, or even all believers, the Arabs 
persisted in an attitude of superiority, whether or not they 
were aware of the departure from basic Islamic ideas inherent
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in that policy, is not for us to decide; but events have 
proved the existence of that outlook.
The favourable impression created by Abu Bakr when he 
proclaimed that excellence on merits was the sole criterion 
of government, was surprisingly enough dimmed by UJmar who 
declared that the Arabs were the aristocrats of Islam; he 
added that they should prove their worth by their good deeds, 
and should they fail to do so, the foreigners would be more 
entitled to the distinction. "By God,’1 exclaimed (.Umar,
"we have not won superiority in this world, nor do we hope 
for recompense for our works from God hereafter, save through 
Muhammad...He is our title to nobility, his tribe are the 
noblest of the Arabs, and after them those are tne nobler that 
are nearer to him in blood. Tguly, the Arabs are ennobled 
by Godfs apostle, feradventure some of them have many 
ancestors in common with him, and we ourselves are only re­
moved by a few forbears from his line of descent, in which 
we accompany him back to Adam. Notwithstanding this, if the 
foreigners bring good works and We bring none, by God, they 
are nearer to Muhammad on the day of insurrection than we. 
fherefore let no man regard affinity, but let him work for 
that which is in God’s hands to bestow. lie that is retarded 
by his works will not be sped by his lineage.0 (40) Contrast­
ing this statement with that of Abu Bakr, the change in attit­
ude can be sensed immediately, nere we have the second caliph
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reviving the ideas of nobility of birth, and superiority of 
Arab ancestry, instead of attempting to put out of circulation 
all that tends to create barriers between the members of the 
same faith. Although tUmar was careful enough to stress 
the value of good deeds, his remarks meant that whenever 
two men were equal in point of merit, the Arab would have 
preference just because he happened to be an Arab, and that 
of course was an unwarrantable assumption.
CUmar was regarded tne most excellent Muslim after Abu 
Bakr, and it was for this reason alone chat he was recommended 
and adopted as the successor of the ffst successor, .before 
appointing him as caliph, Abu Bakr conducted a series of con­
sultations with the wisest among his counsellors. Having made 
up his mind, he proclaimed tUmar and secured for him public 
support. wIf I ah required to account for my decision before 
God, I would say 'I have chosen over your people , the most 
excellent among them,**1 declared Abu Bakr to Talhah b. 
lUbaidallah when the latter objected to the nomination of 
tUmar. (41) Other companions, also complained to Abu Bakr 
of tUmar’s undue severity, and hard-heartedness, but he waved, 
their objections aside b,y declaring them only superficial.
lUmar was undoubtedly a very just and strict Muslim, 
yet on the whole he was impulsive and dictatorial. He was 
seemingly aware of the resentment created among the Muslims 
by his appointment, but he justified his position to himself
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on the ground that the State needed such a stronv hand,
"I heard the peox^le were afraid of my severity/' said MJmar,
. now that I am in charge of your affairs, you should know 
that my strictness has been restrained, and will be let 
loose only on the oppressors of the Muslims. The peace- 
loving, religious, and well-meaning citizens may rest assured 
that I shall be more gentle towards them even than they are 
to one- another." (42) He won the people to his side by strict 
impartiality and able statesmanship.
Consultation was a characteristic of his rule. jtie always 
availed himself of tie wise counsel of the elders of the State, 
but invariably had the final word on any subject; for he be­
lieved that the ultimate decision must be taken b\/ the caliph. 
In his short address from the pulpit on his assumption of 
office, he confidently undertook full responsibility. The 
Arabs, he said, "are like a cam^ tied by the nose, and com­
pelled to follow the driver. The driver should, therefore, 
look where he is taking his camel. By the Lord of the Katbah,
I shall force you into the (right) way." (45) It is inter­
esting to observe that most of the metaphors of UJmar were 
Bedouin in origin. The man himself was more of a bedouin and 
austere tribal chief than any other caliph. He forced the 
people to do what he thought ri&ht, but he did not persuade 
them to realise and appreciate their responsibilities. He 
despised worldly pleasures, and lived like an ascetic. In
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i airness, however, it must be mentioned that he did. not ex­
pect his people to do likewise, although he would, very much 
have liked them to follow his example voluntarily. In his 
management of the State he was serious, and was concerned 
only with what was relevant to the business in hand. Free­
dom from ostentation was second only to justice in his moral 
fibre. The combination of all such fine qualities reflected 
very favourably on his work, and. established his success. 
Al-Fakhri tells how anxious MJmar was to receive news from 
the Persian battle-front, and how he went out to the out­
skirts of Medina to wait for a messenger from the army, and 
returned to the city walking beside the mounted courier and 
conversing amiably with him without the latter realising 
who the poorly clad Arab was, until he heard the people 
addressing him as commander of the faithful. (44) In the 
same humble attire he visited foreign lands where a res­
pectable appearance was very desirable. On his entry into 
Syria riding a dondey, MuVawiyah, then governor of that pro­
vince, met him in a great procession. iJTmar was very dis­
pleased at seeing the Muslims dressed in expensive clothes, 
but when he was told that in order to impress their opponents 
the Arabs had to look presentable, he did not raise much 
objection. (45) The interesting thing was that he himself 
made no attempt to dispense with his own old robes. Bishop 
Sophronius of Jerusalem must have wondered at ^Umar’s
shabbiness. After the surrender of Jerusalem, “the Bishop 
pressed Omar to accept new clothes for his dirty ones, hut 
Omar declined." Bar Hebraeus who mentions this story adds: 
“This man Omar was wholly upright (or, just) and he was re­
mote from avarice, and although they (the Arabs) were masters 
of all treasures of the Persians and the Rhomaye, he never 
changed his original manner of attire." (4b)
The object of these illustrations it to show that ^Umar’s 
actions were primarily religiously guided, had he really been 
following a policy of conquest for its own sake , he would at 
least have availed himself of seme of the material benefits 
resulting from expansion. But he was following a plan that 
was in his opinion an important part of his religious duties. 
He was trying to bring the message of Islam to every land he 
could reach.
It may be asked how far UJmar conformed to the Ideas of 
Muslim aristocracy, and how much he contributed to establishin 
its power. There is reason to think that during his compara­
tively long term of office, (15-23 / 634-644), he exerted a 
great influence, cemented the unity of the Arabs, and Muslims 
in spite of his private views, and helped to consolidate the 
caliphate, his justice and religious zeal became legendary 
in Islam. Above all the motivating force of his life’s ener­
gies was the true understanding of religion; for he practised 
what he preached, and he preached after the fashion of his
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master. On his death-bed after a mortal blow, “he keot repeat­
ing the name of the Lord and the Muslim creed, until his spirit 
passed away.'1 (47) It is this devoted adherence to the precepts 
of Islam before anything else, that hasjsuggested to us the
i
choice of the word aristocracy as an apt description of the 
government of the big four in Islam. The character of tUmar 
stands out as a type uncommon among great men. “Simplicity 
and duty were his guiding principles, impartiality and de­
votion the leading features of his administration," says 
Muir, who places tUmar next to the Prophet in greatness among 
Muslims. (48)
The opinion of Sir William Muir about ^Umar is echoed in 
the writings of many modern students of Islam, LeVi Della 
Vida says: “the caliphate of 5 Omar which is marked by the
complete transformation of the Muslim state, is regarded by 
tradition as the period in which all the political instit­
utions by which it was later ruled had their origin... We 
cannot however refuse the title of.political genius to the 
ruler who was able to impress a stamp of unity and permanence 
upon the variegated and confused elements which went to make 
up the new Muslim state... Me was really the second founder 
of Islam, he who gave the edifice erected by the religious 
inspiration of Muhammad, its social and political framework.(49) 
GocLdziher is also of the same opinion, and refers to UTmar 
as the "veritable fondateur de l*Etat Islamique." (bO)
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VAbbas al-^Aqqad, a prominent Egyptian literateu-r, gives 
his biography of the second caliph under the title of 
lAbqariyyah tUmar or the Genius of ’Umar. (51)
From the point of view of concret? achievement MJmar 
desrves great credit. But we do not think it would be unjust 
to assert that some of the apparently strong pillars of State 
erected by him, were in fact hewn from clay. It was his own 
strength that kept those threatening tendencis under control.
As is known, he was more feared than loved, and he ruled with 
an iron hand, when, however, he thought fit to put on a glove, 
he invariably preferred a steel to a velvet one. his legacy 
was a mixed one.
It fell to the unfortunate iTJthman to suffer the wrong 
policy of preferential treatment inaugurated, at least in 
theory, during the lifetime of UJmar, in favour of the Arabs 
to the exclusion of other Muslims. lUthman was a morally 
good man, but an incompetent and weak-willed ruler. he was 
primarily chosen for his excellence as a Muslim and a de­
voted companion of the Prophet. It is very doubtful whether 
his inability had been detected before his appointment. Du­
ring the life of Muhammad and the two successors after him, 
he was consulted on all important matters and his views were 
often very sound; for he was an intelligent man. We believe, 
therefore, that the six electors, who were good Muslims before 
anything else, had attempted earnestly to choose from among
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them the most promising and able candidate. it often happens 
that when a small group ol men is entrusted with such an im­
portant task, the choice is subject to personal influences, 
and the selected one is often the least capable and most 
yielding. Such considerations were not in evidence in. the 
election of ipthman, but circumstances proved him so other­
worldly and so trusting, that his virtues were revealed as
¥
liabilites rather than assets. He had not the strength of 
character to restrain his relatives from treating the State 
as the belonging of their family. The tendency was apparent 
under UJmar, but was kept under severe check. But now, that 
there was a membei* of their own house in supreme authority, 
they discarded all pretence and exploited the position to 
the full under the unsuspecting eyes of the caliph. After 
all, that had always been their aim since Abu Suf^an voiced 
their opinion after the death of Muhammad. And as Wellhau- 
sen says with reason, “with lUthman the Umaiyids actually 
attained to the Khalifate, for his government was the govern­
ment of his house." (b2)
Whatever else may have'happened during the caliphate of 
CUthman, one prominent feature singled it out as a period of 
underlying struggle of ideas, The Muslim State was still 
faithful to the teachings that brought it into being, The 
cleavage which appeared earlier now became a threatening 
split. Two currents of opinion were in conflict. un the one
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hand there was a group that definitley wanted to turn the sys­
tem of government into one of clan or Jahilite aristocracy: and
on rhe other, stood the majority of Muslims bent on retaining 
the moral excellence and the personal qualities of -the in­
dividual as the sole criteria of command, the battle ended 
in the victory of the latter group defending the original 
precepts of equality of all in opportunities. When tuthman 
promised to end favouritism, the protestants should have re­
tired and given him a chance to fulfill his promises, but 
fate decreed otherwise, for the winners who stood for the pre-. 
valence of orthodox Muslim rather than Arab ideas lost their 
case when a party of them mobbed and killed LU thman, They 
thus gave members of his house a golden opportunity for sur­
vival and revenge.
The situation even then could have been saved had a te­
nacious and capable man been in charge, but in the hands of 
lAlI, the position worsened beyond repair; for he was neither 
brilliant enough to counteract successfully the Umayyad pro­
paganda, nor was he strong enough to crush their disorders, 
ne could not even fully establish his .authority over his own 
followers, and so face his opponents with a united front.
More than any other factor, the indecision of Will caused
his downfall. (53)
In a way it could be said that the Orthodox Caliphate 
or Aristocracy of Islam came to an end after MJ thman. But
in keeping with the definition that the excellence of the 
caliph himself was the deciding factor in calling him a head 
of State, the name of tAli may unhesitatingly he included 
among the best of all Muslims. Unlike his three predecessors, 
he could not secure the formal allegiance of all the believers 
nor could he establish his authority over the whole domain of 
Islam. Mastudi maintains that l»Ali was actually given ge­
neral and formal allegiance four days after the murder of 
tU thman, and was therefore the supreme ruler of Islam. (54)
If there is any doubt that statesmanship needs something 
else besides sincerity of heart and religious devotion, the 
career of tAli would soon dispel any uncertainty. It was the 
misfortune of that ruler that he witnessed the Muslims divided 
into hostile groups resorting to arms to settle their dif­
ferences. To a great extent his hesitance and lack of com­
promise were to blame. In the battle of the Camel (do / 55b) 
the number of fallen was estimated between seven thousand and 
thirteen thousand. (55) Here we see for the first time Muslim 
bearing arms against one another on a huge scale. There is no 
need to stress that civil war was in defiance of the teachings 
of Islam. The failure of Will meant the vigorous restoration 
of the ground temporarily lost by the umayyad party. Had he 
possessed the experience and skill to keep them under con­
stant check, it is highly probable that hereditary monarchy 
might not have been established in Islam..
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Like all men the Pour Caliphs had their own g o o d  and. 
other qualities. Their attributes of strength and weakness 
alike left an indelible mark on the history of their people 
and perhaps the world. Besides using their own judgement, 
they attempted to follow the path of their master and em­
ulate his ways. They were arbiters in the affairs of state 
primarily on the strength of their profound knowledge of 
Islam. Their excellence was the foundation of their re­
spect and authority among their subjects; and their sincerity 
of heart and purpose was not doubted, hven inthman who un­
justly favoured his relatives at the cost of others is re­
puted to have died with the Qur’an in his hands and its words 
on his lips, and was not greatly perturbed at seeing the 
angry and uncontrollable mob breaking through his house, (5b) 
"Rarely has religion united with politics" says Zaidan, 
"and their unity under the Orthodox Caliphs was but an ac­
cident of history." (57) In any case an experiment carried 
out successfully for over thirty years cannot be too much of 
an accident, and had the balance been retained, the Aristocracy 
of Islam might have lived longer. Instead, the pendulum of 
power swung to an extreme in the form of Arab Nationalism 
under the Umayyads, and recoiled to the other extreme in 
the shape of priestly monarchy under the ^Abbasids.
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THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR 
FUNCTIONS UNDER THE ARISTOCRACY.
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The KM.laf ah, the Bai tah, and the Shura were words 
mentioned in the Qur’an in different contexts. Then, later, 
political institutions bearing these names were established, 
it could at least be argued that they owed their origin to the 
Book. Although such words occurred in the Qur’an they were 
not intended as an enunciation of a method of government, 
nor as an exposition of State administration. For example, 
the verb khalafa, and other variations from the same root, 
meaning!ito follow**, or”to succeed”, are mentioned in the 
Qur’an no less than thirty six limes. The word khalifah, 
is used twice, but in neither case does it convey any di­
rect or indirect suggestion that a political organ for the 
object of succession and government of the State should be 
created under that label. In fact the august title Khalifah 
or caliph which was later mentioned with reverent awe was at the 
beginning a very simple and most unassuming one: for it
simply meant "the one who followed" (the Prophet). We can, 
therefore, look upon this and similar establishments as 
improvisations by the Muslims themselves owing their origin 
to ancient customary practices, and their development to 
time and circumstances. Although the caliphs admitted that 
they were following strictly in the Prophet’s track, their 
own thoughts and interpretations contributed greatly to the 
consolidation of that track and giving it a definite shape.
In spite of their simplicity of manner and life, their in­
fluence
was always felt, and their wishes were invariably carried 
out by order, because they were ultimately responsible 
for directing the destiny of their people. There is reason 
for ‘supposing that Islam "in its physical as well as its 
spiritual aspects,... is essentially the religion of demo­
cracy." (1) That assumption is truer in the spiritual than 
in the political sphere. Both from a practical and a tech­
nical point of view it is difficult to find traces of a 
political democracy in Islam. The austerity and strict dis­
cipline of the first four caliphs created.the impression that 
they were democrats. Modern Muslim writers often think of 
modesty in manners and humility in appearance and behaviour 
as the mo&t fitting attributes of a true democrat; and who­
ever portrays these qualities in sufficient measure is by 
that fact looked upon as a democrat.
The truth, however, seems to be different. The test of 
democracy is in the effective control of the people over 
their personal and public affairs. Irrespective of whether 
that is a good or a bad thing in itself, such a system of 
government was not applied in the Muslim State. Contrary 
to popular belief, the majority of the believers under the 
Orthodox Caliphs had little contact with, and no constit­
utional control over, their rulers. They could, and oc­
casionally did criticise their leaders, but they could not 
intervene individually or collectively in the management
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of the State. nevertheless, whenever major enterprises were 
contemplated, the caliphs availed themselves of the advice 
of their close associates and made certain of public support 
for the proposed schemes. But such consultations were purely 
voluntary. no constitutional machinery representing the 
people was in operation. There is an idea that there waa 
an official organ called Majlls-i-Shura to which the caliph 
"had to refer every important affair." (2) Apart from the 
council appointed to elect a caliph after MJmar, I have been 
unable to find reference to the constitutional functions of 
a permanent body under that name, or to' any other for si­
milar purposes.
The advisers to the caliph had no power of direction 
over him, and when they differed in opinion his views always 
prevailed. And although the successors of the Prophet were 
not given to display or splendour, their dignity was un­
impaired. Waqidi suggests that access between the caliphs 
and their subordinates followed a certain order, lie cites 
a very interesting illustration of this procedure under 
mmar. No junior officer could overstep his immediate su­
perior and report directly to the caliph. In correspond­
ence from foreign countries the field commanders reported 
to their chief army commander who in turn conveyed what news 
he had to tUmar. (5) Similarly when the caliph wanted to 
contact a subordinate officer, he did so through his com-
/mander,
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and that was surprisingly good discipline.
Some form of election was observed in the choice of the 
caliph. It would be interesting to assess the extent and re- 
levence of that practice which together with the shura con­
stituted the main legacy of the Muslim Aristocracy.
The only case in which the people had a chance to ex­
press their opinion freely was that of Abu Bakr. It is im­
material how they were influenced in their judgment. What 
mattered was that the caliph was finally elected on the 
strength of an overwhelming majority. Dr.: Haikal says: "Abu 
Bakr did not derive the authority of government from God, 
but from those who elected him," (4) "and the source of 
his adherence to the straight path was his conviction that 
he was to give account before God, as well as before His 
servants.“ (5)
To avoid a repetition of the electoral battle, Abu 
Bakr took matters into his own hands, and nominated lUmar 
as successor, and secured the agreement of the people in 
Medina for that appointment. Abu Bakr could not have under­
taken such a step had he not had some doubts about the certain­
ty of ^Umar’s uncontested nomination. Possibly Abu Bakr 
was afraid that the continued supremacy of Mecca would be 
rechallenged.
After MJmar, there was a further development. It is
generally agreed that before his death tUmar had appointed a
2d 6
board of elders to choose the new caliph. Arnold points out 
that , "Prince Caetani, has suggested that this story of vUmar 
having nominated a body of electors was an invention of later 
times.n (6) However this may have been, this was a different 
method from that of Abu Bakr, and it implied not only that 
the electorate had been extended to include Muslims from 
outside Arabia, but that right previously enjoyed by the 
electors had been denied. Now the six wisest had to decide 
between them who was to assume supreme leadership. It is 
worthy of note that all six were distinguished and excellent 
Muslims. Thiŝ is yet another indication of the plausibility 
of the view expressed above that government and supreme lead­
ership were invested in the aristocrats of Islam. Mainly 
because of their superiority and fine personal virtues those 
men assumed the guardianship on behalf of their less able 
brethren in the faith.
Although tAli ruled for about five years, it could not 
be maintained that he was generally elected or given allegi­
ance by all Muslims. Nevertheless, it was this refusal to 
grant their support that drew attention to the newly con­
quered provinces; for according to principles of belief, 
there must be equality between all believers. Syria as a 
political unit could not be said to be less important than 
Medina or Mecca. Therefore the bailah. must come from every 
department in the State; hence the view that the caliphate
227
was always an elective office. (7) .liven when Mulawiyah 
turned the caliphate into a hereditary monarchy, he made 
certain of securing formal allegiance from all Muslims for 
his heir apparent, -thereafter the bait ah. became only a 
symbolic traditional ceremony, but was adhered to just the 
same. Prom this short survey it is difficult to reach a 
conclusion that elections were a reality in the life of the 
Muslim community.
$he Shura played a more important part in public life 
under the Orthodox Calipha. The number and influence of the 
companions of Muhammad was not negligible, and. therefore the 
caliph had to take into consideration all th6ir views, aut 
consultation with that distinguished group usually took place 
after independent deliberation and serious fetudy of the pro­
jected plans by the caliph himself. When his thoughts on a 
subject reached a definite stage, he summoned his advisers 
and declared to th&m his intentions, listened to their ar­
guments, and explained the intricate points in the proposed 
scheme. When agreement had thus been reached, the caliph 
officially ordered the enforcement of the decisions. All 
this was done with the minimum of formality, and in good faith. 
The caliph invariably took notice of what was said, and attempt­
ed to overcome all objections. It is worthy of note that 
the consultants were neither delegates nor representatives 
of the people; in other words, they had no official, legal,
or constitutional standing. The eminence and respect of 
those men were the sole qualifications in the circle of the 
ruler who, by taking them Into his confidence, made certain 
of avoiding any possible split on important issues.
Sometimes consultations were conducted by a person 
other than the caliph, and in that case these were carried 
out by arbiters of great dignity and wisdom. The arbiter 
took account of all shades of opinion, and pronounced judgment 
on that basis. We quote here an example of each method.
1. Abu Bakr decided upon the invasion of Syria. For 
a time he did not reveal his intentions to anyone.(8) He 
then called a meeting to which the close companions of the 
Bfophet, as well as some distinguished Muhajirs and Ansar 
were invited. He opened the proceedings with a short pra­
yer, and then said; "I intend to spur the Muslims to strive 
against the Byzantines (al-Rum) in Syria, so that Allah may 
consolidate Islam and make His word supreme. The Muslims 
will reap the greatest benefit, because whoever of them 
perishes will be a martyr, and whoever lives will be a de­
fender of the faith... These are my views and I. should like
to hear yours.u UJmar said, "I wanted to forestall you in
this suggestion, and I think you are right.Ji t-Abd al-Kahman
b. tAuf drew attention to the strength of the enemy and sug­
gested flying raids only for the purpose of booty. But 
*-Uthman supported the original plan and commented that Abu
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Bakr knew best what was good. Tor promoting Muslim interests. 
The rest agreed and informed the caliph that they would fol­
low him and never suspect his motives. Abu Bakr then got 
up and said: "Oh people I order you to prepare for the
invasion of Syria," and the meeting was thus closed.(9)
2. Bukharl states that when the six electors appointed 
by tUmar met for consultations lAbd al-Rahman b. lAuf told 
them that he had no desire to compete with them, and if they 
liked he would choose one of them for the caliphate. They 
agreed and he set to work, and all the people turned their 
attention to him and told him their views as to who should 
be caliph. On the eve of announcing his judgment, he still 
continued to weigh opposing currents of opinion. He sent 
for al-Zubair and Sat»d, and when they went away he summoned 
tAli with whom he deliberated most of the night, and lAli 
went away full of hopes. Then finally 'Uthman was called 
and remained with t-Abd al-Rahman till the morning prayers 
separated them, when the prayers were over the people con­
gregated round the-pulpit. They included the ivluhajirs, the 
Ansar, and the military leaders. The arbiter addressed the 
meeting, and informed tAli that the Muslims would not prefer 
anyone to tuthman. tAli then accepted the decision and de­
clared his allegiance to the new caliph in the traditional 
manner. The Muhajirs , the Ansar, the army commanders, and 
finally the mass of the people in that particular order of
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precedence acknowledged the new caliph. (10)
It may he gathered from this illustration that although 
the people expressed their opinions freely the decision finally 
devolved on one man only: the appointed arbiter. The main
guide of VAbd al-Kahman was of course the personal fitness of 
the candidate, and it is curious how little family relationship 
with the Prophet counted in deciding the issue. Further it is 
interesting to observe that while Medina formed a society of 
equals, those equals were stratified in groups; the College 
of Electors, the Muhajirs, the Ansar, the army commanders, and 
the mass of the people, and precedence over one another was 
decided accordingly.
When the State expanded through conquest the importance 
of the sbura increased, and governors as well as army com­
manders had their counsellors, by appointment of the caliph. 
Waqidi quotes a letter from Mjmar to Abu «*Ubaidah, the com­
mander-in-Chief in Syria, in which the caliph says* "..and 
when you read this letter of mine, give orders to lAmr b.al- 
lAs to proceed with his troops to Egypt, and sent with him 
**Amir b. Rabi^ah al-^Amrl, and other elders from the com­
panions of the Prophet to support him with their advice."(11) 
The most remarkable physical achievement oi the early 
caliphate, and perhaps of all Islam, was the rapidity and 
extent of its territorial conquests. It is necessary to 
establish the underlying causes for that movement which went
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on unchecked i or nearly a century, and resulted in the con­
quest of lands larger in size than Arabia, and the adherence 
to the Muslim faith of men more numerous than the oriri 'nal 
conquerors. "The traditional view that the Arabs...were 
fired by religious zeal to march forth on a mission of pro­
selytizing the world is no longer acceptable.“ says Dr. Bert­
ram Thomas. (12) Other views have been advanced, and these 
may be summarised under the four following headings:-
1- The continuation of the Muhammadan policy.
2- The missionary urge.
3- The economic necessity stimulated by the weakness.of others.
4- The political expedient dictated by force of circumstances.
Maulvi M. tAli offers another theory in which he refers
to expansion not as fatfr or foarb, that is, conquest or war,
but simply as J_ihad in the strict sense of being a struggle
against unprovoked aggression. . Since this modern view on
jihad is held by more than one Muslim authority, and since
it has a bearing on the political development of Islam, an
attempt will be made at the end of this chapter to examine
that view critically. In the meantime we shall expound the
four traditional views stated above.
1. Abu Bakr decided to fulfil the uncompleted plans of
the Prophet. He therefore despatched an expedition under
to
the leadership of Usamah b. Zaid,7the borders of Syria. The 
Prophet had intended to send such an expedition before his
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death. Abu Bakr dismissed all objections against sending; the 
army away at that critical moment and leaving Medina vulnerable 
to the threatened attack of the seditionists of the neighbour­
ing tribes. his motive was simply that "not a word of the 
master’s lips should fall to the ground." (16) This, then, 
is the gist of this view. Having asserted on his inauguration 
that he was a mere follower of Muhammad’s policy, and not an 
innovator himself, Abu Bakr was now implementing his promise 
by continuing his master’s work, a s Buhl suggests, "In no 
way did Abu Bekr represent new ideas or principles, but 
clung to Muhammad’s way of thinking and held fast to every­
thing his. friend had ordered or hinted at." (14) Expansion 
in this case was simply perseverance in the policy originally 
conceived by Muhammad. Whether the Prophet had intended to 
conquer foreign lands by force of arms was not certain, but 
•as we have already shown, ample evidence could be found in 
the Qur’an that fighting in the way of Islam was not only 
permissible but highly commendabxe. Besides, there are sug­
gestions of prophecies reputed to have been made by the Pro­
phet that'Syria would be conquered by the Muslims. (15) Never­
theless, Abu Bakr had his own contribution in the matter; 
for while the rrophet had intended the attack on Syria’s 
borders as an intimidatory and disciplinary raid, Abu Bakr 
entered the country itself, and in doing so he declared that 
he would prepare the Muslim warriors to fight in east and
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west, until the people would either say that God was one, or 
pay the jizyah in submission, (lb)
2. The missionary urge was conquest for Islam!sing 
the world.. That policy was primarily arrived at by way of 
deduction from the Qpr’an, and secondly from the views 
thought to have been expressed by the Prophet to his com­
panions or declared publicly to all Muslims. The believers 
also found through their reasoning that it was their duty 
to wage war for the propagation of Islam. It was the in­
dependent judgment of the caliphs themselves that guided 
them to that conclusion. They had reason to think that the 
Prophet had ordered the conquest of the yyzantine and Persian 
Empires, and the subjection of their people\> the Arabs.
From the manner of life of the Orthodox Caliphs, it 
appears that they were motivated by an idea higher than sheer 
annexation of other lands. They were convinced that it was 
their duty to carry the message of Islam to other people, and 
thus lead them to a better way of life. As Khadduri says: 
’’after the death of the Prophet, the caliphs, without con­
sulting the Muslim community, took the responsibility of 
declaring the jihad. The duty was a divine one, imposed by 
Allah through His Apostle, and was delegated after his death 
to his successors.*' (17) Their war was, therefore, an ideo­
logical one. It should be borne in mind that we are dealing 
here with the men who were in charge of planning, and. dis­
charging
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the higher policy of the State. Those leaders had intended 
well, and desired to share the blessings of their religion 
with others, and make it possible for anyone to accept it 
without fear. They thus forced their way into other coun­
tries and proclaimed themselves masters, and invited the 
citizens to confess Islam. Paradoxical as this may seem, 
there was no compulsion in religion even then. Force was 
applied only to break resistance, but holding Islam was 
left optional. In removing the territorial barriers, the 
Muslims were aiming at making the universality of their re­
ligion a reality. That method strikes us nowadays as cur­
ious and contradictory, but it was not so to its upholders. 
They argued that if Islam were a universal religion, then 
with the delivery of its message everyone on earth became 
bound by its rules and laws, and ignorance of these could 
no longer be accepted as a valid excuse. After all, the 
principle Unul n Tessense ignore la loi,̂  is legally a uni­
versal maxim and hold^good in all civilised countries up 
till now. (18) It is needless to suggest that the notion 
of universality also implied that every country in the world, 
and every individual were supposed to have received a call 
to Islam. Acceptance or rejection were different matters. 
Even those who never heard of Muhammad, his creed, or his 
language, were from the point of view of the ShariLah, still 
und„er the same legal obligation. That position was taken
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for granted bA/ Muslim legist-theologians. ±he only difference 
was whether or not another invitation should be sent to the 
leaders of foreign countries before the beginning of hostili­
ties. In his ikhtilgf al-fuqaha» or "Differences of the 
Learned”, Tabari maintains that war should be prosecuted on 
the assumption that the universal message had been delivered 
by Muhammad. At the same time Tabari points out that it would 
be an act of charity or grace if an invitation to accept Islam 
or pay the jizyah were re-issued. (19) Al-Mawardi (450/1058) 
says tnat residents in dar-al-harb, or world of hostility (to 
Isl&m) , may be divided into two sections: those who had
been told of Islam and rejected it by refuting its thesis 
and continuing to hold their own religious beliefs; and those 
who had no knowledge of Islam. It is prohibited for Muslims 
to attack members of the latter group. Polytheists who have 
no idea of Islam must be approached peacefully to find out 
whether they would respond favourably or not. (20) Dr. Khad- 
duri says that, "the custom was developed that fignting should 
be preceded by an 1 invitation to Islam,; and only failure 
to accept the new faith, or pay the tribute, would preci­
pitate fignting with the enemy. Muslim publicists were una­
nimous on this rule, but there was difference of opinion as 
to the necessity of * re-invitingT the same people in a second 
fighting.'1 (21)
The bursts of anger of ^Umar at seeing his subjects, whom
he considered as soldier priests, indulging in luxuries as 
a result of war, revealed his motives. On being informed, 
by a courtier irom Syria that the Arabs were enjoying the 
fruits of victory, he immediately sent a letter to their 
commander reminding him of the necessity of austerity and 
hardihood, and ordered him to follow the Qur»anic injunction:
Mthose who, should We establish them in the land, will keep 
up prayer and pay the poor-rate and enjoin good and forbid 
evil.*' (22)
3. The barrenness and poverty of Arabia were among 
the causes driving the Arabs from their land to seek a bet­
ter life in other places where nature was more bounteous. It 
has been observed that such mass migrations or Volkerwanderung 
had previously taken place in history, and that Semitic mi­
grations were phenomena of that human tendency. The theory 
of economicjnecessity as the basis of Arab expansion is held 
by many European scholars. “Not fanaticism but economic 
necessity drove the Bedouin hordes... beyond the confines 
of their arid abode to the fair lands of the North," says 
Prof. Hitti. He also suggests that passion to go to heaven 
in the next life may have been operative, "but the desire 
for the comforts and luxuries of the civilized regions of 
the Fertile Crescent was just as strong in the case of 
many.'1 (23) ‘Dr. Thomas maintains that: "whatever the higher
motives of the Caliphs of Medina and the enlightened Moslems
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of the settlements, there can be little doubt that the desert 
man himself was principally inspired by the hope of plunder, (14) 
And Arnold points out that, "this expansion of the Arab race 
is more rightly envisaged as the migration of vigorous and 
energetic people driven by hunger and want to leave their 
inhospitable deserts and overrun the richer lands of their 
more fortunate neighbours.M (25) Besides the driving forces 
of hunger and poverty, Arnold holds that the movement was 
accelerated by the weakness of the invaded countries, and 
therefore, ”it was not in the annals of the attacking ar­
mies that one should look for the reasons which led to the 
rapid spread of Islam, but rather to the conditions prevail­
ing among the conquered people.” (26)
4. Haikal Pasha suggests that the original intention 
of the Medina Caliphs was the unification of the Arabian 
Peninsula under one political leadership by the formation 
of a federation of the free independent tribes. The result 
Dr. Haikal maintains "could have been a united States of 
Arabia, not unlike present day America, or the Federation 
of the Swiss Provinces.” (27) But extensive conquest ab­
road was neither contemplated nor intended. The unity of 
the Arab race was the main motive of action, and when that 
was accomplished it was hoped that hostilities would cease.
“But circumstances often prove stronger than the will of 
man, and it was the momentum of events that was responsible
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for forcing the Muslims to proceed with conquests.1' (28)
This theory indicates with reason, that once the aggressive 
spirit of the Arabs was aroused, it could not be checked 
until its force had fully spent itself. Conquest whetted 
the appetite of the Arabs, and so they attempted to aquire 
more territory. The flood of active expansion inundated 
more lands than was originally anticipated. And even when 
the caliph was hesitant, the commanders in the field oc­
casionally took matters into their own hands and advanced 
on their own responsibility. The conquest of Egypt was a 
case in point. lAmr b. al-lAs actually invaded the country 
before official orders to do so had been issued by tUmar.
This form of expansion may be considered Arabian rather 
than Muslim, in other words, it was more political than 
religious.
Each of the theories of expansion explained above pre­
sents part of the truth, and a combination of all would 
give the truest picture of the whole position. The Arabs 
themselves admitted that they were poor and looking for more 
comfortable conditions. They tried to exploit every weak­
ness in the enemy's front. For example, when the young and 
inexperienced Yezdejird ascended the Persian throne at the 
age of twenty one, the Arabs could not hide their delight 
because they knew that his defeat would be easily accomplished. 
Al-Fakhrl commenting on that situation says; Mthen the greed
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ol the Arabs was intensified." (29) "Yet it was those same 
covetous and poor men who said to Yezdejird, "embrace the 
Faith and thou shalt be even as we; or, if thou wilt, pay 
tribute and come under our protection." When in anger he 
told them they were hungry adventurers from a naked land, 
they did not deny his assertions. (30)
The view may be tentatively added that after the shock 
to the Muslim solidarity at the meeting of Banu Satidah, 
the caliph Abu Bakr thought it would be good policy to re­
gain the lost unity and cement its basis by directing the 
energies of the believers into an outward channel. And what 
better outlet is there than war for projecting frustrations 
and repressed emotions? For war can often be the best tem­
porary antidote to local or national troubles, because it 
shifts the centre of conflict from home and places it at the 
door-ste.p of an external real or imaginary enemy, .and thus, 
as Hitti suggests, the expansion provided "an outlet for the 
warring spirit of tribes now forbidden to engage in fratri­
cidal combats..." (31) Becker supports the view by main­
taining that, nit would have been an enormous task for the 
government in Medina to compel all these restless elements 
accustomed to marauding excursions, to live side by side in 
neighbourly peace under the sanctuary of Islam in unfertile 
Arabia.M (32) .In order to keep their troops actively em­
ployed the caliphs were compelled to embark on a scheme of
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territorial aggrandisement. Two purposes were tnus served; 
the propagation of Islam with the extension of its dominion, 
and the creation of an outlet for the flood of energy of the 
zealous Arabs. Finally, it must be emphasised that, had it 
not been for Muhammad, and Islam, the Arabs might well have 
been confined to their desert for generations to come, and 
their potentialities might have remained dormant even up till 
now. They were just as poor materially before the advent 
of Islam as they were after it; and yet, when Muhammad 
awakened them spiritually, they responded, shook off their 
inertia, became full of life. The change must, therefore, be 
primarily attributed to the influence of Muhammad on his men; 
all other factors were ancillary and should be treated only 
as such.
Some form of jihad could always be offered as a reason 
for Muslim expansion. It Is generally agreed thatjthe word 
jihad was not restricted to war, but had different uses.
The moral and spiritual jihads were not less important than 
the physical. The simplest examination of the Qur’an and 
Tradition could confirm that conclusion. In the books of 
shariiah, however, .jihad was mainly applied to armed struggle; 
it was very nearly a synonym for qital or fighting. All Mus­
lim legists accepted a priori the idea that war was a valid 
instrument in the hands of the head of the State, and we are 
not aware of any striking exceptions to this rule. The
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arguments and technical differences of the lawyers were con­
cerned- with the manner of beginning and ending the jihad., but 
not with questioning its validity. Onthe strength of that 
view, the state founded its international relations, and 
shaped its home policy. The faqihs interpreted the ^ur’an 
and Tradition, and thus helped in the formation of an en­
lightened public opinion. Previous to that, the state, re­
presented in the person of the caliphs, reached a similar con­
clusion. The Orthodox Caliphs had a great reputation for 
being authorities on law.
In recent years, however, some Muslim thinkers have de­
clared that the classical legists were misguided in their 
interpretation. The modern school of thought advances the 
theory that Islam did not expand by force, and jihad was not 
at any time the proclamation of aggressive war for tne pro­
pagation of religion. Maulvi Muhammad tAli, was perhaps the 
greatest exponent of that idea, since, however, some of his 
arguments were similar to those mentioned above, we shall 
summarise his theory briefly. In chanter five of his 
Keligion of Islam, M. tAli‘deals exclusively with jihad.
1. ne points out that jihad and war are not synonyms, (p.54b) 
and that "war undertaken for the propagation of islam... is 
unknown to the Arabic language and the teachings of the Holy 
Qurfan." (p.546)
2. jihad, is enjoined (a) to attain nearness to God, and
(b) to win over the unbelievers not with the sword, but with 
the ^ur ’ aji. (p . 548 )
5. The injunctions of Qur’an ix:75: lxvi;9 urging perse­
verance in the jihad against the unbelievers and hypocrites 
do not mean war against them, for that was "unthinkable and 
none was ever undertaken.” (p.548)
4. "The sword was taken up to annihilate the Muslim com­
munity or to compel it to return to unbelief. That was the 
challenge thrown at them, and the Prophet had to meet it."p.5
5. The Qur’anic verses ix:5, ii:191, allowing the slaying 
or killing of the idolaters wherever they may be fou&, refer 
only to the idolaters of Arabia who had made agreements with 
Muslims, but did not respect their undertakings, (p.55b) In 
spite of the idolaters’ unprovoked attack on Muslims, peace 
was concluded as soon as the idolaters asked for it, even 
though their good intentions were doubted.
b. . "Nay! in the life of the Holy Prophet there is not a sin 
gle instance in which he led an aggressive attack.1 (p.560)
7. "According to Muir, even the conquest of the whole of 
Persia was a measure of self-defence on the part of the 
Muslims, not of aggression.n (p.562) The reference is to 
Muir’s Caliphate p. 120 ff.
8. The jizyah was a form of tax that had nothing to do with 
religion, but was levied for the maintenance of the central 
government of Medina. '"It was an act of great’magnanimity
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on the part ol the Holy Prophet to confer complete autonomy 
on a people after conquering them, ana a paltry sum of tri­
bute (jizya) in such conditions was not a hardship but a 
boon.1 (p.57/) The discrimination made by the introduction 
of the jizyah was not in favour of the Muslims but in that 
of the non-Muslims, for the Muslims had to pay a tax heavier 
than that which the non-Muslims were required to pay. (p. 578)
9. Seeing that the Roman Empire and Persia were bent upon 
the subjection of Arabia, and the extirpation of Islam, the 
Arabs were forced to fight in self-defence, (p.590)
10. Even the war of apostasy during the reign of Abu Bakr 
was waged not for religious, but for political reasons; its 
object being the consolidation of the Islamic government.
The murtaddun or apostates would receive their grievous 
chastisement in the next life. ,fThe general impression that 
Islam condemns an apostate to death does not find the least 
support from the Holy Qur’an,... and so far as the holy Qur’an 
is concerned, there is not only no mention of a death sentence 
for apostates but such a sentence is negatived by the verses 
speaking of apostasy, as well as by that magna charta or i-eli- 
gious freedom.a (p. 592 f.) The allusion is to Q,ur.ii:25o
11. nTurning to Fiqh, we find that the jurists first lay 
down a principle quite opposed to the Holy Qur’an, namely 
that the life of a man may be taken on account of his apo­
stasy." (p.598)
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Muhammad tAll’s theory of jihad implies a condemnation of 
all wars undertaken by Muslims after the death of Muhammad, 
and occasionally during his life-time. His endeavour is sin­
cere, and his argument is ingenious, but seemingly quite con­
trary to the unanimous judgement of the classical jurists, 
.whose ideas on that subject he ridicules as misconceptions.
We think, therefore, that his theory is extreme and untenable. 
It is open to doubt that all jurists were misguided in their 
views on such a vital issue, were unable to see the verses 
in their true perspective, and quoted tnem out of their 
proper context. Even leaving aside the verdict of the le­
gists, the historians and chroniclers convey a different im­
pression from that of Muhammad .t'Ali. Let it be borne in mind 
that we are not in the least suggesting the infallibility 
of any human authority however great it may be, but we are 
just pointing out that since the principal imams lived in 
an expanding Muslim State, and derived their theories from 
the two main sources of law in the light of their interpre­
tations and teachings, it follows that such concurrence of 
opinion could not altogether have been baseless.
M. kA.li was quite aware of the volume of yur'anic and 
>traditional evidence of a convincing nature on the coercion 
of armed jihad, and he made a serious■attempt to give an ex­
position to suit his theory. Even the reference he made to 
Muir confirms this conclusion. Reading Muir (Caliphate
p.lMO f.) we cannot iind justification for assuming that the 
Arabs had conquered Persia simply for self-defence: at least
Muir aoes not hold that opinion. Perhaps M. tAli was think­
ing of the modern principle of first aggression, nevertheless, 
it was the Arabs who entered by force into foreign territory, 
and should thus be established as the attacking and not the 
defending side, isven assumig that war had been initiated by 
the Persians, it could have stopped at the national boundaries 
of Arabia, hut to defend one's own country by subduing an­
other and confiscating its independence has been a favourite 
excuse for aggressive war all through history.
That the jihad besides its other meanings, had a special 
warlike significance is a conclusion that most people with 
knowledge of Muslim law are compelled to reach. Every col­
lection of hadiths devotes at least one chapter to military 
jihad; and all books on fiqh, sharitah, and general Muslim 
history hardly ever fail to emphasi% the necessity and place 
of jihad in the life of Islam.
Abu Bakr declared that the apostates were to be fought 
not only for their abandonment of the faith after hold_ing it, 
but also for the least deviation from the conditions they had 
accepted when the Prophet was alive. (32) That, of course, 
might have been the private opinion of the first Caliph: 
but the rest of the Muslims including mmar and other emi­
nent companions agreed with him and helped him.
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To fight is to imperil the lives of members of both 
parties; if, therefore, a caliph finds it reasonable and 
necessary to engage in war with those who neglect the pay­
ment of taxes, which is not a very serious offence after all, 
does it not reasonably follow that the total rejection of 
the faith would provide a stronger reason for hostilities?
Not only should that be the case from the logical point, of 
view, but historians also mention incidents confirming this 
inference, Abu fl-Fida' states that Khalid b al-Walid, 
who subdued the secessionists, killed Malik b. Nuwairah, 
the Chief of. the Banu Yarbut for his apostasy. (53)
If we accept the theory of m , VA.11, then the practical 
implication would be that, from its very early stages the 
Muslim State had given preponderance to political over re­
ligious issues. For if Allah had decreed, thdt no man should 
be killed or molested for his religious beliefs, and history 
testified that thousands had been killed in the course of 
wars sanctioned by the Orthodox Caliphs, then the dead 
must have been the victims of non-religious wars. This Is 
a position, from which we dissent. Although the Big Four had 
political views of their own, these were directly motivated 
by, and invariably subjected to considerations of a religious
character.
Muhammad *AlI could have maintained with reason that 
religious freedom was not annulled or abrogated at any time,
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but war for political reasons was resorted to in order that 
the power of the state might be kept intact, and through the 
liberty of the btate men could practise unfettered the re­
ligion of their choice.
We have previously quoted instances from the Q,ur*an, 
the Jtiadith, and Muslim history to show that on certain oc­
casions Islam and the sword were offered as alternatives, 
we have no reason to change our opinion as a result of the 
argument advanced by Mawlana Muhammad ^Ali.
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GE. VII - 
THE UMAYYAB MONARCHY .
V
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Tlie Umayyads, so called after their progenitor Umayyah 
h. LAbd Shams, were Arabs from the tribe of Quraish. Their 
rule of caliphs of islam was established when Mu^awiyah b.
Abu Sufy&n was proclaimed m  the year 40 / (501 as a legal 
successor of the rrophet. Damascus was the seat of govern­
ment, and during their reign lasting for eighty nine years, 
fourteen caliphs assumed office.
The brilliant and energetic Mu^awiyah ruled for nearly 
twenty years. During that period vb61-b80 A.D.) he succeeded 
in introducing a measure of stability and peace hitherto un­
known, and perhaps unsurpassed in the annals of the Arabs. 
Judged by any standard, he was a ruler and a statesman of the 
first order. ihe shrewd management of men and affairs was an 
art in which he exellea. nis religious beliefs or sentiments 
did not interfere with his discharge of duties as a ruler who 
judged men solely on their merits.
Before his death iaulawiyah secured an oath of fidelity 
to his son ana successor Yazid, and it was thus considered 
that b^ his action iviû awiyah turned the caliphate, which was 
essentially an elective office, into a muIk or hereditary 
monarchy.
xhe Umayyads as a wrhole maintained the sound principles 
of government conceived and applied successfully by Mulawiyah. 
Politics qua politics was the maxim they endeavoured to real­
ise. under their management the territorial expansion of
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Islam reached its greatest limits within the effective con­
trol of a single central authority. In the days of Hisham 
h. lAbd al—Malik (724—743 A.D.) who*was the tenth Umayyad 
Caliph, the Muslim Empire extended from the Oxus to the 
Pyrenees, and from the Caspian to the Nile. The Caliph ex­
ercised real power over the whole dominion, and fairly trust­
worthy governors ruled in his name.
Although the services of able non-Arab Muslims as well 
as Christians and Jews were carefully mobilised, the main 
control was jealousy and inexorably retained in the hands 
of the Arabs. It may even be stated that Arab ism rather 
than Islam was the dominant feature of the Umayyad rule.
In the course of conquests people were free to choose 
between Islam and the payment of the jizyah, and it is not 
unlikely that some caliphs had secretly hoped that the 
latter course would be preferred so that the State Treasury 
would benefit. LUmar b. lAbd al-VAziz, the eighth caliph 
of that house was perhaps the only exception to this rule.
His caliphate (717-720 A.D.) was looked upon by pious Mus­
lims as a revival of the early traditions of the Orthodox 
Caliphs. He was a morally good man, and was reverently 
called the second MJmar, after the famous caliph ‘‘Umar b. 
al-Khattab.
The Umayyads were generally fortunate in the choice of 
their provincial governors and lieutenants. Their caliphate
was distinguished oy the number of remarkable and efficient 
administrators who were devoted servants of that dynasty.
But it is thought that some of those governors wore at times 
unnecessarily cruel in the execution of their duties; besides, 
their collection of taxes was not free from oppression and 
corruption. However, their main loyalty was to their mas­
ters, and when the interests of the State collided with those 
of religion or even the Arabs, strict adherence to the orders 
of the ruling caliph was observed. Some serious political 
murders were thus committed, and Mecca and Medina were not 
spared bombardment in the course of disciplinary expeditions.
The ruthlessness shown in suppressing opposition to 
the government frightened into apparent submission all the 
unruly elements in the State. But political and religious 
dissensions were going on surreptitiously, and it was only 
a matter of time and opportunity that delayed open revolts 
against the Umayyads. Time was needed for the malcontents 
to gain support and find suitable ground for rising. The 
weakness and negligence shown by some Umayyad caliphs, es­
pecially the four last ones, presented their enemies with 
the opportunity long hoped for. Marwan II, (744-750) who 
witnessed the final collapse of the dynasty was called 
al-Uimar, or the ass. He was so called because of his 
stubbornness and perseverance in the face of difficulties.
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Despite his patience in war, his cunning and ability, Marwan 
could not stem the tide of disaster for which he was not 
directly responsible. His three predecessors whose com­
bined terms in office did not exceed two years - February, 
743-December, 744 - were incapable of efficient management 
of the State. They were jealous of one another, and actually 
fought between themselves to the extreme delight of their 
enemies. The Shi**is and the VAbbasid agents and sympath­
isers were the principal antagonists of the Umayyads.
Against these and other enemies nearer home.tenacious Marwan 
al-Himar fought gallantly to the end, but was defeated and 
escaped to Egypt where he was pursued and murdered.
Hair-raising persecutions swiftly followed the over­
throw of the Umayyads. Wherever they were found they were 
hunted down and mercilessly killed and mutilated by the 
^Abbasids who declared themselves caliphs of Islam and legal 
heirs of the Prophet Muhammad. Thereafter members of the 
dislodged dynasty became destitute refugees.
^Abd al-Rahman b. Mu^awiyah, a grandson of the famous 
caliph Hi sham, was among the very few who managed to escape 
with their life from the general massacre. He found his 
way to North Africa, and with the characteristic Umayyad 
cunning and resource he took advantage of the favourable 
circumstances prevalent in Spain and entered it and became 
its independent ruler in 138/755. After a short struggle
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lasting about a year VAbd al-Rahman consolidated his home 
front and repelled all ^Abbasid attempts to defeat him and 
recapture Spain.
In Cordova, the capital of al-Andalus, the Umayyads 
established themselves as rulers but not as caliphs. It 
was not till the year 300/912 that lAbd al-Rahman III, 
known as al-Nasir, proclaimed himself caliph. The Umayyad 
Caliphate in Spain lasted till the year 422/1031.
Prom their history and fine record of public service 
and stable government, the Umayyad Caliphs in the east and 
west, proved that given the opportunity the Arabs could de­
velop into an imperial race that stands comparison with any 
the world has seen. In theory the Umayyads were aristocrats. 
They claimed that their house was the noblest and most ex­
cellent among the Arabs. In practice, however, they were 
simply autocrats of the benevolent type. They took the 
interests of their subjects to heart so long as the latter 
strictly refrained from interference in politics.
The following is a list of the Umayyad Caliphs of
Damascus.(l)
1. Mulawiyah b. Abu Sufyan
2. Yazid b. Mulawiyah.
3.. Mutawiyah II b. Yazid.






65/6855. lAbd al-Malik b. Marwan.
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6 . Al-Walid b. lAbd al-Malik. 86/705
7. Sulaiman b. lAbd al-Malik. 96/715
8 . tUmar IX b. lAbd al-lAzlz. . 99/717
9. Yazid II b. lAbd al-Malik, 101/720
10. Hi sham b. tAbd al-Malik. 105/724
11. Al-Walid II b. Yazid II. 125/743
12. Yazid III b. al-Walid I. 126/744
13. Ibrahim b. al-Walid I. 126/744
14. Marwan II b. M. b. Marwan. 127/744
Pall of the Umayyads. ........ .132/750.
The Umayyads are reputed to have created in Islam a 
hereditary system of government. By their establishment 
of a mulk or kingship they are thought to have introduced a 
bidlah or an innovation. On examination, however, it seems 
that the change was a constitutional one based on the support 
and consent of the Muslim community. The legality of the 
situation was quite in accordance with the only known elect­
ive procedure namely, al-bailah.
In theory Muslim law was followed, and Islam as a re­
ligion increased rather than diminished in power. Conquests 
went on at an even greater pace than before; but no longer 
could it be asserted that war was a defensive measure against
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attack. It was rather a definite means of territorial ex­
pansion and aggrandisement of a youthful and vigorous State. 
Since the freedom of religion was observed it was necessary 
to find some method whereby the numerous non-Muslim citizens 
could play an active part in the life of the State. It was, 
therefore, good policy on the part of MuLawiyah to have 
looked upon the whole of his dominion as one political en­
tity where religion was left aside as a personal matter, 
to say this does not in the least imply that Mulawiyah treated 
religion lightly, or that he himself was negligent of his 
duties as a sincere believer; for we shall learn different­
ly when we study the man* s life in some detail. But it may 
be remembered in this connection that the Prophet himself 
at the outset of his career in Medina, found it expedient 
in the interests of his mission to form a political unity 
between the Jews and the Muslims. Under Mutawiyah the 
amgar or provinces were dealt with on similar lines. It 
seemed to him that only on non-religious bases could he 
effectively control the various departments of the State.
In the long run, however, the result was just as beneficial 
to the cause of Islam, as was the original Muhammadan plan 
in Medina. To govern one needs a governor, and to preach 
one needs a preacher, and neither is expected to perform 
properly the functions of the other. Herein lies the suc­
cess of Mulawiyah; and because his policy was tenaciously
259
followed during the greater part of the Umayyad rule the 
success achieved "by that dynasty was a result of consistency 
ol metnod. When that course was abandoned, and when the 
strict and capable administrators were no longer in power, 
decadence crept in and the house of Umayyah finally col­
lapsed. It is these causes and their effect that should 
guide one in the study of the rise and fall of dynasties 
and States. On these lines it is hoped to give an account 
of the political thought and practice of the Umayyads.
Two aspects are worthy of consideration in the life 
of Mulawiyah the founder of the Umayyad dynasty: (a) the 
bases of his claim to the caliphate, and (b) his method 
of government.
(a) At no time before his conflict with LAli, was the 
name of Mutawiyah mentioned as a suitable candidate for the 
caliphate. The rise of the son of Abu Sufyan to the summit 
of power may be attributed to his own endeavours, and to a 
lesser extent to propitious circumstances. The man himself, 
though brilliant and well suited both by temperament and 
training to play the part of a supreme ruler, was quite con­
tent with his rank as a provincial governor, and his ambitions 
did not go much further than that. Balaam! thinks it was 
Katb T 1-Ah.bar (2) who had encouraged Mulawiyah to aspire 
to the caliphate. Ubiquitous Kalb was a converted Jew with 
great learning and cunning. He is thought to have been a
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counsellor t>o Mu^awiyah when ■the ls.tter was still governor 
of Syria, When the news of ^Uthma^s murder reached Damas­
cus, MuLhwiyah said to Ka<*b: "how I would like to know who 
will rule after ÎJthman so that I may begin to woo him!"
And KaLb answered: "it is you who shall reign after him.'1 (3)
It was lAli with his characteristic stubbornness who 
challenged Mu1awiyah by asking him to relinquish his post as 
Governor, The order was refused and a civil war ensued which 
ended in the defeat of lAl.i whose real weaknesses were ex­
posed; for it was shown that not only was he incapable of 
controlling effectively the wide dominions of Islam, but 
that he was in fact unable to control his own men. Besides, 
the arbitration of Dumah al-Jandal (37/65.7) between Abu 
Musa al-Ashlari and lAmr b. al-lAs, following the indecisive 
battle of Siffln (36/656), proved to the Muslims that suc­
cessful statesmanship needed special aptitudes. (4)
•These, then, were the main (qualifications of Mu * awiyah: 
he was an able man wrell prepared to handle the State in the 
ways most conducive to its continued strength and prosperity. 
On the other hand, besides the ability he had the experience, 
he could weigh men accurately and direct them in the ways he 
wanted. His previous record in Syria won him his point.
Mu1awiyah thought that the Arabs owned the conquered 
territories, and it was proper in his opinion that the best
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element in Arabia should rule the newly formed empire.
The Umayyad appeal was directed to the clan loyalty 
of the Arabs 5 in other words it was a regressive rather than 
a progressive move, and Prof. Browne’s estimate of the 
Umayyad caliphate as 11 the period of Arabian Imperialism and 
Pagan Reaction,” is fully justified.(5) Indeed the record 
of' the Sufyanid family in championing the cause of Muhammad 
and Islamjwas a poor one. Mu1 awiyah with his father Abu
Sufyan and mother Hind resisted Muhammad bitterly end pro­
claimed their faith only when Mecca fell into the hands of 
the Prophet. (6) And as Wellhausen says, T,It was a lasting 
reproach to the Umaiyids that they had been root and branch 
the most d_angerous foes of the Prophet.11 (7) In spite of 
all this the factors in favour of the Umayyads finally pre­
vailed.
Great credit is due to Mu1awiyah for the masterly 
fashion in which he made use of the opposing points of 
view, and harnessed them all to serve his own ends. In 
previous elections Medina decided the issue and the pro­
vinces had to succumb before the inevitable. That caused 
bitterness to the Muslims in the conquered lands because 
they expected the principle of equality of the believers 
to be observed in all matters. Now from Syria Mu1 awiyah 
dictated his will to the Peninsular Arabs.
Mu1 awiyah was fortunate to have had .yria as his work 
ing base. Apart from its strategic position as the gateway
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to tli© v/est, som© inhabitants of that province considered 
themselves as pure Arabs* The rest accepted the Arab con­
quest with relief because it brought an end to the Byzantine 
mismanagement* But whatever the attitude of the population 
may have been, it was quite evident that under the governor­
ship of Mu1awiyah Syria enjoyed a spell of tranquility and 
prosperity unsurpassed for generations. (8) It is reason­
ably certain that the tribes bordering on the fertile Syrian 
crescent were Arabs in origin and language, though mostly 
Christian in faith; yet despite the religious differences 
they helped the Muslims in raids against the Byzantines. (9) 
To the Syrians, the Arab invasion was considered a liberation 
and not a conquest, and Mu1 awiyah did his utmost to encourage 
that belief. He was in Syria more or less constantly from 
the year 13/634, first as a junior commander, then as a local 
governor, and a governor general, and finally as caliph. (10) 
That experience itself was invaluable, because it meant that 
he had the advantages of leadership and government for at 
least a quarter of a century before his encounter with lAli.
During the short period that preceded the serious en­
counter with Mulawiyah, lAli found out tnat he could not 
assert himself in Medina, and admitted that fact by trans­
ferring the seat of government to al—Kufah; then he had to 
put down the rising in the south culminating in the battle
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of the Camel and return to establish himself in a locality
whose people were notoriously unruly and fickle, and final­
ly to prepare himself for a mighty struggle against a well 
organised force. The defeat of ''All in the battle of Siffin 
was therefore not surprising.(ll)
After the decision of the umpires was announced lAli
became only a shadow of a caliph. His plenipotentiary
Abu Musa al-Ashfari, who was justly described in al-Fakhri
as ,fa stupid old fool” had unwittingly denounced the rights
of his master to Muslim leadership. (12) But it was the
dagger of the Kharijite Ibn Muljam that brought to an end the
unavailing struggle of Uli, and thus relieved him of his re­
ed
peated disappointments and establish^ him as a martyr es­
pecially to the Shi1ah.
The road was now comparatively clear. Mulawiyah 
endeavoured to strengthen his position by every possible 
means. To begin with he attempted to legalise his cali­
phate by turning what was in reality a seizure of power by 
force of arms, into an institution resting on the vote of 
the whole electorate. He confirmed his election in three 
ways each of which might in itself have sufficed in the 
normal course. For as a result of tne arbitration he had 
st right to the title of caliph, and was actually addressed 
as such even in the lifetime of '■Ali. (13) Near the end of 
the year 40/660 an oath of allegiance was given to Mutawiyah
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in Jersulem. (14) And when lAlijwas murdered Mu1 awiyah 
"bought from the former’s son al-Hasan all rights to the 
caliphate, (RabI1 I, 41/July-August, 661). (15) Thus 
it can be established that Mu1 awiyah had left no possible 
sources of criticism against his constitutional status.
The trouble taken in securing the .bailah revealed the 
importance attached to the will of the people. In 
Mulawiyah’s opinion it was the paramount source of power; 
for he did not entertain any illusions about divine rights 
or spiritual heredity, and his life was a clear.proof of 
this realistic viewpoint. ”0h people I I am not the best 
among you; verily there are others who surpass me in good­
ness, but perhaps I am your most efficient statesman, the 
hardest on your enemies, and the most productive in work.”
(16) His emphasis on practical and social virtues was also 
recorded, and his views reCvealed insight and human under­
standing. ’’Wisdom and clemency are the finest possessions 
of man,” said Mu1 awiyah. ’’One must remember when reminded, 
be thankful when given, patient under tribulations, self­
controlled in anger, forgiving in power, asking forgiveness 
in error, and fulfilling promises once the word is pledged.”(17) 
The purport of this argument is that in his govern­
ment the founder of the Umayyad caliphate laid the proper 
emphasis on the qualities needed for the service of the 
State. He seemingly followed the view that the caliphate,
which was the focal point of the Arab Empire, was a political 
institution deriving its sanctions from the general will of 
the Muslims. Even when he was persuading the electorate to 
adopt his son Yazid as a prospective caliph Mulawiyah observed 
that rule.
Paradoxically, the belief in the sovereignty of the 
people did not induce the caliph to restrict his own power, 
or even to control it by admitting to his council a repre­
sentative body of the electors. Quite the contrary, he 
exploited to the full the general mandate he managed to ex­
tricate from the people, and it did not matter greatly to 
him how the allegiance of his subjects was secured. There 
is reason to believe that the punctilious care he attached 
to fulfilling the requirements of the bailah, was a measure 
of his anxiety over his usurpation of the caliphate. For 
had Mu1awiyah really believed in the sovereignty of the people 
he would have treated them with greater consideration, and 
would at least have given them a greater scope of political 
expression. But that was not the case. In spite of his hilm, 
or forbearance, he was uncompromising and intolerant of any 
interference in State affairs. Ibn Duraid says that once 
a man provoked Mu1 awiyah intensely but was forgiven, and 
when the caliph was asked why He did so, he answered: ”1 do 
not care very much what the people say so long as they do not 
interfere between us and our kingdom.” (18) It should be
remembered that Ibn Duraid, (d.321/933), was a pro-Umayyad 
and a champion of the Arab cause against the shu1ubiyyah, 
and could not, therefore, have been maliciously prejudiced 
against Mulawiyah. (19)
Occasionally, however, Mu1awiyah behaved as a first 
among equals, especially with noble dignitaries from the 
two cities; but of course that clever show of modesty ac­
companied with lavish hospitality, was a measure of good 
diplomacy and nothing else. In reality, Mu1 awiyah kept him­
self above the rest and repeatedly demonstrated his author­
ity lest those around him should forget who he was.
Two ideas seem to have permeated the thoughts of 
Mu1 awiyah and the rest of the Umayyads: the Muslim State
was a political institution and a social community; and the 
leadership of the State was the right and duty of the able 
nobility of the Arabs. That policy and the way to its ful­
filment were clearly defined in the advice reputed to have 
been given by Mu1 awiyah, in his last illness, to his son 
Yazid. The salient points of the caliph's counsel are the 
following
” 1. By suppressing the enemy and subduing the Arabs
I (Mulawiyah) saved you a great deal of fighting.
2. Know (Oh Yazid) that the people of the Hijaz are 
your relatives, so treat them generously.
3. If the ‘Iraqis ' ask you to change their governor 
daily, then do so in order to avoid insurrections.
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4. Rely on the Syrians for support.
5. Yon have only f'onr possible Qurashite competitors: 
al-Hasan b. HAlI, lAbd Allah b. lUmar, *Abd al-Rahman b.
Abu Bakr, and t-Abd Allah b. al-Zubair.
6 . The most potent threat may come from Ibn al-Zubair. 
If he attacks yon, and yon prevail over him, then tear him 
into pieces.
?. Avoid bloodshed as mneh as yon can.‘f (20)
These words seem to reveal the dying caliph as a totally 
secular rnler, and it is quite possible that they had been 
attribnted to him by later writers. Obvionsly a dying man 
does not make snch clear and comprehensive pronouncements, 
and indeed those directions are too long and too elaborate 
to be the last words of a man whose powers of life were 
crumbling under the hammer of death.
(b) The government of Mu1awiyah achieved its purpose 
because he followed a correct method. He put the interests 
of the State as a whole before the interests of any individual, 
and preferred the service of society to that of the private 
person. That this sound maxim guided his actions can be 
verified from his public appointments which led to a stable 
administration in the Empire. And although to Mu1 awiyah the 
leadership of the State was generally an Arab, and specific­
ally hn Umayyad concern, he did not fall in the error of 
Mjthman and cAlI who appointed their near relatives to
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important positions regardless of ability or worth. (21)
Mu1awiyah was careful, and favoured his relatives only 
when they were sufficiently capable of discharging the 
duties assigned to them. With his keen sense of knowing 
the value and potentialities of those who came in contact 
with him, this caliph soon gathered around him a group of 
excellent and reliable lieutenants. (22) As a result of 
this v/ise policy all undeserving aspirants to high office 
quickly realised that the Empire was not after all a family 
estate intended solely for their enrichment and exploitation.
Old prejudices did not unduly disturb Mulawiyah's 
sense of proportion. Once he had a need for the services 
of a particular person, it was almost certain that the 
caliph would manage somehow to gain those services for him­
self and the State. The famous Ziyad b. Abih, was once a 
trusted supporter of tAlI, and even up- till the year 38/658 
he was the governor of Persia on behalf of LAli.(23) Yet 
Mu^awiyah attracted Ziyad to his side: and how right uAli
was when he warned Ziyad that, ”Mutawiyahts intrigue en­
velops men from left and right, front and back I (24) 
Similarly, al-Mughirah b. Shu''bah (25) was a counsellor to 
lAli before joining Mu*awiyah’s ranks, and so was lAmr b. 
al— '•As. To Ziyad, al-Mughirah, and tAmr, the term dahiyaji 
was applied -a word signifying a person of extreme cun­
ning and intelligence without an equal measure of virtue.
Among the Muslims four men were thus described: the three
mentioned above and Mutawiyah. This gives an idea of the 
immense advantage secured for the Umayyads at the outset of 
their rdgime
The employment of capable non-Muslims by MuLawiyah 
proved of great benefit to the State. This caliph was the 
first to appoint Greek or Byzantine secretaries in his ad­
ministration. This precedent was observed by all the Suf- 
yanids, and was later changed by lAbd al-Malik b. Marwan. (26) 
Al-Mawardi mentions that the change over from Greek to Ara­
bic took place in Syria by order of LAbd al-Malik, and from 
Persian into Arabic in the Eastern provinces by order of al- 
gajjaj. (27)
The army under the-first Umayyad caliph and others 
after him included non-Muslims. On one occasion during the 
reign of Yazid b. MuLawiyah, "a disciplinary force which in­
cluded many Christian Syrians," was dispatched against 
Medina. (28) This fact indicates a drastic change of 
thought; the army became an instrument of the State, and was 
used against all insurgents irrespective of their religion or 
standing. Orthodox Muslims were embittered and alienated by 
that regrettable move.
It was a measure of extreme prudence on the part of 
MuLawiyah that he did not install in positions of real autho­
rity men who had even the remotest possibility or right to
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the caliphate. For example, Satid b. ’Uthman, the son of 
the third Orthodox Caliph, was living comfortably in Damas­
cus under the watchful eye of Mulawiyah. When ashed, Salid 
showed some reluctance in giving his vote to Yazld and de­
manded a provincial governorship as a price for his vote, 
the shrewd caliph was very obliging, and appointed Salid 
to the principality of Khurasan, and sent with him as lieu­
tenant-governor Aslam b. Zurlah, who was in reality an agent 
of Mulawiyah. (29) When, however, Mulawiyah secured the 
fielty for Yazid, he lost no time in dismissing SaHd and 
reappointing lTJbaidallah b. Ziyad. A worse incident is re­
ported by al-Jahshiyari. " LAbd al-Rahman b. Khalid b. al- 
Walid was the '•amil, or agent in Hims, and did so well that 
Mulawiyah feared that the Syrians might transfer their al­
legiance to the son of Khalid. A man Awthal, who was a 
Greek secretary of Mulawiyah, was sent to Hims where he 
poisoned lAbd al-Rahman and thus murdered him.*' (30) It was 
also for a similar reason that the caliph dispensed with the 
services of lAbd Allah b. '•Amr b. al-^s who was the govern­
or of al-Kufah in 41/661, while his father lAmr was at the 
same time the governor of Egypt. (31) Al-Mughirah who was 
once the Lamil of al-Kufah end made a fortune for himself by 
exploiting his position, pointed out to Mulawiyah that LAmr 
and his son could easily form a pincer movement round Damas­
cus; and where would the caliph be? The caliph's suspicions
were aroused and VAbd Allah was deposed. (32)
Another great weakness in the character of Mulawiyah 
was his lack of compromise. In spite of his hilm he could 
not really he genuinely reconciled to his enemies, and some 
form of coercion was his principal instrument in dealing 
with actual or potential foes. His appointments in al-Kufah 
and al-Basrah showed that tendency unmistakably; for his 
chosen agents there were on the whole tyrannical and opp­
ressive. As a short term policy the method proved success­
ful, but in the long run it was disastrous because suppress­
ion never wins the hearts of men. In fact this weakness 
was characteristic of the Umayyads and proved to be a major 
cause in their downfall.
Nevertheless, the reign of Mulawiyah was remarkable.
He found the State in a chaotic condition, and moulded it 
into a strong and unified whole. Henri Lammens, who is 
perhaps the best biographer of Mulawiyah, goes so far as to 
assert that: "No one possessed to such a degree as Mulawiyah 
the gifts of the founder of an empire: vision, energy, and 
promptitude in action, breadth of view, logical thinking... 
and ability to use men to deal tactfully with their prejudices 
so as not to offend them. This rare combination of qualities 
enabled him to extract order out of the apparent chaos of 
Beduin anarchy. He created the Arab State: a creation seen 
darkly by lOmar without having been brought to realisation."(33)
The historian al-Mas*udi (345/956), known as the 
Herodotus of the Arabs, speaks highly of Mulawiyah*s 
piety, strict personal observance of religious duty, and 
profundity. In a chapter devoted to “the character and 
politics of Mu*-awiyah,n MasiudI mentions that:
1. Mulawiyah’s daily routine - invariably beginning before 
dawn - started with a short reading from the history of pre­
vious kings, their wars, politics, and administration.
2. Besides reciting a section of the Qur’an, and per­
forming voluntary devout prostrations, the caliph fulfilled 
with regularity the five compulsory daily prayers.
3. Most of his time was fully occupied in the management 
of the State.
4. He spent the evenings with his ministers and close as­
sociates, reading and discussing the history, literature, 
and politics of earlier nations. (34) It is little wonder, 
therefore, that Mulawiyah attained such great eminence. He 
left his impression on his followers, and their fine achieve­
ments were in no small measure due to his planning. But 
that, of course, does not detract from the creditable records 
and contributions of the other famous Umayyads such as i-Abd al 
Malik b. Marwan, and his son Hisham both of whom were nearly 
equally as eminent as Mulawiyah.
THE UMAYYADS AND HEREDITARY KINGSHIP IN ISLAM.
We mentioned above without comment the prevalent view
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of the Umayyad mulk. Dr. G. Stewart says that this principle 
“appeared first when Mulawiyah, the founder of the Umayyad 
dynasty in 576, four years previous to his death nominated 
his son as the future Caliph,M (34) Mulawiyah is reputed to 
have initiated this movement deliberately and in full pos­
session of his faculties. Lammens exclaims, "non seulement 
ce souverain se permit de transmettre le pouvoir a son fils, 
mais il prit cette mesure non a ses derniers moments, mais 
en pleine sante." (35)
Like many other unfounded allegations against the 
Umayyads this tradition seems to have been transmitted through 
the ages without much scrutiny until it has assumed the 
semblance of a fact. There is reason to believe that Mu*a- 
wiyah' was not the first caliph to secure an oath of allegiance 
to his son. It was LAli who conceived the idea in the year 
40/660 by ordering the citizens of Medina to swear allegiance 
to his son al-Hasan; the order was given at the point of the 
sword. (36) But whereas ^Ali failed Mulawiyah succeeded.
Even assuming tnat the Umayyads had really established, 
the system of mulk in Islam, that does not indict them as 
misguided innovators. The word bid^ab is an emotionally 
coloured one and implies the initiation of a legally un­
founded practice. But as it has been shown above, the yur- 
1 an, and the Haditb are non-committal on the question of
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succession. Therefore, the Umayyad action cannot with 
justice be termed an innovation. It is true that the idea 
of kingship with its attendant pomp and circustance is in­
compatible with the primitive nature of the bedouin Arabs, 
but that is no reason why Muslim institutions should strict­
ly follow those of the primitive Bedouins. besides, king­
ship as an institution cannot be definitely invalidated on 
î urfanic premises. The Book contains at least twenty two 
references to mulk, or earthly kingship -universal mulk is, 
of course, an attribute of Allah. Only two verses (Qur. 
xviii:80, xxvii:34) denounce the system. The other verses 
commend it as a blessing of Allah on His good servants.
The best king is he who possesses both power and wisdom, or 
al-mulk wa *1-hikmah like David; (37) and how reminiscent 
this is of Tlato’s conception of the king-^hilosopher1 (38)
In the course of time kingship became quite acceptable 
to the Muslims, and now the title of king is the usual one 
for the figure-head in most Muslim States. There are kings 
in jigypt, al-t-Iraq, Transjordan, and Sa**udi A.rabia. The 
Imam of al-Iaman is a hereditary ruler and has the status 
and title of a monarch, so has the sultan of Morocco. The 
Shah of rersia, as his title suggests, is also a king. (39)
If the critics of the Umayyads were really serious j.u 
their allegiations, they could very easily have adopted a dif­
ferent system in place of hereditary succession. But history
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proves that the notion of mulk under different guises was 
adhered to with great tenacity after the Umayyads. It 
seems to us that the action of Mulawiyah was no more than 
a retrogressive step towards clan loyalty. This caliph1s 
plan was designed to retain power in the house of umayyah, 
and strict hereditary succession from father to son was not 
perhaps contemplated. The analysis of the Umayyad record of 
succession helps in clarifying this point. Among the four­
teen caliphs of that dynasty only four directly succeeded 
their fathers. These were the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, and 6th rulers; 
namely Yazld and his son Mulawiyah II, t-Abd. al-Malik b. Marwan 
and his son al-Walld. (40) On the other hand, eighteen out 
of the thirty seven t-Abbasid caliphs directly succeeded their 
fathers; and this obviously shows that the tAbbasids were in­
sincere in their criticism of the Umayyads. (41) Besides, it 
should be borne in mind that it was the Kufans who initiated 
the method of direct filial succession in Islam as conceived 
by tAli. On his death they announced the caliphate of his 
son al-fLasan, and this action was taken without consultation 
with other provinces.
THE BAI*AH UNDER THE UMAYYADS.
The Umayyads ruled as autocrats or benevolent despots, 
but not as monarchs by divine right. Prom the constitutional 
point of view this method of government was self-contradictory.
276
On the one hand the caliphs were disinclined to share re­
sponsibility of government and control of public affairs 
with their subjects, and were actually very jealous of any 
interference in politics from the people whose primary duty 
was obedience to orders from the rulers. On the other hand, 
the Umayyads relied on the strength of public allegiance 
expressed in the bailah, for continued legal authority in 
the State. fo them the will of the Muslims was the only 
source of constitutional government. And yet, the oath of 
fidelity was often secured under extreme duress. when 
generous presents or threats failed to achieve the desired 
purpose ruthless violence was employed. rhe validity of an 
allegiance wrested by such coercive methods may, therefore, 
be questioned.
But it is to the credit of the umayyads that they 
attached equal importance and significance to the votes of 
every province in the umpire. No longer was Medina the 
polls and the rest of the Muslim world mere followers. In 
fact the important election campaign in which Yazld was 
nominated had been decided first in Syria, then in Medina 
and Mecca. Actually the twojcities were confronted with a 
fait accompli in which they had to acquiesce after some 
reluctance. (42)
Although delegations from every corner of the umpire
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went to the court of .Damascus to confirm their loyalty to 
M u tawiyah and his son, there was a sense of make-believe 
about the whole demonstration because everyone realised 
fully that Yazld had to be elected. In their speeches the 
delegates tried to confer upon the occasion an air of ser­
iousness and dignity. But a man, Yazid b. al-Muqaffa*', 
was particularly realistic and forthright in his short but 
remarkable address. He got up, pointed at Mulawiyah and 
said laconically: "the Commander of the Faithful is this;"
he then faced Yazid, .pointed at him and said: "and after 
him that,” then finally the speaker drew his sword, looked 
at it and announced tersely: "and he who dissents will 
surely suffer this." The caliph smiled meaningly and said 
to him: "you are the master of all orators.” (43)
The use of force by the umayyads had its serious draw­
backs; for those rulers repressed and did not conciliate, 
and they failed to diagnose properly the underlying general 
dissatisfaction of which the repeated risings were only a 
symptom. The Muslims were as yet quite unprepared to 
support voluntarily the Umayyad policy of secularisation.
The ruthless measures against insurrections, and the po­
litical murders of relatives of the rrophet including women 
and children, and the violation of the sanctity of the holy 
cities combined to intensify the resentment of all other 
parties and led inevitably to the risings which brought to
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a violent end the power of that dynasty.
It was under those conditions that the lAlids and 
i*Abbasids gathered followers and moral support; not so 
much because the Muslims had any particular appreciation 
for the esoteric doctrines of the Shi^is and anti-Umayyads 
but because the new parties had declared their opposition 
to secularisation and announced that they would re-install 
Islam in its proper place. Even when it was beyond doubt 
that the opposition was steadily gathering momentum the 
umayyads did not compromise. lAbd al-Hamid al-Katib, the 
famous secretary and one of the most celebrated Arabic 
prose writers, suggested to Marwan the last umayyad caliph 
a marriage alliance with the leading house of the i'AbbasIds, 
but the advice was ignored. (44) Marwan thought that taking 
such a course would in effect be an admission of weakness, 
and argued that the rebels must be punished for violating 
their oath of allegiance. It was indeed curious how one­
sided the umayyads were in their interpretation of the bind­
ing force of the bai «*ah. They thought that once a people 
admitted their allegiance to the caliph they were bound to 
obey him. On the other hand, when a few persons or a group 
of men withheld the bai * ah from the caliph they were con­
sidered rebels against the existing order and were found 
relentlessly. There Is reason to conclude, therefore, that 
although the baiiafo was observed all through the Umayyad
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rule itu existence was of value to the rulers only.
THE VALUE OP A CONSISTENT POLICY
A major source of power and stability in the Umayyad 
State was the adherence to one general strategy. Heligious 
considerations were left aside and the affairs of the comm­
unity were dealt with on political lines. Some members of 
this dynasty did not initially subscribe to this policy, 
but they soon changed their minds when they became caliphs. 
Al-Fakhri mentions that AAbd al-Malik b. Marwan had ex­
pressed his horror at the sacking of Medina and Mecca 
during the reign of Yazid b. Mulawiyah, and yet, when he 
(’•Aba al-Malik) became caliph he surpassed his predecessors 
in ruthlessness. It is further reported that kAbd al-Malik 
was a devoted student of Muslim law, and used often to re­
cite the Qur’an in the mosque of Medina, and when he was 
summoned to the caliphate he closed the Book saying: Tlthis 
is a parting between you and me.1' (45)
It does not matter whether or not the umayyad policy 
was a correct one. The important point is that the method 
was consistently observed; but a minority of caliphs fail­
ed to do so, and their weakness was immediately exploited 
by their enemies and thus grievous injury was done to the 
cause of that dynasty. t-Umar b. LAbd al-LAziz who revived 
the pietist tradition was politically a conspicuous failure.
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As Von Kremer points out, his management of affairs ruined 
the machinery of government painfully and laboriously 
built by his predecessors, and his kindness was misinter­
preted. During his caliphate the decline of the umayyads 
began. (46)
There is reason to suppose that the Umayyad plan of 
government was a right one, and if at all politics qua 
politics was exercised in Islam, it was under the Umayyads 
and nowhere else that it took place. But .unfortunately 
neither the time nor the temperament of the Muslims in 
general and the Arabs in particular was sufficiently pro­
pitious to insure the success of the experiment. It seems 
as though Mulawiyah, the initiator of that policy was a 
long distance ahead of his time and people. As is known, 
he was a keen student of past history and it may be plaus­
ible to suggest that he had borrowed some of his ideas from 
non-Arab sources. however, the Umayyads were fortunate in 
their choice of Syria as their base because, although that 
province had previously suffered from Byzantine mismanage­
ment, the Syrians themselves were for many generations ac­
customed to submit to authority. They were on that ac­
count In advance of the unruly Arabs of the interior in 
their readiness to respond favourably to discipline under 
an ordered government. But this initial asset tux-ned later 
into a liability. As the centre of gravity moved eastwards
281
Damascus became too far to the west to exercise effective 
control over the rebellious provinces.
Good fortune also played its part in allowing the three 
ablest rulers to govern longest. Mulawiyah, **Abd al-Malik 
b. Marwan, and Hisham, each ruled nearly twenty years, 
ihis is an indication that consistency and stability are 
prerequisites of construction and development.
Another remarkable feature of the Umayyad government 
was the continuity of a fixed administration, and the ful­
filment by the new caliphs of the general plans conceived 
or partly finished by their immediate predecessors. This 
resulted in an efficient and undisturbed otate machinery.
These essentials of a successful government reflect credit 
on the Umayyads because even in the present time such prin­
ciples are observed only in well organised and politically 
mature States. It is interesting to notice, for example, 
that Sarjun b. Mansur al-Rumi, the head of diwan al-kharaj, 
or Board of Land nevenue, held office continuously under 
five caliphs - Mulawiyah to **Abd al-Malik, (47) This 
Greek Christian was a devoted servant of the umayyads and 
held their complete trust. Besides being in charge of the 
most important department in the whole administration, he was 
.a secretary to the caliphs and his advice was often sound 
and sincere. Once lazid I was reluctant to appoint ^Ubaid- 
allah b. Ziyad - whom he hated - to the governorship of al-
Rufah, but .hen cold by Sarjun that Mulawiyah had personally 
intended iUbaidallah for that post xazid immediately 
gave his consent. (48) It was not unusual for able govern­
ment to continue service without interruption under more 
than one caliph irrespective of personal differences. But 
on the whole confidence was mutual between rulers and lieu­
tenants. Once a general or governor proved himself vfvorthy 
of crust he was given full scope and consent encouragement. 
Nevertheless the selection of the right persons' was not an 
easy or a haphazard affair; for it could hardly have been 
chance or random choice that resulted in the mobilisation 
of such an impressive number of talented men.
ADVERSE CONDITIONSs THE ECLIPSE AND PALL OP THE UMAlfADS.
Although the success of the umayyads was predominantly 
of their own making, their failure was only partly due to 
political miscalculations and partly to circumstances be­
yond thuir control. Paradoxical as it may seem, the main 
pillar of strength upon which that dynasty had established 
its power proved later to be its heel of Achilles. The un­
timely secularisation of the utate was perhaps the principal 
adverse factor leading to disintegration. The attendant 
evils of this policy were pervasive throughout but remained 
latent because the scheme was administered ably and ruthlessly. 
The strict monopoly of power by one single family had the
283
beneficial effect of strengthening the solidarity of that 
group. But the exclusion of others was a violation of the 
principle of equality inherent in Islam. Arab families 
other than the umayyads took a more serious view as they 
considered the arrest of power by one house a definite 
act of unjustifiable monopoly. Deep resentment was a- 
roused and might have led immediately to the formation of 
a united opposition had it not been for the existing anti­
pathy of the Arabs towards other races. ihe assertion of 
the superiority of the Arabs was of course an endemic 
weakness which was condemned by the' rrophet but was per­
sisted in, nevertheless. xhe result was that the alien­
ated Arabs could not easily join hands with other enemies 
of the Umayyads. It was to the delight of the conquered 
nations to hear of dissensions between their conquerors.
In speech and letter derogatory accusations were exchanged 
between ohe umayyads and their Arab: opponents represented 
by the ^Alids and the orthodox inhabitants of Medina and 
Mecca. (49) The echo of these words did not escape the 
ears of the subject peoples, especially the Persians who 
were always looking for an opportunity to rid themselves 
of Arab rula and regain their lost freedom. By every poss­
ible method the Persians tried to exploit tnese differences 
to their own advantage. if the Arabs could lay claim to
superior lineage, why not che lA.jam? After all, they were
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heirs to a civilisation greater than that of the Arabs.
This reciprocal antagonism led to the movement known 
as Shutubiyyah. The name was derived from Qur’an xlix;13,
,f0 meni verily We have created you from a male and a female, 
and have made you nations (shulub) and tribes (qaba»il) that 
you may know each other; verily the noblest of you in God’s * 
sight is he amongst you who most fears God...1* By knowing 
each other was intended the promotion of friendly relations, 
and it was evident that the undisguised contempt of th^ nraos 
for foreigners had no religious basis. It should be held in 
mind that it was not restricted to the Persians. On the other 
hand, of all the foreigners the Persians were the most violent 
in their reaction. At the beginning the Shu^ubis claimed 
with justice equal status with the Arabs, but their movement 
in its later developments definitely asserted the superiority 
of the *»Ajam over the Arabs who, it was stated, were barbar­
ians of no civilisation worthy of the name. This latter con­
tention was motivated by the sense of injury of the Shu’-ubis 
and their strong desire for self-vindication.
The ShuLubiyyah reached its full force in the early 
period of the LAbbasids, but its origin was much earlier than 
that. In the" days of Hi sham, a Persian, Isma ̂ il b. Yasar was 
thrown into a stream of water and nearly lost his life because
he boasted his descent from a race which excelled all others.(50) 
But repression only retarded for a short time the active 
rising against the oppressors. «hen the alienated groups 
began to work together the Umayyads were doomed. it is 
doubtful whether the Persians had any special liking for 
the t«Alids or the ’'Abbasids, but there seems reason to be­
lieve that it was the community of interests that caused 
these groups to unite. The Persians thought with good judg­
ment that any action undertaken to weaken the Arabs was a 
step forward on the road to emancipation; hence the repeat­
ed support offered by the Kufans to the kAlids and their 
faction or shl^afc. Another indication of this tendency 
was the bewildering exhibition of Eufan cowardice at crucial 
moments. They lured the descendants of ’'All to their camp 
and promised to champion their cause, and when the umayyad 
expeditions arrived on the scene of action the inhabitants 
of that area of al-LIraq hurried their retreat and left one 
Arab party to exterminate the other. The truth is that that 
locality was predominantly Persian in race and sympathies and 
from a national point of view their treachery was highly com­
mendable. When they assured themselves that the umayyads were 
sufficiently exhausted, they openly revolted against them and 
supported the ’-Abbasids and made certain that the new dynasty 
would establish itself on Persian swords. By so doing they
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knew that they would be putting an end to the Arabs and 
Arabism. and how prophetic Ka^b b. Sayyar the governor
of Khurasan was in his distressing and moving appeal to 
his master Marwan the last umayyad caliph! ,!If you do not 
waken and stand up to the impending menace, then better bid 
your last farewell to Islam and the Arabs.” (51) - How else 
can one account for the wave of vaunted claims of Persian 
superiority that accompanied the rising of lAbbasid power?
It appears that the final triumph of the sons of ^Abbas and 
the establishment of their caliphate in Persian surroundings 
was a definite success to that nation’s cause. In fact it 
looked as though it were a Sassanid renaissance. Thus as 
Taha Husain remarked,1 the Umayyads deviated from the policy 
of the Prophet. He wanted to dispense with clan loyalty 
and they relied on the help of one single party of the Arabs 
to the exclusion of all others. t o  do so they strengthened 
al- *■ as ably yah (esprit ae corps) but failed to control it, and 
that consequently led to their downfall; nay, to the whole 
overthrow of tne Arabs and the revival of the i-ersians.” (52) 
The Umayyad monarchy -with its enlightened autocrats now gave 
way to a more intensive despotism under the v-Abbasid theocracy 
in which the Arab racial element fell behind and the Persian 
gained the ascendancy. Islam, however, did not suffer ad­
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Additional note.
KaLb al-Ahbar d.c. 32 /652.
Kalb is referred to (JE. vii:400) as one of the most 
prominent fathers of Muslim tradition. He was a native of 
al-Yaman and on account of his learning he was styled 
al-fcibr or al-ahbar -possibly from Heb. ion. He settled in 
Medina and declared his acceptance of Islam. He knowledge 
and integrity won him the respect of the Muslims and their 
leaders. Kalb was a great favourite of vUmar.
1Abbas al-^Aqqad (op.cit.348) describes Kalb as :
"a defeated and converted Jew who pretended sincerity to 
Islam., LAqqad suggests further that Kalb had taken part 
in the planning of the assassination of tUmar. "Three days
before the murder took place Kalb prophesied it to tUmar,
and claimed that it was mentioned in the Torah... But the 
truth is that lAbd al-Rahman b. Abu Bakr saw Kalb, Abu 
Lu’lu’ah (the murderer of Ulmar^ and two other Persians 
whispering." I Al-^Aqpad does not mention the source of his 
information.
According to Tabari and Balfcami, Kalb must have died 
after 35/655, because his advice to Mulawiyah to arrest 
power was tendered after the murder of ^Ut liman. But Ibn 
Qutaibah (Handbuch der G-eschiciite p.219) maintains that
KaVb was living in retirement at Hims, and died there in 
32/652, while ^Uthman was still alive. On that account it 
would appear that Bal^ami’s report concerning the counsel 
of Ka^b to Mulawiyah is apocryphal. We are inclined to 
accept Ibn Qutaibah’s view. This is borne by the his­
torical study of the character of Mutawiyah who was not 
inclined to act on sudden impulses.
Z9d
CH. VIII 
THE 1 ABBAS ID THEOCRACY
Z94-
The tAbbasids began their rule when ^Abd Allah Abu 
*1-**Abbas known as al-Saffah, or shedder of blood, was pro­
claimed caliph at al-Kufah in 132 /749. This event took 
place when Marwan II, the last Umayyad ruler was still the 
recognised head of State; in other words, the ^Abbasids 
usurped power by armed revolution.
From al-Kufah the new caliph sent his uncle tAbd 
Allah to engage in battle with the remaining Umayyads. In 
the battle of the Zab near al-Mausil, the Umayyads were de­
feated beyond recovery.
Close blood relationship with the Prophet was the 
claim of the new dynasty to the headship of Islam. But 
this argument depended on the unwarrantable acceptance of 
spiritual heredity as a basis of government; and even 
assuming there were reasons to hold this view of succession, 
the -descendants of &Ali b. Abu Talib would have been more 
entitled to the caliphate. The truth is that the lAbbasids 
seized power first and justified or rationalised their 
position afterwards.
By skilful use of propaganda in Khurasan and al- 
tlraq -two provinces quite suitable for intrigue and clan­
destine movements- the :l Abbas id agents manoeuvred and pre­
pared the way for their masters by leading the people to 
believe that the Hashimids would supersede the Umayyads 
and observe the principle of equality between all Muslims.
The reign of the first Abba aids, especially al-SaffaJp.,
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will long be remembered for its violent storm of terror 
against their foes and competitors.
Al-Mansur, the brother and successor of al-Saffah 
built and made Baghdad his seat of government. It remained 
capital during the greater part of the rule of the dynasty.
It Is said with reason that the first century of the 
lAbbasid reign was the golden period of Islam. In material 
wealth and intellectual life, in brilliant prosperity and 
internal peace, Islam reached its summit. , The rulers 
gave the lead to their subjects in the field of peaceful 
occupations. Culture and urbanity were the professed aims 
of life. Al-Mansur, al-Rashid, and al-Mafmun, the three 
most prominent caliphs were especially remembered for their 
construction, fine administration, and patronage of science 
and the arts. It Is interesting to observe that each of 
them had a comparatively long term of office -about twenty 
years.
The Arabs lost their ascendancy under that dynasty 
and had to accept at the best only an equal status with 
^ile LAjam. But the Arabs benefited indirectly from this 
policy. Instead of seeking their advantage at the cost 
and labour of others, they began to engage in useful and 
constructive work. This rehabilitation was aided by the 
few generations of settled urban life and intermarriages 
that preceded the advent of the iAbbasids.
In theory the method of the new dynasty was theocratic,
but its practice was most despotic. The familiar picture 
from alf laylafc (Arabian Rights) of the caliph,- the wazir 
or vizier, and the executioner was on the whole accurate.
Because of stability in the Empire, and owing to the 
increased number of cities comparatively densely populated, 
a greater number of government officials was employed to 
run the different departments of State. It should be noted 
that this staff had no legal influence or independent com­
mand; its jurisdiction was derived from the caliph who re­
tained and exercised absolute autocratic sovereignty and 
constitutional irresponsibility. That state of affairs 
was intensified by the fallacious claims to divine pre­
rogatives. The VAbbasids asserted in speech and action 
a
that! unique mandate from Allah had been invested in them; 
and that is tbe main reason for declaring the rule of that 
dynasty as theocratic.
The hold of the central government over the dominion 
of Islam was not firmly maintained. Even at the height of 
power the tAbbasids could not subdue their Umayyad rivals 
in Spain. As time passed the rulers of Baghdad progress­
ively weakened and their grip on the outlying provinces 
relaxed to an increasing extent, until finally the stage 
was reached when the caliphs themselves were over-shadowed 
by their mercenaries. Independent and hereditary prin­
cipalities sprang up within the Empire and only formally 
acknowledged the religious or spiritual position of the
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impotent and often virtually imprisoned caliphs, before 
final collapse the lAbbasids reached such a low ebb that their 
command could hardly extend beyond the walls of their capital 
and its immediate environs.
This dynasty came to an end when in 656/1258, the 
Mongols under Hulagu, the grandson of Jenkiz Khan, conquered 
and sacked the metropolis once called the City of Peace. 
Al-Mustatsim the last of the iAbbasid rulers, his family, 
and staff were murdered by the invading hordes. Half a 
millennium previously a similar fate had been mercilessly 
inflicted upon the umayyads by their compatriots and co-
religionists, the sons of al-VAbbas. How the :
men and dynasties change i•
The following is a list of the ^Abbasid
■1. Al-Saffah 132 /7b0
2. Al-Mansur 13b /754
3. Al-Mahdl 158 /755
4. Al-HAdl 159 /785
5. Al-Rashid 170 /78b
b. Al-Amln 193 /809
7. Al-Ma’mun 198 /813
8. Al-Mu^tasim 218 /833
9. Al-Wathiq 227 /842
10. Al-Mutawakkil 232 /847
11. Al-Muntasir 247 /861
12. Al-Musta LIn 248 /862
13. Al-Mu’*tazz 251 /8bb
14. Al-Muhtadi 255 /869
15. Al-Mu^tamid 256 /870
lb. Al-Mu**tahid 279 /892
17. Al-Muktafi 289 /902
18. Al-Muqtadir 295 /908
19. Al-Qahir 320 /932
20. Al-Racji 322 / 934
21. Al-Muttaqi 329 /940
22. Al-Mustakfi 333 /944
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Pall of the lAbbasids 655 /I258 (2)
an estimate o p ' the legal bases op the â b b a s i d s•
Tabari says that the Prophet had informed his uncle
al-^Abbas b. VAbd al-Muttalib that the leadership of the 
Muslims would reside in the latter*s descendants. (3) The
source of the tradition was Muhammad b. tA.ll b. tAbd Allah
b. VAbbas who was in fact the arch designer of the tAbbasid 
movement. The fictitious nature of the statement can be 
detected in the prophetic forecast; for as previously 
mentioned, most serious Muslim thinkers reject haaiths 
based on prophecy. Besides, if al-VAbbas, uncle of the 
Prophet, had any such information he would have presented 
it at the meeting of the Banu SaLidah in which Abu Bakr 
was chosen as caliph. Al-LAbbas, who was two or three years 
older than Muhammad, took an active part in that assembly, 
but no one at the time seriously considered him as a suitable 
candidate despite his age and relation to the Prophet. Un­
like his brother, the faithful martyr Hamzah, al-lAbbas did
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not help appreciably in the spreading of Islam, and declared 
his faith only when mecca surrendered. He was rather unctuous 
and was thought to have acted as a spy. (4) Yatqubi men­
tions that al-LAbbas was dissatisfied with the election of 
Abu Bakr, and went on to further the cause of tAlI in spite 
of the unanimity of the electors to the contrary. (5) That 
implies that al-t'Abbas acted as a disruptive element and 
tried to split the ranks of the Muslims. It is not un­
reasonable, therefore, to question the genuineness of a 
tradition coming frcm that source.
It would be more correct to trace the origin of tAbba­
sid ambitions to KAbd Allah b. al-Wlbbas. (o) To transfer 
the investigation from father to son is not as trivial as 
it appears at first sight; in fact it helps in directing 
the course of research from the less, to the more important 
person. A study of the career of Ibn *-Abbas would clearly 
reveal the motives behind his actions. Buhl is of the 
opinion that the tAbbasids have descended from tAbd Allah 
b. &Abbas. (?)
fAbd Allah served ''All as an ambassador and later 
as governor of al-Basrah. From his record of administration 
in that city, the conclusion cannot be escaped that he was 
astute, untrustworthy and perfidious. He left his cousin 
^Ali at a most critical moment and returned to Medina with 
his stolen treasures. Buhl believes that VAbd Allah had 
sold himself to Mu^awiyah at a high price, and afterwards
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acted treacherously towards al-Hasan. (8)
The object of showing tAbd Allah in this discreditable 
but most probably true character is not to belittle a cause 
by throwing odium on its upholder, for that would indeed be 
fallacious. The idea is to point out that a man cannot be 
generally trusted when his actions have repeatedly proved him 
unreliable. tAbd Allah owes his fame not to his politics,
(<but to his greatly admired knowledge of profane and sacred
tradition.1* (9) He is a prolific traditionist, but scholarly 
criticism has exposed him as a conscienceless liar whose for­
geries quite correspond to his cunning political tricks. It 
is perhaps relevant to mention that Tabari and Ballami con­
sider tAbd Allah as a dahiyati. There is reason to assume, 
therefore, that having witnessed the loss of the LAlid cause 
and the success of the Umayyadfs, LAbd Allah nursed his am­
bitions and began to prepare the way for his own family by
coining forged traditions in order to strengthen the position
of his descendants to the caliphate, a s is generally admitted, 
political motives have been among the strongest reasons for 
the fabrication of traditions. Thus the inference may be 
drawn that the VAbbasids had no valid legal or religious 
rights to supremacy among the Muslims. Only by very subtle 
propaganda and unchecked use of force did they reach, and then 
consolidate their hold on the caliphate. In this aspect they 
were not different from any other dynasty usurping power.
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TEE tABBASID PROPAGANDA.
During the Umayyad rule some nashimlds lived in the 
village of al-Humaymah in the province of Syria. Muhammad 
b. Zayn al-iAbidin, who was a direct descendant of the Pro­
phet’s daughter Fatimah and her husband lAli, died there in 
116/734. (11) The family of Muhammad b, t-Ali lAbd Allah 
b. lAbbas also resided in that hamlet. It Is thought that 
Muhammad b. ^Ali was the first to spread active propaganda 
in the name of the Hashimids -an ambiguous term generally 
used in reference to the family of the Prophet. The famous 
Abu Muslim al-Khurasanl was a slave of this man Muhammad, 
and was entrusted by him to disseminate secretly in Khura­
san publicity in favour of his master’s family. (12) It 
should be borne In mind that Abu Muslim was not the first 
agent of the LAbbasids. Their subversive activities had 
started sometime before the engagement of Abu Muslim, but 
as Barthold points out, "the movement prepared since long, 
was accelerated through his (Abu Muslim’s) arrival and the 
success of his religious propaganda.’1 (13) When Muhammad 
b. tAli died, his place was taken <by his son Ibrahim. The 
revolution broke out in 129/747 and a serious struggle went 
on between the Umayyad governor of Khurasan and the tAbba- 
sid insurgents. Marwan II, managed to capture Ibrahim in 
130/748 and is thought to have put him to death. But Ib­
rahim’s brothers Abu ’ 1-’'Abbas and Abu JaLfar, later known 
as al-Saffah and al-Mansur, took charge of the revolution
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and even added to Its fury, until in 132/750 al-Saffah became 
caliph. it Is interesting to notice that neither al-Saffah 
nor al-Mansur had actually taken part in the fighting. They 
stayed in al-Humaymah, then moved directly to al-Kufah, where 
they remained in hiding for some time until it was considered 
safe to proclaim themselves and declare openly their intention 
of assuming the caliphate as the rightful heirs of the Prophet.(14) 
The subtlety of the kA.bba.sid propaganda was revealed 
in its ambiguity* The main cry against the Umayyads was 
that the descendants of the Prophet must be his legitimate 
successors. This argument had previously been unequivocally 
rejected by the majority of the Arabs who realised the ser­
ious implications of admitting such a principle. The lAbbasids, 
therefore, left aside the predominantly Arab areas and fixed 
their attention on the provinces of al-^Iraq and Khurasan, 
which were considered most suitable for an anti-umayyad ri­
sing. Eoth localities were sufficiently removed from Damascus 
to render difficult the rapid movement of government troops 
to put down the insurrection. At the same time al- t»Iraq and 
Khurasan presented the ’•Abbasids with a fertile breeding ground 
for their activities. It was also fortunate for the «*Abbasids 
to have chosen al-£umaymah for residence. That village being 
within easy reach of the rulers of Damascus made it difficult 
for them to suspect the existence of an underground movement 
designed to uproot their dynasty, and by tne time the Umayyads
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discovered the plot, it was too late for them to take effective 
measures to save the situation. Abu Muslim asserted with satis­
faction that he worked under the very nose of his enemies until 
he took them completely unawares. A saying of his to that effect 
became proverbial: nhe who tends his sheep in a lion’s den
and relaxes his vigilance, will certainly have lions to look 
after his flock.*' (15)
The da^is, or publicity agents, endeavoured to per­
suade the people to transfer their loyalty-from the sons 
of Umayyah to the sons of Hashim. The sons of Hashim formed 
three branches: The descend<ants of Muhammad, ’-Abbas, and
kAli. The Prophet had no direct male heirs to survive him.
Since Arab lineage principally followed the»male side, it can 
be asserted that Muhammad had no descendants in the proper 
sense of the word. Incidentally, this view implies that any 
Muslim who poses as a descendant of the Prophet is either an 
Ignorant impostor or a barefaced liar attempting to exploit 
the credulity of the people. (1*6)
The children of al-’-Abbas were in no way distinguished 
before or after Islam, and their eligibility as leaders of 
the Muslim community was not seriously entertained in the 
early days of the caliphate. They had to content themselves 
with second-class appointments, and fully realised the weak­
ness of their own position, nad they at the early stages
1of rising declared their real intentions of becoming ca\iphs,
504
the story might indeed have been different even in Khurasan. 
But only the agents were acquainted with the plot and kept 
it as a guarded secret.
The tAlids had their own supporters from the very 
beginning. Their party was not very strong, but in time it 
became an effective force in the arena of Islam. Many people 
leaned towards the shitab out of sympathy and sorrow for 
the fate of its leaders. It may be reasonable to suggest 
that every political failure suffered by the descendants 
of I'Ali resulted in the consolidation of their standing later 
on. The martyrdom of some chiefs of tne house of **Ali was 
in fact the corner-stone of the sMTat. The more tragic 
the affliction the greater was the sympathy. Thus it appears 
that by their misfortunes the ^Alids rendered se great ser- 
vice to the shiiafc movement. The curious and unortnodox 
views held by this party are to some extent also due to the 
fact of martyrdom. Tor example the belief that >. .) “the death 
of an Imam is rendered void by the idea of radj *>a (tne re­
turn of the soul), concealment and parousia" does not find 
any support in the sunni school of thought. (17) These 
opinions of the shi^ah reveal the extent of their frustration 
and the measure of their hopes. It isctcurious fact that 
their ambition to secure power in the name of the ahl 11- 
bayt, or family of the Prophet, had not been satisfied. Apart 
from the Fatimid rule in Egypt, and the small independent 
principality founded in 172/788 in Morocco by Idris b. «*Abd
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Allah, a great grandson of lAli, the shilis never at any time 
exercised supreme power in Islam, and until they get their 
chance they have to console themselves with the hope that 
one day the absent Imam will reveal himself and spread jus­
tice in the world according to shi Li prescriptions. It 
can be seen, therefore, that shltism always had a special 
appeal to a certain type of mentality, and its attraction 
was particularly strong to the oppressed, frustrated and 
persecuted. Such people presented the ^Abbasid agents wâ th 
an ideal medium for revolutionary activities.
The belief was spread in the lands of insurrection 
that the principal aim of rising against the Umayyads was 
to vindicate the wrongs inflicted upon the '•Alids; and 
hence the use of the obscure term Hashimids. The campaign 
was conducted by twelve chief propagandists supported by 
seventy other assistants and they were all sworn to se­
crecy. They were well trained in the. art of persuasion 
and instructed in the different methods of approach and 
appeal to men's weaknesses and prejudices, (l’fe) Even 
when success w‘as assured the lAbbasid general LAbd Allah 
al-Qusari took al-Kufah on behalf of the Banu Hashim. Abu 
Salamah the new governor of the city also maintained his 
silence. When after two months he heard that allegiance 
was publicly given to al-Saffah, he hurried to the new 
caliph and said: "you have hastened in announcing yourself 
but I hope the outcome will be safe.” (19)
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It should not "be assumed that the underground move­
ment worked peacefully all the time. When the ground was 
prepared by the original agents, and Abu Muslim took over, 
these men discarded their guise of simple and harmless com­
mercial travellers and joined his forces. In a directive 
from Ibrahim b. Muhammad, Abu Muslim was ordered to be ex­
tremely ruthless in waging war. "Kill whoever you suspect, 
and if you can annihilate every Arab from Khurasan, then 
do so.u (20) Abu Muslim fulfilled his instructions merci­
lessly and it is estimated -probably exaggeratedly- that 
his victims numbered six hundred thousand. How anyone can 
think those massacres were carried out in the name of Islam 
it is very difficult to imagine I The motive for those 
hideous crimes was simply blind lust for worldly power and 
nothing else. The **Abbasids hoaxed the people and led them 
blindfold and finally confronted them with an accomplished 
fact for which there was no alternative but death. Al- 
Saffah, the first caliph of the new dynasty, did not acquire 
his infamous label in vain: for it was the blood of the
Muslims shed so freely by him that earned that tyrant his 
description. (21) Far from being a movement intended to do 
away with Umayyad injustice, the VAbbasid rising heralded 
a despotism more unscrupulous than anything seen before,
THE PERSIAN CHARACTER OF THE LABBASID CALIPHATE.
The advent of the ''Abb as ids marked a revival of the
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national life of Persia. Arab writers often minimised this 
definite change and took comfort in the Qurashite lineage 
of the caliphs. Although rulers and ruled are normally 
interdependent and closely linked by the common bond of 
nationality, greater importance is usually attached to the 
people regardless of the sovereign. Whatever his origin 
or ancestry, the supreme head of a State should be identified 
with the people he rules and not vice versa. For example, 
Otto the first ruler of the resurrected and independent 
Kingdom of Greece in 1830 was himself a Bavarian Prince; 
Muhammad tAli "the founder of Egyptian independence and of 
the royal house which still reigns in Cairo, was an Albanian 
Moslem from Kavalla;" and the present monarch of the United 
Kingdom is partly of German ancestry. (22) Therefore, it is 
not an extraordinary historical event to find an Arab caliph 
on the Persian throne. It is interesting to notice that a 
secretary of Charlamagne refers to Harun al-Rashid as "the 
King of Persia, Aaron." (23)
There is reason to believe that although the Per­
sians were decisively defeated in battle by the Arabs, they 
never gave up the struggle for national survival and in­
dependence. Islam was accepted by them as a religion and 
a civilisation, but at the same time they continued to op­
pose the Arabs, and whenever possible plotted seriously 
for their downfall. Proofs are not lacking of Persian en­
deavours to disorganise and split Arab unity. "National
,
enmity was the principal cause of the murder of vUmar h. al- 
Khattab," says al-lAqqad.(24) The murderer was a Persian 
who was motivated by hatred to the Arabs. "The Persian 
converts and slaves were not really sincere to the Arabs," 
says Taha Husain.(J25) By way of vengeance and as an outlet 
for the intense dislike they had for their conquerors, the 
Persians exploited the political differences between the 
Arab parties and tried to intensify discord between them 
in order to disorganise their ranks and weaken their soli­
darity. Further, the treachery of the ^Iraqis and in par­
ticular the residents in the area near al-Kufah which was 
the seat of the Persian kings before Islam, was one effect­
ive method of shattering Arab unity and strength. The Per­
sians in that locality were very conscious of their defeat, 
and their repeated betrayal of Arab claimants to the cali­
phate should be regarded as an expression of a determined 
will to emancipation. It is unlikely that any people can 
be perfidious or volatile by nature; circumstances, how­
ever, sometimes force men to resort to practices of this 
kind for higher ends. It should be remembered that even 
when the wave of Arab conquest was at its height, the Per­
sians revolted against the attacking armies and rejoined 
the resisting remnants of the forces under Rustum. (26)
We seem entitled to conclude, therefore, that the cAbba- 
sids by establishing their rule in Persian surroundings 
and with Persian swords, had unwittingly caused the rebirth
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of that nation. This fact was clearly realised at the time 
of the revolution immediately preceding the collapse of 
the Umayyads. The leaders on the spot knew then that the 
struggle was a national and not a religious one, and they 
appealed in vain for a concerted Arab counter attack.(27) 
Fortunately for Islfim, however, the Persians themselves 
had been absorbed in that religion. Their renaissance was 
to a great extent modelled on the Muslim pattern, but 
traces of the Sassanid regime could be detected in the 
various political institutions introduced by the VAbbasids. 
The social life of the new dynasty was also influenced by 
the pre-Islamic Persian standards and manners.
Some students erroneously use Arabism and Islam as 
synonyms. This may perhaps account for the mistaken app­
lication of the term Arab to the VAbbasid caliphate. Dr. 
Sanhoury refers to that dynasty as "la deuxieme dynastie 
arabe." But he does, however, qualify his statement by 
mentioning that "c’est lfelement persan qui est devenu pre­
ponderant. . .L* influence de cette nation s'est fait sentir 
des le debut du regne Abbaside." (28)
On the whole, the Persian stamp on the ^Abbasid 
period has been marked clearly. "A Persian and Khurasanian 
dynasty," is the description of Prof. Browne.(29) Prof. 
Nicholson in his moderate statement asserts that "we pass 
from the period of Arabian nationalism to one of Persian 
ascendancy and cosmopolitan culture,... the new dynasty, owing
its rise to the people of Persia and especially of Khurasan 
could exist only by establishing a balance of power between 
Persians and Arabs.'1 (30) Dr. Thomas suggests that since
^  * I
the lAbbasid caliphs owed their throne to Persian Khurasan- 
ian levies they had to shape their rule accordingly. (31)
It is doubtful whether the new rulers had intended 
the Persians to rise again as a nation opposed to the Arabs. 
There is reason to believe that the LAbbasids were forced 
to choose Persia as a final resort. This is inferred from 
the letter of the chief VAtobasid in al-IJumaymah to his agent 
The Arabs having previously rejected the thesis of heredi­
tary succession in the ProphetTs family could not be in­
duced to change their minds in favour of remoter relatives
of his. The people of Syria were definitely pro-Umayyad.
- - ?J,But the people of Khurasan were great iny umber... empty in
hearts having; no fixed loyalties... possessed of large bodies 
and low intelligence, yet impressive and persevering sol­
diers. 1 (32) When finally the revolution succeeded, the 
ruling house had to be set up amid its supporters and no 
where else, and it had also to accept the character of the 
environment that brought it victory. The effects of the 
change were far reaching. Persia did not only become a 
free State once more, but actually fell heir to the Arab 
and Muslim Empire. Prom al-Anbar, the capital of al-Saffah, 
and later from Baghdad, the famous capital of al-Mansur and 
his followers appointments all over the whole dominion were
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made, and the City of Peace became the political Kabbah of 
the Muslim world. Thus the new society was not a closed
one but a unit in a cosmopolitan State, and the new civi­
lisation was neither wholly Persian nor purely Muslim; it
was a combination of both with an essence of its own. The
sremarkable featoire about the Persian; was their keen interest 
in Islamic studies. Their antipathies towards the Arabs 
were not combined with similar feelings towards the language 
or the culture derived from Islam. On the contrary, a great 
interest was taken in the study of Arab literature and thought. 
The first century of the kAbbasid caliphate was rightly called
the golden period of Islam, not only because of the great
material prosperity and splendour of rulers and ruled that 
followed the change of dynasties, but because of the im­
pressive strides in scholarly achievements. As soon as the 
wave of persecution was over, both Arabs and non-Arabs set 
to work together under the auspices of the caliphs. The 
benefits of that policy were immense. As already mentioned, 
it was during that century that the sciences of tradition, 
law, philology and philosophy seriously engaged the minds of 
Muslim thinkers of all nationalities. Parochial consider­
ations were dwarfed by the unifying power of Islam. In ad­
ministration and court life, the Persian pattern was in 
vogue, but in the more fundamental matters Islam kept its 
original identity. But it was singularly unfortunate that 
politics followed the baser values of the period. The Arabs
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were not fully reconciled to the prevailing conditions and
*
attempted to stage a come-back. They exdrted themselves to 
tip the balance in their favour hut their efforts were de­
feated, and civil war proved harmful to both sides. The 
most painful symptom of that phenomenon was the struggle bet­
ween al-Amin and al-Ma’mun.
GOVERNMENT BY DIVINE RIGHT.
The VAbbasids introduced into Muslim politics a wholly 
unorthodox theory of State, namely, government by divine 
right. Not only did the caliphs rule as special agents of 
God, but claimed a kind of divinity for themselves -an 
assertion which no Muslim ruler before, including the Pro­
phet himself, dared to put forward. Leaving aside the re­
volutionary movement which culminated in their seizure of 
power, the lAbbasids attributed their legal sanction not 
to the will of the people as was the case previously, but 
to the principle of sacred heredity. The ruling imam, who 
by that very fact allegedly possessed a divine and unique 
authority, had the right to appoint his successor and im­
part to him his mysterious spiritual power. The. wagiyyab, 
or bequest, was the term used for this peculiar transaction. 
Like the word shi1ah, the wasiyyah became a technical ex­
pression. We learn that Ibrahim b. Muhammad appointed his 
brother al-Saffah as a wagi, or executor, and bequeathed 
to him his hereditary rights. Prof. Browne suggests that 
this idea and the special relationship of the imam and
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his executor are of Jewish origin. Moses and his brother 
Aaron were the classical examples of this concept, and the 
Prophet Muhammad and his cousin lAli were supposedly its 
Muslim prototypes. (33) We have reason to think that a 
combination of shiti and Persian ideas can be put forward 
as an explanation of this devefpmsnt in Islam. The origin 
of this belief can be traced to a much earTer peifbd than 
VAbbasid times. Al-Shahrastani in his account of al-Ghulab, 
or shi1I extremists, says that VAbd Allah b. Saba once add­
ressed uAli b. Abu Talib as anta anta, literally meaning 
1,you are you,’* or in other words, "you are God." LAli im­
mediately refuted the assertion and ordered the banishment 
of Ibn Saba from Medina.(34) But the profound enthusiast 
did not desist and went on with his activities setting up a 
conspiracy in favour of lAli. With the passing of time the 
shivah movement widened rather than diminished in scope.
It was observed further- that heretic teachings had a greater 
chance of acceptance in the areas which were far distant 
from the orthodox Muslim centres. But nowhere in Islam was 
there a more intensive concentration of shilis than in al- 
^Iraq and the provinces surrounding it. This, incidentally 
is the case up to the present time.(35) Therefore, there 
must have been another factor peculiar to that province to 
account for the phenomenon. We are inclined to believe 
that the explanation may be found in the pre-Islamic Persian 
traditions. It is probable that the reverence of kings was
so great that it amounted to deification. When the '•Abb'a- 
sids established a government and a court after the Sassanid 
fashion, the people must have revived the custom of earlier 
times. When the imam became caliph his alleged divine ill­
umination did not weaken or suffer, but rather increased.
The Rawandiyyah, a faction of the G-hulah, flocked to the re-
1sidence of the caliph to pay him homage. These extremists 
declared their caliphs to be gods.(36) But their exaggerated 
sentiments could not be accepted with safety by any res­
ponsible ruler. Al-Mansur, whose palace was once visited by 
these men, was shrewd enough to realise the danger of allow­
ing such views to pass unchallenged. He rejected their be­
liefs and punished them for their profanity. (3)
Although the LAbbasids were not foolish enough to de­
clare that they were gods, they nevertheless went far be­
yond their station when they attributed a measure of divinity 
to their own persons, thus setting themselves on a plane 
higher than the rest of the Muslims. This unparalleled 
attitude of superiority was expressed in three ways: (a) con­
stitutional irresponsibility, (b) assertions in public im­
plying unique spiritual powers, and (c) disregard for the 
will of the people. Upon these three contentions the lAbba- 
sid theocracy was established.
(a) In their autocracy and consequent legal irres­
ponsibility before their subjects, the rulers of Baghdad
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were not different from their Damascan predecessors. Al­
though the machinery of State was bigger and more intri­
cate than before, no legal competence was invested in the 
officials. Even the prerogatives of the wazir were exer­
cised as a personal concession from the caliph; in other 
words, the principal secretaries of State had no constit­
utional standing; what power they possessed v/as conferred 
upon them by their masters as a personal favour. But “if
at any moment the Caliph lost patience with the Wazir, he
6would relive him of his office if not his head.5' (38) The 
might of the magnificent Barmakls vanished overnight by 
one wrathful blow from Harun and nobody dared to interfere 
or raise a voice in protest. As Prof. Browne says, “the 
office of the Wazir for all the power and dignity which 
it carried with it, was a perilous one.1* Abu Salamah, 
the first minister in Islam, was put to death by order of 
al-Saffah, and Abu ’1-Jahm, the successor of Abu Salamah 
was poisoned by the same caliph. Peeling the venom of his 
sovereign, the first minister dragged himself out of the 
caliph* s presence. “Where are you going?*’ asked al- 
Saffah, “to where you are sending mel“ replied the bro­
ken man. Abu Muslim, the architect of lAbbasid victory 
was also murdered by al-Mansur .(39) It would be wise, 
therefore, not to dwell too much on the similarities bet­
ween a wazir of that period, and a prime minister in 
modern times. There seems reason to accept the view
lb
that the wizarah of the **Abbas ids was a revival of a Per­
sian institution.(40) On the other hand, the present minis­
terial system in independent Muslim States is largely based 
on the western notion of legal and constitutional respon­
sibility before the nation and its representatives.
(b) In their public speeches and statements the VAbba- 
sid caliphs left sufficient evidence to indict them not only 
as theocrats, but as heretics in the eyes of the pious Mus­
lims. The speeches referred to have oftep. been quoted as 
examples of the fine oratory and literary ability of the 
rulers concerned, and this lends greater force to the charge. 
Had the writers been seeking to incriminate theCcaliphs by 
quoting their words, the possibility of forgery in the re­
cords would have arisen.
In a sermon delivered at Mecca during the season of 
pilgrimage al-Mansur said: u0h People’, verily I am the
power of God on earth. I lead you with His approval, guid­
ance, and support. I am the custodian of His property, and 
I do with it what I like, certain that I act according to 
His will and desire; for Allah made me a lock. If He
wished, he would cause me to open (my hands) and be gene­
rous to you and decide your fortunes; and if He pleased,
He would close my hands on His wealth. Intercede, therefore, 
with Allah and His Prophet that I may be directed to the 
right path and act mercifully and charitably towards you. (41) 
Evidence of caliphal divine mandate can also be
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deduced from some State documents of al-Rashid. This 
caliph who lived luxuriously and indulged in wine and other 
carnal pleasures in a lax manner, thought and acted as if 
he were himself a god. The concluding part of his document 
of succession in which al-Amin was appointed heir to the 
throne, contained hedides an irrevocable command binding 
on all Muslims, a potent threat of excommunication to all 
dissentients. }|0h community of Muslims I You have to ful­
fil the articles contained in this letter by the Commander 
of the Faithful...and if you change any part of this will, 
or in any manner revoke its terms...you will lose the pro­
tection of Allah, His Prophet, and all the Faithful and Mus­
lims, and everything you may possess now or for fifty years 
to come, will be given away to the poor...and every re­
bel must walk in penitence to the House of God in Mecca 
fifty times in pilgrimage, and Allah shall insist on the 
fulfilment of this condition and no alternative can be ac­
cepted. .. and every slave you own or may acquire in the 
course of fifty years from now will be free., and every 
wife you have will be irrevocably divorced.;t (42) The 
astounding assertions contained in this document by Harun, 
were reaffirmed in similar orders to his sons, and the pos­
sibility that his action had been taken in haste or with­
out serious meditation must, therefore, be excluded. But 
the people do not seem to have conceded such right to the 
caliph; for in spite of all his threats, the will of Harun
was totally revoked a short time after his death. Bat the 
point vve seek to establish is that any ruler who claims for 
himself such authority over men’s lives and fortunes is ex­
ceeding all conceivable limits. He is in fact setting him­
self on a plane higher than that ordinarily accorded to mor­
tals; or else he could not venture to exercise such an un­
warrantable mandate on behalf of God.
By order of Harun the document was hung on the walls 
of the Kalbah for all to read, and copies of it were cir­
culated through the whole dominion with specific instructions 
to provincial governors to spread its contents as far afield 
as possible. The circular stated: ’’By order of the Com­
mander of the Faithful, a copy of the agreement reached bet­
ween his two sons Muhammad and ^Abd Allah is attached here­
with... Read it to all the Muslims in your area and explain 
its contents to them,... and register it in your diwan, and 
write to the Commander of the Faithful of the reaction it 
causes. (Written by IsmalIl b. Sabih on Saturday 23rd. 
Muharram 186 A.H.)” (43)
The same theocratic despotism was exercised by 
al-Ma’mun who followed closely the method of his pre­
decessors. He went a step further by asserting that the 
caliphate was not only an office, but a unique quality 
that certain people only do possess. (44) The implication 
was that the will of his subjects had no validity or
meaning becaue he was installed in his office by God whether 
they liked it or not.
Another indication of ^Abbasid theocracy may be in­
ferred from the manner of address to the caliphs. These 
included some complimentary expressions which were so highly 
exaggerated that they amounted to blasphemy. Since these 
undeserved compliments had often been made during the first 
century of that caliphate, and since we have no records of 
Official disapproval of these profane assertions, we may 
be justified in concluding that the caliphs encouraged and 
fostered such ideas among their subjec-ts. The following 
are a few revealing examples of the exaggerated eulogies.
"Thanks be to Allah who made the caliph an heir to 
His inspiration, and a trustee of His Book among His ser­
vants,... for verily Allah has chosen the Commander of the 
faithful for his caliphate, and created him to rule the 
peoples and nations by His command and His justice.1'
"Thanks be to Allah who supported the Commander 
of the Faithful since his appointment as His successor in 
earth, and trustee oter His creatures."
"Thanks be to Allah who conferred upon the Commander 
of the Faithful the inheritance of His apostleship, and 
transferred to him the reins of His succession.”
"Thanks be to Allah who singled out the Commander of 
the Faithful with His inheritance and directed him to His 
caliphate.” (45)
(c) The will of the people expressed in the haivab> 
reached a very low ebb under the ^Abbasids. It was, of course, 
meaningless to make such grandiose claims about the divinity 
of the caliphs and at the same time appeal to the people for 
confirmation. Nevertheless, a shadow of the bai^ah was 
maintained. Men acted only as negative agents because the
caliph used to nominate his successor and confirm his app-
aointment by spiritul bequest and the only part played by the 
Muslims in the transaction was to acknowledge the accomplish­
ed fact. Occasionally a caliph would appoint two successors, 
but the practice proved very disappointing as it created 
severe conflict between the interested parties. Be that 
as it may, the traditions of theocracy were quite strict 
under this regime. The ruler received -or thought he did- 
his prerogatives from God. He acted in His name and was 
consequently responsible to Him. The will of God was ex­
pressed in the actions of the caliph who thus concluded 
that his will muvst be treated as an expression of divine 
will. This, incidentally, was more than the Prophetfs 
claims for himself and his office.
The tAbbasid caliphs took the obedience of the people 
for granted, because in their opinion men had no rights or 
privileges but those bestowed upon them by their rulers.
This, then, accounts for the theoretical origin of the 
divine prerogatives of the caliphs; it also explains the 
bases of the uncommon disciplinary sanctions declared
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against any possible witholders of allegiance; in fact 
both notions were closely inter-related. In the circular 
of Harun to his governors the threatened damnation of dis­
sentients was the natural result of the alleged uniq^ re­
lationship "between God and caliph. The preaf.mble to the docu­
ment under consideration lends force to this view. ’’Allah 
is the Patron of the Commander of the Faithful and his heirs. 
He is the protector of His caliph, and his guide in what 
he does or leaves undone. He is the "bestower on the caliph 
of victory in east and west...” (46)
ELEMENTS OP POLITICAL THOUGHT.
Settled conditions of life and comparative pro­
sperity together with caliphal patronage of scholars jus­
tified the assumption that the first century of the ^AbbA- 
sids was a memorable one. Independent studies were en­
couraged, and the learned and talented men of the age were 
welcomed in court circles. Munificent rewards were given 
in appreciation of valuable contributions in the realm of 
knowledge. Accounts of the generosity of caliphs, are gi­
ven in most literary works. These, however, are not our 
immediate concern, and we shall, therefore, dwell only on 
the aspects most relevant to our subject. Jurisprudence and 
translations of foreign works into Arabic were among the 
prominent features of mental life under the LAbbasids.
The influence of the faqihs was most marked not 
only on their students and immediate associates, hut on
the Muslim world as a whole. Eminent teachers like Abu 
Hanifah and Ibn Hanbal in Baghdad, and Malik b. Anas in 
Medina attracted to their circles students from near and 
distant parts of the Empire. The respect and sympathy 
shown to these doctors were clear indications of high 
understanding and admiration. That these jurists were 
principally guided by their impeccable conscience and un­
biased love of truth can be confirmed from the moral cou­
rage exhibited in their teachings which at times were in 
diametrical opposition to the views of the caliphs. Im­
prisonment and flogging were inflicted upon Malik, Abu 
Hanifah, and Ibn Hanbal -three out of the four founders of 
Sunni schools of thought. Ibn Khallikan says that Abu 
Hanifah died in prison.(47) But like all men of mental in­
tegrity and resolution the faqihs held tenaciously to what 
they considered to be right. The points of difference 
between jurists and caliphs were not extraneous or ir­
relevantly pedantic, but really fundamental. Malik, for 
instance, received his chastisement for asserting that the 
oath of allegiance to the ^Abbasids was not legally bind­
ing. That amounted to sedition which at the time was a 
very serious charge against anyone; but Malik took his 
stand deliberately and with his eyes open. Ibn Hanbal 
denounced the MuHazilite doctrines, and dissented from 
al-Ma’mun’s theory of the creation of the Qur’an, and was 
on that account scourged and flogged by order of the caliph.
According to Ibn Khallikan, 800,000 men and 60,000 women 
attended Ibn Hanbal’s funeral.(48) If that is so, then it 
was an eloquent expression of sympathy and support to the 
reverend doctor, and a silent demonstration against his per 
secutor. It is quite possible that the moral excellence
and unwavering conviction shown under trial by the cele-
F onbrated imams made a/ deep an impression^the public mind
as did their profundity.
The active movement of translation into Arabic from 
Greek, Persian, Sanskrit, Syriac, Hebrew, Latin and Coptic 
sources, resulted in the enrichment of the language and 
paved the way for Muslim scholars to proceed on their 
own initiative in the new tracks. Muslim and non-Muslim 
intellectuals engaged in translation, but the latter were 
more numerous and in this respect it seems that no dis­
crimination was made between men becaiise of religious di- 
ferences. In philosophy, the Greek masters of political 
thought exerted a decided weight on later Muslim philo­
sophers; it was only natural that a certain time should be 
spent in the understanding and adequate recognition of a 
branch of knowledge for which the Muslims, and the Arabs 
in particular, had no special aptitude.
In his thesis on ’’Islam and the Principles of
Government,” the modern Egyptian jurist lAli lAbd al-Raziq,
♦
asserts categorically that: ”we do not know of a single
author or translator of politics in Islam, neither are we
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aware of any researches in systems of government or fu- 
damentals of State.” He maintains further that, ”the Mus­
lims have neglected the study of Plato’s Republic and 
Aristotle’s Politics.”(49) We venture to suggest that this 
part of the celebrated treatise needs to be reconsidered; 
for the truth is that, not only were the R^ublic and the 
Politics translated into Arabic during the first century 
of the ''Abbasids, and made a profound impression of some 
men of distinction, but that all the major political works 
of Plato and Aristotle available at the time had been ren­
dered into Arabic. At a later date these books and others 
of similar interest were expounded by no less an authority 
than al-Farabi. Ibn Rushd and al-Kindi, besides their 
commentaries on these political classics, added original 
contributions of their own.
Ibn al-Hadim (325-400 /936-1009), the author of al- 
Pihrist, or Index, says that Hunain b. Ishaq (194-260 /809- 
873) translated kitab al-siyasab (politics) and kitab al- 
nawamis (laws) by Plato.(50) We are also told that the 
Philosopher of the Arabs al-Kindi -born about the middle 
of the ninth century A.D.- worked under al-Ma'mun and al- 
MuHasim as a translator and editor of Greek philosophical 
manuscripts. ”His major thesis was on politics,” says the 
author of al-Pihrist. (51)
•Ibn ’1-Qifti (568-646/1172-1248), gives a similar 
account and adds some details on the political translations
and compositions by Arabic authors. (52)
Ibn Abu 'Usaibi^ah (600-663/1203-1270), says: "some
a
philosophical compositions ̂ -re concerned with morals, others 
with politics; those on politics deal with the State, or 
siyasa& al-mudun, and with economics, or siyasah al-manzil.
In his reference to Plato, Ibn Abu Usaibi^ah says: "among
his twelve philosophical books, one is on political philo­
sophy and another on law." (53)
"Al-Farabi," says UsaibiLah, "has two excellent books, 
one on politics and the other on morals,., and he also 
edited the Compendium of Politics by Aristotle and the Laws 
by Plato." (54) Another source gives the information that 
al-Farabi included politics among the five principal scien­
ces. (55)
"The philosophy of Ibn Rushd (Averroes) is based on 
that of Plato as is shown by the formerfs commentary on the 
Republic," says Farah Antun, a modern biographer of Ibn 
Rushd . Antun also says that the Politics of Aristotle 
was rendered into Arabic by Ibn Rushd . (56)
The conclusion cannot be escaped, therefore, that 
the study of political philosophy was open before Muslim 
thinkers. They availed themselves of the opportunity, but 
it seems that their efforts in that direction were not 
fully appreciated, and the interest aroused in the subject 
was not large enough to create a general impression in the 
public mind. It is highly doubtful whether the caliphs
deliberately discouraged their subjects from the study of 
politics. It is evident that the faqlhs who preferred to 
suffer persecution rather than give up or change their views 
on jurisprudence could easily have done the same in the 
sphere of political thought had they accurately assessed 
its far reaching impact on the life of the individual and 
the State. There seems reason to hold that the Muslims 
voluntarily concentrated on jurisprudence and derived from 
it their notions on social and political life. Good life 
in the State was based on the rules of the shari uah, and 
good morals were those prescribed in the Qur’an and Tra­
dition. Reason played its part in shaping the thoughts 
of Muslims, but when a choice had to be made between wis­
dom and religious dogma, the latter was invariably followed .
This, then, is our view of the development of poli­
tical thought and practice in Islam. From the Hiirah to 
the end of the first century of the VAbbasid caliphate, no 
Muslim thinker deservedly reached fame through eminence in 
political philosophy. In the practice of government and 
administration there certainly were many renowned and able 
men. But these were individual cases, and had their num­
ber been greater, or had their methods been steadily and 
consistently observed and improved, a fine tradition of 
good government might have been established, and the Muslim 
Empire might not have dwindled so quickly. The believers 
were too quick and ready to surrender their inherent rights
of self-government. The caliphs who "benefited from that 
weakness exploited their advantage to the full. On the 
whole, insatiable Inst for piwer, individually or dynastically 
was the motivating force behind the rule of the Umayyad and 
^Abbasid caliphs. Had the promising start shown after the 
death of the Prophet been faithfully kept up, the political 
heritage of Islam might have been something higher than it 
actually was. But that unfortunately was not the case; for 
every addition to the power of the ruler meant an equal sub­
traction from the collective authority and will of the nation 
in other words, a weakening of the essential antidote to 
unchecked autocracy.
If asked to summarise in one sentence the gist of the 
views expressed in this thesis, we would say that we have 
discussed various aspects of despotism.
CH. VIII 
N O T E S
In this short historical introduction only factual 
data have been included, and controversial arguments 
purposely avoided. Cf. Khald. H.iii:128 ff., Athir 
v :152 ff, Tab.Ill,i:23ff., Mas .M ii:143 ff., Fakhrl 
201 ff., YaLqiibi ii:404 ff., Muir C. 4.32 ff. , LHA 254 
LHP 1:251 ff., Lane-Poole 12, Zambaur 4, El i:14 f., 
Hitti HA 288.
Our survey ends with the reign of al-Wathiq. For 
exact dates and fuller information concerning lin­
eage see Zambaur op.cit. p.4.
Tab. III,i:23. I failed to find this tradition 
in Bukhari .
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550
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40. The Persian origin of the word wazir is stated in 
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Additional note 1; .
FALLACIES IN LINEAGE.
According to Yauqubi the Prophet is reputed to have 
said: "do not "boast of your lineage, hut of your (gpod)
work." (Yalqubi ii:123). Ihn i Sa^d,II,i:131, gives evidence 
of the Prophet’s disapproval of appeal to glorious ancestors 
as a means of attaining distinction undeservedly. In the 
event of such appeal, however, Muhammad favoured adherence 
to the paternal line. Since the Prophet left no male heirs, 
the children of his daughters should have followed the family 
tree of their fathers. Qur.xxxiii:40 "Muhammad is not the 
father of any of your men... ^  ^  ^  **
may have heen intended for that purpose.
It seems however, that the architects or makers of 
lineage, were quite inconsistent in their method; for they 
selected the route that yielded the greatest honour and 
.ignored the humble side of descent. The paternal and maternal 
sides were thus confused. For instance, al-Amin, and al- 
Ma’mun were half brothers. The mother of the first was said 
to have been Arab, and the latter’s was Persian. Al-Amin 
was on that account considered Arab. But Haruh, the father 
of both men, was himself a son of a Persian woman called 
Khayzuran.(Hitti HA.304) How then could al-Amin justify 
his Arab descent? Now Zudaydah, who conferred the honour of 
Arab origin on her son al-Amin was not fully entitled to do 
so: for she was a descendant of al-Mansur, himself a son of
a Berber slave woman. No lineage, should be admitted without 
careful scrutiny.
Additional note S.
THE PRESENT STRENGTH OP THE SHlVdl.
Of the twenty two million shi MLs forming 9% of the 
Muslim population of the world, the greatest concentration 
is still in the traditional shili localities, that is. Persia 
and al-LIraq. The rest are scattered in small pockets in 
Asia and Africa. The official religion of Persia, whose 
population is about sixteen million, is the Ithna EAshariyyah 
or believers in twelve hereditary imams. The proportion 
of sunnis to shi1 is in al-^Iraq, -whose population exceeds 
three million, is 5:8. The southern provinces of al-^Iraq
are predominantly shi Li . There seems reason to think that
the bond between the'shiLis in al-lIraq and their neighbour­
ing co-religionists is very strong. In Karbala and al-Najaf 
which are considered sacred in s h i opinion, Persian is 
nearly a second language besides being the tongue of culture. 
It is interesting to observe that the chief priest of Persia 
usually resides in al-Najaf and sometimes in Karbala, even 
though both localities are outside the political frontiers 
of Persia.
A visit to al-Najaf and Karbala is called a pilgrimage,
and is considered to be as meritorious as that to Mecca.
The shi Lis hardly ever follow or share the traditional 
religious festivities of the sunnis. Religious intolerance 
between both sects is -unhappily apparent up to the present 
time. Cf. The Statesman’s Year Book, ed.M.Epstein, London, 
1946, pp.1014, 1154, 1302.
Additional note 3.
A COMMENT ON THE WORD WAZIR.
Although the Qur’an contains two references (xx:29, 
xxv:35) to wazir, neither, the word nor its lAbba.sid app­
lication conform to the special notion depicted in the Book.
In both Qur’anic references, Aaron was the person intended.
But he was not totally subservient to his brother, because 
both Moses and Aaron were appointed by Allah and each had 
a specific' duty to perform. They were complementary to one 
another. This is shown from the verses (Qur.xx:43 ff.)”G-o 
both to Pharaoh,..and speak to him..and say: surely we are 
two apostles of your Lord..” the dual form of address is used, 
and had one of them been solely responsible the singular would 
have been applied. The Jewish interpretation of this fra­
ternal relationship is not dissimilar to the Qur’anic one.
(Cf. JE. i:2) Prof. Browne (LHP. i:255) maintains that the 
word wazir is identical with Pahlawri vi-chir meaning coun­
sellor. It is interesting to notice that Dr. Jeffery (op. 
cit.287) includes the word among the foreign ones in the 
Qur’an. His conclusion seemingly reached independently of 
Browrn* s. (LHP, is not mentioned in Jeffery’s work.)
The fact that al-Saffah was the first to appoint a . 
wazir in Islam can be taken as an indication of the Persian 
origin of the institution. Ibn Khaldun P. xvii:5, confirms 
the Persian origin of the office of wazir, and Jurji Zaidan 
agrees. (Cf. Zaidan, op.cit. i:112).
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or initials. The definite article al is generally omitted at 
the "beginning of words, and is denoted "by a hyphen. Only im­
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A
Aaron ,^333, 307
- 'Abbas, 26,53,91,286 ,297 ,298
'Abbasids, 12,216,255,278 ,285 , 
rise against Umayyads ,286; "be­
ginning of reign,194; propa­
ganda of,301; Persian cha­
racter of govt.309: theocracy,' 
312; 319, translation under, 
323
'Abd al-Hamid al-Katih ,278
lAbd Allah? the Prophet1s 
father,48
kbd Allah al-Q/usarl, 305
tA"bd Allah "b.lAmr b.al-VAs, 
270, 271
lAbd Allah h . al-Zubair,
267
LAbd Allah "b.Saha, a shi’i 
extremist, 313
'Abd Allah h. 'Umar, 267
lAbd al-Malik b.Marwan, 256, 
269,272,275,279,281
lAbd al-Rahman b.Abu Bakr,
267,291
lAbd al-Rahman III (al-Nasir) 
256
are included in this index.
vAbd al-Rahman h. LAuf,228, 
229, choses a caliph, 230
LA"bd al-Rahman "b. Khalid 
b. al-Walld, 270
'Abd al-Rahman b„ Mu'awiyah, 
255,256
lAbd al-Raziq,VAlI, 96,323




206,207, freedom of opinion 
under,225; 226 4329,231, or­
ders invasion of Syria, 232; 
239,243,245,297
Abu Daud al-Tayalisi,219
Abu Hanifah, the Juri st,136,
322
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Abu *1-Haitham b. al-Tayyihan. 
a confederate at al-lAqabah,5
Abu Luflu!ah, the murderer 
of lUmar, 291
Abu Ivlusa al-Ash Lari . 260,253
Abu Muslim al-Khurasani,301, 
306,315
■ ID
Abu Salamah, the first mini­
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Abu Sufyan, 180,189,215,259, 
261
Abu Talib, 19,20,44
AbtL Talib al-Makki, 139
Abu 'Ubaidah, the Comoanion, 
182,189,230
Abyssinia, emigrants to, 31
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'•All b. Abu Talib, litigates 
with a Jew,108; 147,148, as 
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166 ,168 ,182,186,189,191,-a 
caliph,214; 215,226,229,259, 
260, difficulties of govt.262; 
263, favours relatives,267; 
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273; 275, treachery of Kufans 
to,285; 294,199
'•All, Chiragh, 94
'All, Maulvi Muhammad, 36, 
an estimate of Hudaybiyyah,
77; 119, view on consul­
tation, 162; 241,244, On 
Jihad,246; 248
klids, 278,283,285
Allah, symbol of Muslim deity, 
conception of in Arabia before 
Islam, 48
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lAmir b. Rabf al- lAmri, 230 
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-'Aqqad, lAbbas, 212,291,308
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Arbuthnot, P.P., 2,14
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Bismarck, Otto von, 64 
Bosworth Smith, R., 92 
Bowman, I., 288 
Brierly, J.L., 116,137 
Brockelmann? C., 9,14,174
Browne, E.G., 4,309,312,315
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Budge , E .A,W. , 219
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Carlyle, T., 32,44
Carr, E.H., 120,137
Carra De Vaux, 92
Caspean, 253
Cavour, Count, 64 
Charlamagne, 307 
Christ, see Jesus




Communism, -opposed to Islam,129
Cordova, 256
D
dahiyah, or evil genius,268,300
Damascus, 252,277,281
dar-al-harb, or domain of 
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-Darimi, lAbd Allah, 46
Darr b. al-Khattab, the 
poet,91
De Gayangos,P., 287 
Democracy,-!: Islam, 130 
De Perceval, A.P.O., 45
De Santillana, D., 136,197,
199
Dhimmis or non-Muslim script- 
uraries, 148




Egypt, M. & Roman governor 
of- 80; Arab conquest of,238; 
255*270,274,304
Essad Bey, 48,57, 75
Eve, the first woman, 120
P.
-Farabi, M.b.M. (Abu Na§r) , 
324,325
-Path, battle of, 33
Fatimah, daughter of M.,301





Gentilis, Italian Jurist, 116 
Germany, 64
-Ghulah, or shi'i extremists,313 
Gibb, H.A.R., 14,138 
-Gindi, 'Abd al-Hallm, 139• m 7




Greek, the State, 104
Griff ini, E. ,. 172




-Hadith, or Tradition, reasons 
for contradictions in, 5; 6,158, 
fabrications in,166; -on pro­
phesy, 167; -on Jihad,245; 247, 
273, concerning 'Abbasids,298
Hafsah, wife of M., 169





Hami dul1ah, M ., opinion on M . 
letters to rulers,78; -0n'
Muslim international law,118
349
Hamilton, C. , 46
Hamzah b. LAbd al-Muttalib,298
Hanzalah b. al-Rabi1, a per­
manent secretary of M., 156
-HarittL b. Hisham, (a poet),
52
Harper, S.N., 138 
Harun, see- Rashid
-Hasan b. '•All, 264, 267, 
273,300
-Hasan b. Nimr, 155
-Hasani, lAbd al-Razzag,290
Hatib b. Baltatah, envoy of 
M. to al-Muqawgas, 97
Heraclius, 78
"Hiirah, or emigration of M. 






Hisham b. *-Abd al-Malik,253, 
255,257,272,281,284-
Hitler, A. , 64
Hitti, P.K., 48,236
-Hudaibiyyah, truce of, 73, 
74,75,79
Hughes, T.P., 46 
Hulago, 297
-Humaymah,301,302 
Hunain, battle of,33 
-Hurmuz an, 157
Husain, Taha, 43,58,184,286,308 
I
Ibn al-Abras, (a poet) 49
Ibn 1Arabl, or Ibn al-lArabi, 
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Ibn '•Uqbah, the Companion, 155
Ibrahim b.al-Walid 1,257
Idris b. cAbd Allah,304,305
ijma1* , or consensus of 
opinion,130
Ikhwan tl-safal,94
Imam, alleged qualities of, 
125; -as leader of prayers, 
178; 191, -sovereign,198;
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Jenkiz Khan ,297 
Jerusalem, 264
Jesus,22,136
Jews, in Mecca,38; 39,56,57,58 
M ’s compact with-,66; 67, li­
quidation of-,80
-Jihad, armed form of in Me­
dina,71; 231,240,241,242,244







KaLb b. Malik, (a poet), 91 
KaLb b. Sayyar, 286 
Kalb, tribe of, 32 
Khadduri, M., 6,14,233,235 




Khalid b. Sa'-Id b. al~lAs,155
-Khandaq, battle of,33
Kharijites, or anarchists of 
Islam,188,191,192
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Labia (a poet),49 
Lammens, H., 271,273,289 
Le Beaume, Jules, 45 
Le Pur, 144 
Levi Della Vida,211 




Maladh b, Jabal al-Ansari, 
a Medinese imam of Mecca,217 
Macdonald, D.B., 48
Mac Iver, R.. M . , 138 
-Mahdl,297
majlis al-shura, or con­
sultative assembly,162,163
-Makhzumi, Jamal '1-Din M., 
43, 217
Malik b. Anas, 322
Malik b. Ruwairah, a tribal 





Mariah, a wife of the Prophet,97
Marwan b. al-Hakam, 256
Marwan II (al-IIimar) ,254, 857, 
278,286,294,murder of,295; 301
Masse, H., 219
-MasKidi, (historian) ,215 ,272
-Mausil, 294
-MawardI, 8,235,849,269
Mecca, 18,21,25, power of M.in, 
59; policy of M. in,61; bom­
bardment of, 254
Medina, 20,23, policy of M. in 
61; subjects Mecca,179; bom­
bardment of 254
Mez, A., 146,172





Mu t*awiyah b . Abu Sufyah ,155,191, 
209,227,252,256,258,259,260,261, 
263,265,267,272,277,281,892
MuLawiyah II b. Yazid,256,
275
-Mughirah b. Shuvbah, as 
secretary of M.,155; shift­




Muhammad, the Prophet (Ma- 
home t,M ohammad,& Mohamme d) 
govt, of-11,151; religious 
mission of 17,18; early sup­
porters of 41, a servant of 
God,43, effect of emigration, 
44; -Iclsn loyalty, 51; -1 
pact of -LAgabah,52; -a po­
litical genius,58; -crea­
tion of State,63; poly­
gamy of,69; -& Arab unity,
70; -success at rludaibiyyah, 
74; -contact with rulers,79; 
magnanimity of-,82; dele­
gations to-,83; farewell ser­
mon of-88; death of-,90; 
prohibits non-Muslims from 
Ka '•b ah, 9 7; -as 1 awmaker ,123; 
political interest 155; - & 
shura,160; - fulfilled his 
mission,164; silence on suc­
cess ion, 171; - influence on 
Ar ab s,240
Muhammad lAli, of Egypt,507 
Muhammad b. lAlI b. lAbd 
Aliah b. 1Abbas, 298
Muhammad b. Zayn al-MAbidin, 
301
-Muhtadi, 297
Muir, Sir W. ,78 ,211,242,244- 
-Muktafi, 297
mulk, or kingship, 193,252, 
257,273,274
-Muntasir, 297





















-MuHasim, 14, 297 
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174
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rising in, 310
Plato M ’274,324
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-Qur’an, verses quoted , 
see notes
Quraish, 32,58, members of 
as permanent rulers, 168
R
Rabilah b. Umayyah, 89 
-Radi, 287 
-Rashid, 298
-Rashid, Harun, 295,297,317, 
321, 331
-Rawandis, party of extreme 
shi^is, 329
-Riddah, or apostasy, 192, 
war of-,195
Ripperger, 48
Roberts, R., 45, 46
Robson, J., 174
Ross, E.D. , 92
Ru’ay b. Abu Fatimah, Re­
gistrar of booty under M.,155
S
Sabine, G.H., 132, 139
Sa^d b. Muladh, a chief of 
Aus, 55
Sa^d b. Abu Waqqas, the Com­
panion, 229
Sald b. tUbadah, a candidate 
for caliphate, 181
-Saffah, 294, 295,297,301, 
305, 315, 328, 332
SalId b. Mjthman, 270
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Schacht, J., 136 
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-Shahrastani, 192,217, 313
-Sharivah, 7,9, a definition 
of-,107j tenacity of-,109;. 
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Sherwani, H.K., 14,44, 136,163
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Stanton, H.U.W., 95
Stewart, G. , 273
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T
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scribe of revelations,155;
3-88, 189, -caliph,212; 213,’ 
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relatives,267; 291
uUthman b. Talhah, a guardian 
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V
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Von Kremer, 280,290
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Yahya b. Adam, 148,172
Yahya , the Imam and king of 
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